

Zukunftsethik: Discussing Responsibility for Environmental Sustainability in the Future with Hans Jonas as a Philosopher and Theologian

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Abstract: The threat of environmental destruction is a threat to human existence. The old ethics, which only consider the short-term effects of human actions on the environment, are inadequate to address this threat. Then Hans Jonas designed Zukunftsethik (future ethics), which focuses on the effects of human actions now on the future existence of humanity. This study is a philosophical investigation (metaempirical) that begins with a field survey (empirical) in Indonesia about Hans Jonas's future ethics. This study aims to explore the basis for why Hans Jonas burdens humans with full responsibility for the future existence of humanity and how we think about "divine providence" in the future. Is future ethics about to make a paradigm shift from theodicea to anthropodicea? To answer this question, the study discusses Zukunftsethik philosophically-theologically, involving several contemporary philosophers, such as W. Benjamin, E. Bloch, J. Derrida, E. Levinas, J. De Caputo, R. Spaemann, A. Naess, and C. Gilligan, and several contemporary theologians, such as E. Jüngel, J. Moltmann, and J.B. Metz. From this study, it was found that Zukunftsethik relies on Hans Jonas' theology of God, who is no longer "omnipotent." The loss of the attribute of "omnipotence" in God is based on what he called "factum brutum" in the Auschwitz incident in Germany, where God was silent. Therefore, the threat to human life in the future due to environmental damage can only be overcome through human efforts. Therefore, humans bear full responsibility for the integrity of the environment, ensuring the sustainability of human life in the future.

Keywords: Responsibility, Technology, Fear Heuristics, Existence, Human, God, Solidarity, Suffering, Utopia, Eschatology

1. INTRODUCTION

Zukunftsethik is a new ethic about the responsibility of humans now towards the salvation of humanity in the future. Because it focuses on the consequences of future actions, it is also called the "Ethics of Future Responsibility." This theory was put forward by Hans Jonas (1903-1993),

a German-American philosopher and theologian of Jewish descent who experienced the atrocities of Nazi Hitler and lost his mother in Auschwitz. Jonas' response to the event was expressed in his theological work, "Der Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz. Eine jüdische Stimme" (Jonas, 1978). With this work, Jonas is known as a Jewish theologian who revises the view of God's omnipotence. So, Zukunftsethik was born in the context of Jonas answering the theological question that God is no longer omnipotent. If God is no longer omnipotent, then humans cannot help but become "omnipotent" in order to organize and maintain their lives, both now and in the future (Jonas, 1984).

Several questions can be asked of Jonas: Why should we be responsible for humans who "do not exist"? Can we take responsibility for an unlimited period into the future, considering the fact of human contingency? Doesn't that mean humans accept a very heavy responsibility, which is akin to that of God as the creator and organizer of the world?

The novelty of this study lies in its ability to answer this question. In our literature study of German and English literature on Hans Jonas, we found that researchers have not explored the basis for why Hans Jonas designed a future ethics that burdens humans completely. Here, we can mention famous studies in German and English-speaking areas about Hans Jonas, such as First and Kettner (Kettner, 1990), who made a critical observation of Hans Jonas' responsibility purely from the perspective of ethical philosophy but did not seek the basis for why the responsibility was burdened solely on humans. Second, Gethmann-Siefert (Gethmann-Siefert, 1993) also conducted an in-depth philosophical study of Zukunftsethik, highlighting the legacy of Western metaphysics that underlies Hans Jonas' thinking but did not explicitly discuss the theological basis of Zukunftsethik. Third, Böhler (Böhler, 2009) conducted a comprehensive study of Zukunftsethik, discussing its actuality at the global level and contrasting it with what is called "Diskursethik" in the Contemporary German tradition. This study also does not explore the basis of why Hans Jonas burdens humans with future responsibilities. Fifth, similar to Böhler Gordon's study in the English-speaking region, the Zukunfthsethik study focuses on the global aspect of this new ethic. Although this study critiques Hans Jonas's thoughts, it does not examine the reasons why Hans Jonas assigns God's responsibility to the world and humans. This study aims to explore the answer: Why was Zukunftsethik born, and is this ethic adequate to truly give hope for the future of humanity? Several philosophers and theologians will be involved in this discussion, as it concerns a significant responsibility on the shoulders of

humans, given that the ontological nature of humans remains as *ens continens* (Gethmann-Siefert, 1993). No matter how great the human ability to be responsible is, it is still limited, and therefore, it is always possible to fail. Due to the contingency of human existence, humans are constantly threatened by various evils: *malum physicum*, such as natural disasters; *malum morale*, which refers to the evil caused by industrialists' exploitation of nature; and *malum structurale*, which refers to the evil caused by unfair socio-political and socio-economic structures. These three evils are based on the fundamental principle of *malum metaphysicum*, namely the inherent limitations of human nature as *ens continens* (Jakob, 1996). Realizing that humans are in various circles of *malum*, this study aims to discuss Jonas' thoughts as a philosopher and theologian in their entirety, but with a starting point in the masterpiece on the ethics of future responsibility (Jonas, 1984). In other words, Jonas' ethics of the future cannot be fully understood if they are only focused on that philosophical work because the birth of this ethical masterpiece cannot be separated from Jonas' theological thoughts on God, who is not omnipotent so that there is a shift in responsibility for the future of humans to humans completely. Therefore, this discussion is divided into four parts: first, describing the background of the emergence of ethics of future responsibility, key theses, and new insights. Concerning the new insights of future ethics as an environmental ethics, it will be discussed here with (1) Levinas' ethics of responsibility, Robert Spaemann and J. De Caputo (Caputo, 1988; Spaemann, 1991); (2) Arne Naess's environmental ethics (ecocentrism) (Arne, 1973), J. Rawls's environmental ethics (Rawls, 1971); and (3) Carol Gilligan's feminist ethics; second, discussing the ethics of the future with three contemporary Jewish philosophers (Gilligan, 1993), to find its depth and compatibility with each other; third, discussing the ethics of the future with three contemporary German theologians to see its depth and compatibility with theology from other traditions (Christian); fourth, finally noting down important points from the results of the discussion so that they can be discussed further by experts (philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, environment).

2. RESEARCH METHODS

This study is a research on environmental philosophy (Environmental Ethics). Therefore, we use the philosophical research method. However, philosophy, as a scientific discipline, recognizes that its object of study remains related to empirical reality as studied by the social sciences, which

have the status of "the first level sciences." In contrast, philosophy is "the second level science." Because this study is a study of philosophical thinking on "Future-oriented Environmental Responsibility Ethics," which is based on empirical reality, namely the threat of environmental damage by the use of technology, this study obtains data in two ways: First, by meeting empirical facts (in Indonesia) through a field survey which is then used as the basis or reason for us to conduct a study on Hans Jonas' Zukunftsethik thinking; second, analyzing philosophical-theological thinking on Zukunftsethik. The research flow can be described as follows:

3. RESEARCH FLOW




Figure 1: Research Flow

Therefore, this study uses a multilevel method (Figure 1). At the first level, field research (an empirical study) was conducted to gather empirical facts about the knowledge of philosophy and theology lecturers and philosophy and theology students at 10 universities in Indonesia. From the survey, we found a disconcerting fact: not only do philosophy and theology students not know Hans Jonas as a philosopher and theologian, but also philosophy and theology lecturers, as shown in the table below. Additionally, the majority of philosophy and theology lecturers and students are unfamiliar with the three environmental ethics that are currently widely discussed, namely anthropocentrism, ecocentrism, and biocentrism, as shown in Table 1 below. Likewise, the relationship between Hans Jonas' thoughts and several contemporary French and American philosophers, as well as contemporary German theologians, who intersect

with the philosophical-theological ideas of Zukunftsethik, is shown in Table 2 below:

Table 1: Survey No. 1		
No	Pertanyaan	Jawaban (ya %, tidak %)
1	Do you agree with the ethical approach of Norwegian Philosopher Arne Naess's "Biocentrism"?	Agree 90.2%, Disagree 9.8%
2	Do you agree with the ethical approach of German-American Philosopher Hans Jonas's "Ecocentrism"?	Agree 97.6%, Disagree 2.4%
3	Of the following three environmental ethics (Anthropocentrism, Biocentrism, and Ecocentrism), which one do you support more?	Ecocentrism 70.7%, Biocentrism 14.6%, Anthropocentrism 14.6%

Description: This survey was conducted through Google Forms from May 23 to June 02, 2025. This survey was conducted at several universities as many as 11 institutions in Indonesia, including Faculty of Philosophy, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan University, Bandung, Faculty of Philosophy, Widya Mandira Catholic University, Kupang, Ledalero Institute of Philosophy and Creative Technology, Widaya Sasana Malang College of Philosophy and Theology, St. Peter's Pastoral College, Atambua Diocese, Driyarkara College of Philosophy, Jakarta, UKSW Salatiga Faculty of Theology, UKDW Yogyakarta Faculty of Theology, Sanata Dharma Yogyakarta Faculty of Theology, University of Indonesia Jakarta Philosophy Study Program, IPI Malang Pastoral College, Kupang Archdiocese Pastoral College. Survey participants included lecturers of philosophy and theology, as well as students of philosophy and theology. The total number of respondents was 41 people from 11 institutions.

Table 2(a): Survey No. 2		
No	Pertanyaan	Jawaban (Ya %, Tidak %)
1	Do you know Hans Jonas in the sense of being familiar with his thoughts on the environment?	Ya 63,4%, Tidak 36,6%
2	Have you ever considered or conducted a comparative study of Hans Jonas's biocentrism ethics with Arne Naess's ecocentrism?	Ya 14,6%, Tidak 85,4%
3	Have you ever thought about or done a comparative study of Hans Jonas' "non-reciprocal" ethics with Emmanuel Levinas' "asymmetrical" ethics?	Ya 14,6%, Tidak 85,4%

Table 2(b): Survey No. 2

No	Pertanyaan	Jawaban (Ya %, Tidak %)
4	Have you ever considered or conducted a comparative study of Hans Jonas' "non-reciprocal" ethics with John D. Caputo's ethics, known as "ethics without principles"?	Ya 7,3%, Tidak 92,7%
5	Have you ever considered or conducted a comparative study of Hans Jonas' Responsibility ethics with Robert Spaemann's (German) Responsibility ethics?	Ya 12,2%, Tidak 87,8%,
6	Did you know that Hans Jonas was a theologian and philosopher?	Ya 61%, Tidak 39%
7	Do you know the philosophers Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, and J. Derrida?	Ya 48,8%, Tidak 51,2%
8	Do you know any contemporary American female philosophers who talk about the ethics of care?	Ya 26,8%, Tidak 73,2%
9	Do you agree if Hans Jonas' views on future responsibility are compared or discussed with the three philosophers mentioned above (Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, and J. Derrida)?	Ya 82,5%, Tidak 17,5%
10	Do you agree that Hans Jonas' views on future hope can be compared or discussed with those of the three German theologians mentioned above (Eberhard Jüngel, Jürgen Moltmann, and J.B. Metz)?	Ya 82,9%, Tidak 17,1%

Description: This survey was conducted through Google Forms from May 23 to June 02, 2025. This survey was conducted at several universities as many as 11 institutions in Indonesia, including Faculty of Philosophy, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan University, Bandung, Faculty of Philosophy, Widya Mandira Catholic University, Kupang, Ledalero Institute of Philosophy and Creative Technology, Widaya Sasana Malang College of Philosophy and Theology, St. Peter's Pastoral College, Atambua Diocese, Driyarkara College of Philosophy, Jakarta, UKSW Salatiga Faculty of Theology, UKDW Yogyakarta Faculty of Theology, Sanata Dharma Yogyakarta Faculty of Theology, University of Indonesia Jakarta Philosophy Study Program, IPI Malang Pastoral College, Kupang Archdiocese Pastoral College. Survey participants included lecturers of philosophy and theology, as well as

students of philosophy and theology. The total number of respondents was 41 people from 11 institutions.

The above facts encourage us as researchers to conduct a serious and in-depth philosophical study of Zukunftsethik for the Indonesian context, using several basic methodological elements of philosophical studies, as follows: (1) Interpretation: Delving into the philosophical-theological works of Hans Jonas to capture the meaning and nuances intended by him in a unique way, especially the theological work entitled "Der Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz" and the philosophical work entitled "Das Prinzip Verantwortung." (2) Internal coherence: In order to provide an accurate interpretation of Zukunftsethik, all concepts and aspects of the two works are viewed according to their harmony with each other. With that, it can be determined why Hans Jonas philosophized about future ethics and, at the same time, found the core of his environmental ethics thinking. In other words, a logical and systematic arrangement of philosophical and theological thinking about Zukunftsethik can be found. (3) Holistic: In order to properly understand the philosophical-theological concepts of Hans Jonas' ethics of future responsibility, all of these concepts are seen in the context of his overall vision of man, nature (the world) and God. (4) Historical continuity: The common thread in the development of Hans Jonas' philosophical-theological thought is seen both concerning the historical environment, namely philosophical thought (E. Levinas, J. de Caputo, R. Spaemann, E. Bloch, J. Derrida, A. Naess, C. Gilligan) and theological thought (E. Jüngel, J. Moltmann, and J. B. Metz) which were contemporaries of Hans Jonas and the influences he experienced in real-existential terms such as the "factum brutum" in Auschwitz.

4. JONAS' ZUKUNFTSETHIK

4.1 God's Omnipotence and Human Responsibility

In his theological work, Jonas discusses the issue of God's omnipotence and the *factum brutum* experienced by the Jews at Auschwitz. How can we explain God's omnipotence in the face of the immense suffering in His creation? The suffering of the Jews in Auschwitz cannot be explained by reasons such as: God's punishment for unfaithfulness to the covenant, or as testimony of God's suffering servants, or sacrifices for the sanctification of God's name. These three theological reasons, for Jonas, are inadequate because they mean we only question human responsibility and take God's omnipotence for granted.

According to Kabbala, "whoever is unwilling to despise God's understanding... so as not to let it pass unnoticed, must think about it anew and must seek new answers to Job's questions" (Jonas, 1978).

To answer this fundamental question, Jonas explores the Jewish tradition of *Kabbala*, namely, a speculative mystical school founded by Isaak Luria (1534-1572). According to the Kabbala conception outlined in the teachings of *Zimzum* (contraction or concentration), the world will only have a place in the universe if God can reduce Himself (Jonas, 1978). For there to be room for creation, God must first withdraw Himself. God needed to make himself smaller to make room for creation; otherwise, there could be nothing outside God. After all, God is everything. However, this contraction will have an end when creation loses its identity and enters divinity, where God becomes everything in everything. With this belief, Jonas asks: Why did God not immediately become everything in everything when He saw the terrible suffering of His people? Why doesn't God close the space of creation again and include all of creation within Himself? (Jonas, 1978). Jonas answered the question by radicalizing the *Kabbala* teaching that to give space to creation, God Himself had to give everything of Himself. God does not hold anything back from Himself. God gave all of Himself to the world. Therefore, Allah does not have the power or possibility to determine anything after creation. Everything was handed over to the world, so He became powerless. Thus, in situations of human suffering, God cannot do anything, not because He does not want to, but because He cannot. Because God is powerless, humans must prove to be free creatures responsible for whatever happens in the world (Jonas, 1978). Moreover, this idea of human responsibility has also been given an anthropological basis in his work, "*Zwischen Nichts und Ewigkeit. Zur Lehre vom Menschen*" (Jonas, 1963). He wrote: "In our uncertain hands we hold the future of the divine adventure in the world, and we must not betray Him, even if we wish to betray ourselves" (Jonas, 1963).

4.2 Key theses of Zukunftsethik

Jonas establishes future ethics because all traditional ethics are inadequate to face the threat of destruction of life in the future posed by modern technology (Jonas, 1984), with several theses or key ideas, such as: "Humans must continue to exist" (Jonas, 1984). Humans must continue to live, not only in the present but also in the infinite future. This is the essence of Jonas's book. Because humans are natural creatures or part of nature, the environment in which they live must also remain intact, so "nature must remain intact" (Jonas, 1984). In this case, we must paradigm

shift from anthropocentrism to biocentrism. Biocentrism ethics teaches that humans have value in themselves and nature, and therefore nature has the right not to be harmed (Böhler, 1994, 2009). By understanding biocentrism, we can only build a "new imperative" (Jonas, 1984), namely, a responsibility for human life in the future. Jonas shows that Kant's categorical imperative is inadequate (Kettner, 1990). With the new imperative of responsibility, we ensure that we do not threaten the conditions for the future sustainability of human life. However, Jonas is aware of the problem faced by the imperative of responsibility for the future of humanity, namely that we have no experience of the future consequences of our current actions. It is experience that helps us obey ethical demands. Jonas answered this with "*Heuristik der Furcht*" (Jonas, 1984). However, a future catastrophe is not yet a certainty. Opposing this rebuttal, Jonas stated the priority of dire predictions (*malum*) over good predictions (*bonum*). If human existence is at stake, we have no right to ask whether disaster is certain or only possible, so "the priority of bad predictions" (Jonas, 1984). Then it closes with the final thesis, which is a unity with the first thesis, which says that natural life is an affirmation of life and "rejection of nothingness" (Jonas, 1984).

4.3 New Insights of Zukunftsethik

Several key theses above clearly show a new insight into contemporary ecological ethics, such as: first, Jonas links the notion of responsibility to time, especially future time; second, ethics is linked to metaphysics after metaphysics (Caputo, 1988; Levinas, 1979; Spaemann, 1990) was removed from contemporary philosophical discourse; third, Jonas' ethics can also be seen from the perspective of modern environmental ethics (Arne, 1973; Rawls, 1971) and feminist ethics (Gilligan, 1993).

4.3.1 Responsibility and the Future

The novelty of Jonas' responsibility lies in the period of that responsibility, that is, it is no longer like traditional ethics, which only concerns actions that concern the immediate time environment. The main problem is that if the consequences of our actions, which we do not know for sure, will happen in the future, how can we be held responsible? However, that is precisely where the novelty of Jonas' ethics lies (Jonas, 1963): First, the imperative of responsibility is immanent because its object is *a priori*, so it is no longer based on an experience (Jonas, 1984). Meanwhile, the advantage of traditional ethics is that its consequences are

a direct experience, so it is a posteriori. Second, the imperative of responsibility is no longer the responsibility of an individual subject but a collective subject, so this future responsibility is the responsibility of all humans today towards humanity in the future (Jonas, 1984). Third, the imperative of responsibility has an asymmetrical relationship with consequences, "nicht-reziprokes Verhältnis" (non-reciprocal relationship), says Jonas (Jonas, 1984), so it is different from the nature of traditional responsibility, which is symmetrical or reciprocal (Jonas, 1992). With this, the ethics of future responsibility can be compared with Levinas' ethics of responsibility, "responsibility for the other". In my responsibility, I am obsessed "for" (*pour*) the other (Levinas, 1979). Every responsibility contains within itself an obsession towards the other. In the presence of the other, I am asked to come out of myself, out of the tendency of an always selfish attitude. There are two radical ideas of Levinas' ethics: the epiphany of the face and substitution. My encounter with the other is an encounter that is also an imperative of responsibility for me for the good and safety of that person. The ethics of the face, which means an attitude for the other in its most radical form, is substitution. That means that responsibility for the other means responsibility that makes the situation and condition of the other part of my situation and condition too. Levinas' ethics of responsibility have the exact nature as Jonas' ethics of future responsibility, namely non-reciprocity. Levinas does not use the category, like Martin Buber, of the I-Thou relation, but rather I-Other. I-Thou is, close, and limited. At the same time, the I-Other relation is a category that refers to all others, the general, the universal, the close, but at the same time, the far (Levinas, 1981). Therefore, the epiphany of the face is not just a matter of the empirical fact that I meet someone at a time in a place but also concerns my encounter with others wherever and whenever. So, the epiphany of the face is a representation of the universality of humanity. Jonas's future responsibility ethics can also be compared with the "responsibility without principles" understanding of John de Caputo (Caputo, 2003). For Caputo, ethics that prioritize principles and norms are considered "unethical" because by assuming principles as a benchmark in all ethical decisions and responsibilities, humans tend to fall into authoritarian power with rigid knowledge. According to him, we can be very responsible when we respond to all the demands of the conditions and situations. The situation requires us to act not based on principles as the main guideline, but on an "irreducible situation". The problem gives us direction on how to step or act.

4.3.2 Environmental Ethics: Ecocentrism and Biocentrism

Jonas' environmental ethics, which bears the name biocentrism, can also be compared to Naess' ecocentrism. According to Arne Naess, a Norwegian ecological philosopher, the environmental crisis results from modern humans' perspective on nature (Naess, 1989), where nature is seen as an object to be controlled and humans as the rulers and owners of nature. This perspective is anthropocentric because it places humans at the center. To overcome the environmental crisis, according to Naess, we must abandon anthropocentrism, which views humans as the rulers and owners of nature, and replace it with ecocentrism, which views the natural environment as the center, not humans. With this new paradigm, which is no longer "humans facing nature" but "humans are part of nature", Naess talks about deep ecology, which is opposed to what he calls "shallow ecology," which still adheres to anthropocentrism (Arne, 1973). Shallow ecology is aware of environmental sustainability, but preserving nature is only so that it continues to benefit humans. So, it is not free from the attitude of viewing nature as an object of human control for the benefit of humans. It still only recognizes the instrumental value of nature. While deep ecology abandons the instrumentalist view, because nature has intrinsic value, it has its own value, which does not depend on external factors (whether it is economically advantageous). Naess's ecocentrism is parallel to Jonas's biocentrism. According to Jonas, modern technology does help humans, but it also threatens human survival, especially in the future. This condition demands a change like human moral obligations (Gethmann-Siefert, 1993). The concept of responsibility needs to be given a new dimension. He expresses this in Kant's categorical formula but with a new dimension, namely the future dimension: "Act in such a way that the consequences of your actions are by the true perpetuity of human life" (Ulfig, 1997). Jonas replaces Kant's categorical imperative with the imperative of responsibility. Jonas' biocentrism focuses on responsibility, not responsibility as taught by traditional ethics, namely concerning the consequences of actions in the present, but responsibility to the future. Therefore, the basis of this ethics is no longer Kant's categorical imperative but the imperative of future responsibility, namely, an imperative to act so that human life in its integrity in the future is not threatened. When we currently exploit nature using technology for our interests, we must imagine the horror of the destruction of nature in the future. So, the primary obligation of future ethics is to imagine in fantasy as strongly as possible the destruction of the environment in the future (Jonas, 1976). Thus, Jonas and Naess's attitudes towards traditional ecological ethics are

similar, namely that they both reject anthropocentrism but differ in their aspects and dimensions. Naess's environmental ethics focus on human attitudes towards nature, namely not "humans facing nature" but "humans are creatures of nature." Hence, protecting nature is the same as safeguarding humans themselves. Naess rejects traditional ethics that treat nature as facing humans; therefore, humans seem to have an ethical imperative to control nature. Jonas accepts that, but Jonas focuses more on the issue of how human responsibility is currently to ensure the continuity of human life in the future. His focus is on human survival. Jonas's responsibility is entirely new in the world of ethics, because he not only pays attention to the consequences of human actions in the immediate time environment, namely at present (Rolston, 2015), but especially the consequences in the future. Responsibility is not enough to only pay attention to the consequences of actions at the time, but must stretch into the future (Jonas, 1994b). Ethics with a far-sighted reference because it realizes that the threat of current technology will have a sustainable impact on human survival in the future. Although there are differences in dimensions and aspects, Naess and Jonas have the same fundamental option, namely, both emphasizing that the environment (ecocentrism) and life (biocentrism) are values in themselves that must be guaranteed (Berdinesen, 2017). This obligation has a special binding force regarding humans because only humans have consciousness, so only humans must be responsible. Traditional ethics (anthropocentrism) are inadequate because it is as if humans are given the task of becoming rulers and owners of nature. According to this biocentric ethics, the most critical ethical obligation is to guarantee future human life (Jonas, 1994a). Jonas's fundamentalist option aligns with Rawls's understanding of justice in his masterpiece, *A Theory of Justice*. According to Rawls, we are not acting reasonably if we pass on a damaged and nearly extinct environment to the generations after us. For this reason, he formulated "the just saving principle" (Rawls, 1971). This means we must save by using natural resources, so there is still enough left for future generations. Humans in the future have the same rights as we do now. Rawls formulated the principle of justice for all humans now and in the future, because non-renewable natural resources, such as coal, gas, metals, and oil, will not be enjoyed by future humans. If we extract all the oil now, thanks to the power of technology, we cannot save it for all generations after us simultaneously.

4.3.3 Ethics of Responsibility and Feminist Ethics

The new insight of Jonas' biocentrism can be very clearly a contribution

to environmental sustainability when compared or aligned with feminist ethics, especially Carol Gilligan's "Care Ethics" as contained in her work *"In a Different Voice"* (Gilligan, 1993). Gilligan rejects the measure of moral progress as studied by her colleague, Lawrence Kohlberg, as the achievement of moral attitudes oriented to abstract principles of justice. Gilligan criticizes Kohlberg's description of the stages of moral maturity, especially the last stage (sixth) called the stage of moral autonomy, where ethical decisions are based on rational considerations, because it reflects typical male prejudices. Against that, Gilligan develops an ethics that prioritizes not rationality but intuition and empathy, where intuition is typical of women. With that, Gilligan built a new understanding of ethics: ethical attitudes are based on intuition and empathy, not rationality. If Enlightenment ethics, since Kant, emphasize rationality as the basis for consideration of ethics of justice, then Gilligan counters that with ethics of care that rely on intuition, empathy, kindness, or compassion. All of that is typical of women.

So, the debate map is clear: Ethics of justice (typical of men), while ethics of care (typical of women). Suppose ethics of justice emphasizes rights, obligations, reciprocity, and autonomy. In that case, ethics of care ignores all those categories; the main thing for her is how to care for others, empathy, and concrete relationships between people. So, ethics of care is contextual and situational and not abstract and universal like ethics of justice. This is an excellent contribution in this era. Although this ethic originated from a woman's resistance to the dominance of male ethics, such as the ethics of justice, the caring attitude is no longer limited to women. Still, it is an ethic demanded by this era. Because the traditional emphasis on justice is only possible and reasonable if the attitude of caring is assumed, it becomes clear that morality does not start from reason but from the heart, namely, the attitude of caring. Without the attitude of caring, the ethics of justice that emphasize rights and reciprocity lose their meaning. As Gilligan taught, Jonas's environmental or future ethics can be categorized as an ethics of care. Jonas teaches that humans must pay attention to humans in the future, even though they "do not exist," therefore, there is no attitude whatsoever towards humans now. Jonas's ethics of care align with Gilligan's ethics of care, which does not pay attention to whether they will have *obligations* to humans in the future. Still, humans now must guarantee their lives later. In other words, humans in the future will have rights but will not have *obligations*. With this, the ethics of the future go beyond the ethics of justice that demand reciprocal actions. So, according to Levinas's understanding, Jonas's ethics of the future are

ethics of care, namely, asymmetrical ethics. The uniqueness of the ethics of care is that if the ethics of justice is "non-partisan," then the ethics of justice is only truly ethical when it "takes sides" - taking sides with whom? Taking sides with those who are concrete, who are currently suffering. This is where the difference between Jonas and Gilligan lies. Jonas cares about humans who are not concrete but imagined humans, namely, humans in the future. However, this is precisely where Jonas' understanding of care is superior to Gilligan's, namely that even though they have not seen and experienced directly and concretely the suffering of humans due to environmental damage, humans today are obliged to take a caring attitude, to save them.

4.3.4 The Relationship between Ethics and Metaphysics

Jonas revived the relationship between ethics and metaphysics when metaphysics was declared dead. Rorty, for example, rejected metaphysics, which always seeks the basis of reality to be used as a foundation for objective truth. According to Marcuse, metaphysics ensures that objective truth does not exist, because all that exists are truths (Marcuse, 1975). Therefore, if we want to be ethical, meaning, to do good morally, metaphysics is not needed. Being moral, the clearest example is solidarity with others. According to Marcuse, to be in solidarity with others (Marcuse, 1975), for example, for our discussion, to be in solidarity with humans in the future, there is no need for a metaphysical view, but instead we are sensitive to the suffering of others. It is not metaphysics that makes us sensitive, but literature, ethnographic reports, and journalists about the suffering of others. However, Jonas knows that we are in a moral emergency (Notstandsethik) and that metaphysics is necessary (Jonas, 1994b). Jonas is not concerned with the specific question of how much we should consider the well-being of future human beings, or how much present human beings should sacrifice to prevent the loss of future human well-being; Jonas wants a binding ethic based on the ontological imperative: "There must be human beings". He says that if we want to answer the question: "Must there be human beings?", then we are facing Leibniz's metaphysical question: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (Jonas, 1984). Jonas is in line with Robert Spaemann's ethics of responsibility, which holds that responsibility is essentially metaphysical (Spaemann, 1991). He redirects ethics to metaphysics, that is, to substantial issues, from the empty preoccupation with methodical issues that characterize most of this century's ethics. Every day, we pass by many people, as if we do not see them. However, as soon as we meet someone,

even someone we do not know, recognizing their reality immediately creates a calling: When we witness a gross injustice, we are angry, and when faced with someone in distress, we feel compassion. We immediately realize that we, before any consideration of duty, help him, even though it often happens that we cannot fulfill this duty. Here we come to the origin of morality, namely reality itself, which is always directly an ethical calling for us (Spaemann, 1990). According to Jonas, saving others in the future, even though they "do not exist," does not require theoretical considerations such as: is there certainty about the destruction of nature in the future, and whether they existed then. All theoretical considerations can be ignored, because Jonas only thinks about our current responsibility so that humanity in the future will continue to exist (Jonas, 1994b). Here, there is indeed a difference between Jonas and Spaemann. For Spaemann, our responsibility is not abstract but concrete and personal. Therefore, we are responsible for the consequences of our actions, which we can directly predict. We are not responsible for all the side effects of our actions, such as the long-term consequences. We are obliged to consider only *Zumutbarkeit*, namely whether the side effects of the action that will affect others are still within the limits of reasonableness (Spaemann, 1990). Thus, although Jonas and Spaemann base their ethics on metaphysics, they differ in viewing the consequences of actions in a time perspective: Jonas looks forward, while Spaemann only sees the immediate impact in the present (Spaemann, 1990). However, they both provide a fundamental ethical attitude that we as humans should show kindness to others and the salvation of humanity in the future. Kindness in the form of love does not require or even allow consideration of rights and obligations. Likewise, Jonas's efforts to save humanity in the future do not need theoretical concerns about the rights and obligations between us now, who provide salvation, and those who will be saved in the future (Jonas, 1984). Basing ethics on metaphysics can also be compared with Levinas, who made ethics so important in human life that metaphysics is no longer the *prima philosophia* but ethics (Levinas, 1981). He tries to show that humans in all their experiences and attitudes are driven by an ethical impulse, by a responsibility that can be called a pre-reflexive responsibility towards others. This responsibility is pre-reflexive because we act without considering who I am dealing with and why I am responsible for them. Still, as soon as I meet him, I am immediately burdened with a responsibility for him. Therefore, Levinas does not speak normatively. He does not say we must be responsible for others (Levinas, 1981), but he speaks phenomenologically. That is, he refers to a reality in our

consciousness. Levinas wants to open our eyes to a layer of reality in our consciousness that we generally do not notice. Levinas is the first philosopher to explicitly dig into the roots of moral facts previously only assumed by Kant, namely, the obligation to behave morally. He shows that the absolute obligation to behave well is an undeniable, intuitive evidence that I have always been directly aware of in every encounter with others (Levinas, 1981). This kind of moral phenomenological framework is why we align with Jonas. We must be responsible for the fate of humans in the future without having to hold any ethical principles. We are responsible for them in the future, not because they have done something good for us. We are accountable for their fate because they are humans. We must save their lives (Jonas, 1994a). In the framework of normative ethics, the most challenging thing to understand is that the humans who are the responsibility target actually "do not exist" (Jonas, 1976, 1994a). That is why Jonas's future ethics rests on the metaphysics that humans are in the framework of the natural life process (procreation), however in the future, there must be humans, but their existence, borrowing Aristotle's term, is still at the level of *ens in potentia* not yet as *ens in actu*. Meanwhile, normative ethics is always based on humans in *actu*, not humans who exist at the level of possibility (*in potentia*).

5. ZUKUNFTSETHIK OF JONAS AS A PHILOSOPHER

5.1 Jonas and Benjamin: Future and Past

Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) was a German philosopher of Jewish descent who experienced suffering under Nazi-Hitler's rule (Benjamin, 1977), especially the humanitarian barbarism at Auschwitz (Marcuse, 1975). Jonas reflects on the cruelty and discovers that the almighty God believed in by Jewish and Christian traditions has no power to stop human suffering. God is not omnipotent, and therefore, humans must rise to become guarantors and saviors for their lives. That is why Jonas talks about human responsibility towards fellow humans (Müller, 1988). Meanwhile, Benjamin, as a member of the Frankfurter Schule, reflected that Auschwitz's experience did not give up the nature of God's omnipotence but only developed cynicism and pessimism towards philosophical thought (Arens et al., 1991). The mind that is exalted and exalted by modern humans is barren and dull. The optimism of philosophical thought since the Enlightenment has become mythical and irrational (Schmidt, 1983). Because of this, the way they think about time is different, but it is not

about the nature of time, but the orientation of time. Benjamin is oriented to the past, to the modern experience of barbarism at Auschwitz. At the same time, Jonas sees the *factum brutum* event from the perspective of Kabbala theology, which shows clearly that the almighty God has no power to stop this barbarity. Therefore, he transfers total responsibility for human fate to the future, which rests only on human shoulders (Kaiser, 1972). Suppose Benjamin uses the *memory* of the past to discover the "messianic power of the past". In that case, Jonas uses the *fantasy* of the future to discover the "messianic power of the future" for humanity in the present. What is the same is the time in which they live, namely *the present*, as a starting point for orienting to the past and fantasizing about the future. Benjamin brings the past to the present to save the past, whereas Jonas brings the future to the present to save the future. According to Benjamin, we must destroy historicist time's empty and homogeneous system by connecting the past and present. The unity between the past and the present will produce what he calls *Dialektik im Stillstand* (dialectic in a state of standstill). By ending the continuity of empty and homogeneous time, the present becomes the present which has content and creates a new quality (Benjamin, 1977). This perspective can be compared to Jonas's about the future, which relies on the present, namely relying on human actions to stop the potential destruction of existence in the future. Both consider modernity the main space for saving the past (Benjamin) and the future (Jonas). Viewed in terms of content, for Benjamin, the past is an "unfinished" period, so it is a time that holds various hopes and demands that must be fulfilled in the present. For Jonas, the future is a time "that will be", with multiple hopes and needs that must be fulfilled in the present (Jonas, 1976).

5.2 Jonas and Bloch: Existential and Utopian Future

Ernst Bloch (1885-1977) was a German philosopher of Jewish descent. He is a Marxist, communist, atheist, but seriously reads religions, especially the Christian Bible, Old and New Testaments (Bloch & Moltmann, 1967). Fleeing Nazi-Hitler atrocities, Bloch eventually moved to the United States and then returned to Germany. His masterpiece is *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (The Principle of Hope) (Bloch, 1959). He is involved in discussions about the ethics of Jonas' future, because he, too, with his understanding of hope, thinks about the future. Jonas initially read Bloch, especially about hope for the future, but did not follow Bloch's thinking about a utopian future. Jonas thinks of the future as an existential human hope (Jonas, 1984). Bloch's basic idea that can be discussed here with Jonas's future is that humans

have not yet come to be. Therefore, he has desires or hopes to make it happen. Bloch's main problem was how to realize this hope. In this connection, he quotes Ssanin: "Why would I allow myself to be hanged so that the workers of the 32nd century would not suffer from lack of food?" (Bloch & Moltmann, 1967). Bloch did not explicitly answer the question. However, with this question, he begins to dissect Christian eschatological hope. According to him, the Kingdom of God announced by the prophets of Israel and Jesus was not meant purely spiritually, so only for life in the afterlife, but also as a real time in this world, where the oppressed and those who suffer injustice receive their liberation and rights. Bloch's criticism of the nature of Christian hope in the future is by Jonas' view of the future that desire for a new future is truly a human hope and therefore can be realized in the real world if humans get rid of God as "*ens perfectissimum*" (Bloch & Moltmann, 1967; Jonas, 1978). According to Bloch, in line with Jonas, by removing the most perfect reality from human life, humans can only become truly human and therefore realize their hopes in the real world. Jonas is also actually on Bloch's path. However, instead of taking back the power or essence that was thrown to Allah (heaven), he abandons the understanding of Almighty Allah so that humans become powerful and can even be "omnipotent". With this "extraordinary" power, humans can plan their future without depending on God (Jonas, 1978).

5.3 Jonas and Derrida: The Future and Uncertainty

Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) was a French postmodernist of Jewish descent. We engage Derrida in discussing Jonas's future because of their views on the relationship between the future and uncertainty (Jacques & Alan, 1978). Derrida, with his deconstruction philosophy, talks about the future, but an uncertain future, and that uncertainty cannot be overcome (Jacques & Alan, 1978). Meanwhile, Jonas acknowledged the uncertainty but was confident he could solve it with his "*Heuristik der Furch*" method. He is aware of the epistemological problems of his *Zukunftsethik*, such as: We do not have definite knowledge about the consequences of our actions in the future; nor do we have specific knowledge about the interests, needs and living conditions of future generations so that we can include their welfare in our current ethical decisions (Jonas, 1984, 1994a). Likewise, the ontological problem is recognized by Jonas: Can a moral agent have obligations towards a person who "does not exist"; can humans in the future be holders of the rights we must guarantee in the present; How do we ensure future environmental destruction that requires us now to act to avoid it? (Jonas, 1994b, 1996). Derrida talks about the future in two

contexts: the context of apocalyptic theology and historical understanding. Both lead to the same conclusion, namely that the future is impossible or something uncertain. In connection with his apocalyptic theology, he talks about the religious meaning of life, which begins with self-struggle with radical uncertainty, unforeseen surprises that make faith waver. While the future is related to historical understanding, he criticizes Hegel's view of historical time, which differentiates between ideal and factual futures. For Derrida, ideal history cannot be separated from factual history. Any history that idealizes a common goal must acknowledge the factual dimensions that shape it. Every ideal envisioned by ideal history is also influenced by contingency factors (Caputo, 1988). In other words, perfect history is not neutral from "*differance*" (Gasché, 1994). Therefore, differences and changes will always be inherent in any historical ideal. The reality of difference and change makes the future always uncertain (Colebrook, 1998). However, like Levinas, Derrida recognizes that the call to an infinite future is always ethical. This ethical dimension is an inevitable part of any historical process. Every idea about history cannot be separated from ethical demands that hold us accountable to do justice and open ourselves to *the Other* (Levinas, 1979). It is at this point that Derrida's view of time can be compared with Jonas's *Zukunftsethik*, namely how we are responsible for humans who, even though they are "not present", we now have an ethical call to prepare decent and humane conditions for them. The difference is that Derrida believes in the uncertainty of the future based on his *deconstruction* philosophy. At the same time, Jonas acknowledges that uncertainty can be overcome with his "*Heuristik der Furcht*" philosophy (Jonas, 1984).

5.4 Summary

Jonas, Benjamin, Bloch, and Derrida are contemporary Jewish philosophers. They think about human time, but their orientations about time and the content of that time are different. The similarities and differences can be compared with Jonas' *Zukunftsethik*: *First*, Jonas and Benjamin. Both reflect the "messianic power of human time", but their orientations to time differ. Jonas is oriented to the future, while Benjamin is oriented to the past. Therefore, Jonas uses fantasy to think about the messianic power of the future, while Benjamin uses memory to think about the messianic power of the past. For Benjamin, the past is a time that holds various hopes and demands that must be fulfilled in the present. Meanwhile, for Jonas, the future is a time that holds various hopes and demands that must be fulfilled in the present. So, both think about the present as a space to save the past (Benjamin) and the future (Jonas). *Second*,

Jonas and Bloch. They think about the future, so they talk about human hope. The difference is that Jonas thinks about the future as an existential human hope, while Bloch thinks about a utopian future. Bloch talks about future hope as a critique of Christian eschatological hope. According to Bloch, Christian hope is true but not after death, namely, life in heaven and this world. That hope will be empty if not realized in this real world. At this point, there is a similarity with Jonas's future hope, because Jonas talks about the future as an existential future. However, the most important similarity between the two is that God's role can be removed in human life so that humans can become truly human, and with their human strength, they can realize their hopes in this world. *Third*, Jonas and Derrida. Both think about the future. Derrida, with his deconstruction philosophy, views the future as an uncertain future that cannot be overcome. However, Derrida agrees with Levinas that the call to the infinite future is ethical. Therefore, even though the future is uncertain for Derrida, humans still have a moral calling to face it. At this point, Derrida is in line with Jonas. Jonas acknowledges the uncertainty but can ensure the future with his "fear heuristic" method. Therefore, according to Jonas, humans are now obliged to take action to ensure that human life in the future continues.

6. ZUKUNFTSETHIK OF JONAS AS A THEOLOGIAN

6.1 Jonas and Jüngel: Suffering and Hope for the Future

Eberhard Jüngel (1934-2021) was a German Protestant theologian who responded to Jonas' theology about God and suffering (Jüngel, 2003), which leads to the conclusion that God is not omnipotent. Meanwhile, Jüngel, based on his Christian faith, rejects all talk about God that places God as the answer to human needs, like Jonas's theology. For Jüngel, theology should not become an anthropology, as Feuerbach once thought, where God only appears as an answer to specific human deficits (Jüngel, 2003). If our thinking pattern is like this, we will fall into the danger of making God merely fulfill human needs. Therefore, Jüngel argues starting from faith. Christian faith, according to Jüngel, stretches between *deus revelatus* and *deus absconditus* (Jüngel, 1978), so between the definiteness of God's self-revelation in the Gospel and the hidden face of God in the organization of the world. Here, Jüngel answers Jonas by modifying the omnipotence of God (Jüngel, 2003), which in Christian faith cannot be thought of without Jesus as the power of love (Jonas, 1978). Therefore, if Jonas uses the notion of God's *kenosis* (self-emptying) for God's entire

relationship with creation, namely that in creating God has given all of Himself without any remainder. Jüngel limits God's kenosis according to the biblical testimony, namely to the event of Jesus Christ. The love shown in the helplessness of the cross is omnipotent love, because love can endure everything (1 Cor 13:7). Consequently, God's self-limitation does not necessarily result in the loss of God's omnipotence, and this is different from Jonas, namely God loses His omnipotence (Jonas, 1978). Thus, for Jonas, the future is a hope pursued only by humans. For him, facing the future with "*malum methodicum*" (priority of *malum* over *bonum*) is to achieve hope, namely, creating decent and humane environmental conditions for humans in the future (Jonas, 1984) - meanwhile, Jüngel talks about the human future more as a believer's future, an eschatological one. However, Jüngel still provides space for the freedom and responsibility of believers themselves to try to free themselves from suffering. So, for Jüngel, God who suffers is still with humans. Therefore, the responsibility for the future is not only a human matter but also primarily the business and responsibility of God as the creator of the continuum.

6.2 Jonas and Moltmann: Anthropological and Theological Future

Jürgen Moltmann (1926-2024) was a German Reformed Church theologian who experienced the atrocities of Hitler and World War II just like Jonas (Moltmann, 1964). The framework of his thinking shows the strong philosophical influence of Ernst Bloch. If Bloch, as a philosopher, wrote philosophy, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, then Moltmann, as a theologian, wrote *Theologie der Hoffnung* (Moltmann, 1964). Moltmann is discussed alongside Jonas here because Jonas explored the idea of hope in Bloch. So, both received influence from Bloch, one a Protestant theologian and the other a Jewish theologian (Jonas, 1963; Jonas, 1978). Both have similarities in the sense that they both think about the hope of humanity's future. The difference lies in hope: Jonas, because God is no longer omnipotent, the future is purely a human matter, so it is an anthropological hope, while Moltmann talks about hope for the future being theological. Moltmann speaks of hope based on God, who promises a future for all those without hope. Only when one experiences suffering radically does one understand what hope means. Therefore, Moltmann understands the *theology of the cross* as the other side of the *theology of hope* (Moltmann, 1973). For him, suffering will appear as a scandal only in the light of hope, and conversely, hope can only be understood and experienced from the perspective of suffering. Moltmann and Jonas's discussion is interesting because both talk about hope that originates in Bloch. Both take Bloch's understanding of hope but

differ in the essence and nature of their hope. For Moltmann, as a theologian, suffering is a space for the birth of hope, and that hope is realized in the future, namely the eschatological era (Moltmann, 1964, 1986). Meanwhile, for Jonas, suffering in the form of the threat of the destruction of nature by technology gives rise to an attitude of human responsibility for the future of humanity. In this, responsibility arises, and hope for human safety in the future. Thus, Moltmann speaks of future human salvation as an eschatological hope, whereas Jonas speaks of future human salvation as an existential hope (Jonas, 1994a, 1996).

6.3 Jonas and Metz: Humanity and the Future

Johann Baptist Metz (1928-2019) was a German Catholic theologian who was drafted into the military by the German Nazi regime in 1944 and captured as a prisoner of the Second World War by the United States (Metz & Metz, 1984). Metz's most significant contribution was *Politische Theologie* (political theology). He took Benjamin's idea of *Erinnerung* (memory) to develop his political theology, which focused on dangerous memory (Metz, 1968). The common thread of the discussion between Metz and Jonas here is the idea of *memory* and *hope*, where, for Metz, memory is always a memory of suffering. Therefore, the opposite of memory here is not forgetting but *hope* (Metz, 1968). Jonas also talks about suffering, in the context of the *Kabbala* tradition, so he does not directly connect suffering with hope for a better future, but instead connects it with God, who is not omnipotent. Because God is powerless, humans must bear responsibility for creating hope for the future (Jonas, 1978). If Metz talks about solidarity that is not reciprocal, (Baptist, 1977), then Jonas is also in this line of thought, in the form of designing an ethic of future responsibility to ensure human existence in the future without demanding a response from them because they are "nothing" (Jonas, 1976). Then Metz said that solidarity is also *compassion*, namely, the ability to see and make room for the suffering of others. For Metz, *compassion* is a choice and contribution of the Scriptures to creating a global ethical program now and in the future (Metz & Metz, 1984). This ethics concerns the essence of humanity but is not the result of a consensus (Apel, 1973). Metz's view agrees with Jonas regarding saving those threatened with suffering (non-existence) due to the irresponsible actions of humans today. Therefore, Jonas's ethic of responsibility can also be categorized as a global ethic. It is an ethic implemented by all nations so that life on earth will continue to exist in the future (Apel, 1973). However, Jonas' "global ethics" is not the result of a *consensus* of the communicative

ratio of humans from all nations, but rather the result, as Metz said, of contemporary human *compassion*, namely the conscious ability and will of every human being to guarantee human life in the future (Burckhart & Gordon, 2014).

6.4 Summary

Jonas, Jüngel, Moltmann, and Metz are contemporary German theologians. Only Jüngel is of pure German blood, while the other three are of Jewish blood. As a theologian, Jonas can be compared with the other three theologians. The basis of comparison is about future hope, which is still related to *Zukunftsethik* (Future Ethics). *First*, Jonas and Jüngel. Both think about the future of God by starting from the understanding of *kenosis* (God's self-emptying). For Jonas, kenosis is total, giving humans space to struggle to achieve future hope. While for Jüngel, *kenosis* is limited to the event of Jesus Christ. Therefore, achieving the future is not only the responsibility of humans but also the responsibility of God. *Second*, Jonas and Moltmann. Both learned about hope from Bloch and started from the fact of suffering. For Moltmann, suffering is a space for the birth of hope, and that hope is realized in the future, namely, the eschatological period. For Jonas, human suffering gives birth to an attitude of human responsibility for the future of humanity. For Jonas, because God is no longer omnipotent, as proven in the massacre of humans by Hitler's army, God is silent, so the future is purely a human matter, and anthropological-existential hope. At the same time, Moltmann talks about hope for a theological-eschatological future. *Third*, Jonas and Metz. Both think about humanity and time. Jonas thinks about the future and hope, while Metz, following Benjamin, feels about the past and the suffering memory. For him, the opposite of memory is not forgetting but hope. At this point, he is in line with Jonas. Their fundamental option is the same, namely, to guarantee human existence in the future. Metz emphasizes solidarity (*compassion*), namely the ability to see and provide a place for the suffering of others. This aligns with Jonas, who thinks about actions to save those threatened with suffering in the future due to human actions today. Thus, both Jonas and Metz build a global ethic for humanity.

7. CONCLUSION

Based on the discussion above, we can finally note several important points:

First, Zukunftsethik Jonas cannot be separated from his theology. Jonas departs from the *factum brutum* of Nazi atrocities and the God that the Jews believe in is silent. Jonas has a choice: defending Almighty God or human freedom and responsibility. Jonas's choice is a human responsibility, so an ethic of future responsibility is born. However, this transfer of responsibility from God to humans does not mean that Jonas no longer believes in God. Jonas still believes in God, but God only has the attribute "all-good," not "all-powerful".

Second, by freeing God from the burden of responsibility for all events in the created world and transferring it completely to human shoulders, Jonas is shifting a theological and philosophical paradigm from *theodicea* to *anthropodicea*. If so, philosophers and theologians must prepare new arguments, no longer to defend God but to protect humans, remembering that responsibility for the future of humanity is placed entirely on humans. In contrast, human nature has not changed, namely remaining as *ens contingens*, and God remains as *ens necessarium*. From ontological facts like this, humans are threatened by failure to carry out this enormous responsibility. So, implementing this responsibility may lead to denying human responsibility for the crimes committed.

Third, Zukunftsethik is showing an ideology about *homo homini deus*. With the transfer of responsibility from God to humans to guarantee the life of humanity in the future, humans have taken over God's role in ensuring life on this earth. Of course, Jonas's *homo homini deus* is different from what Feuerbach's projection theory suggests. Jonas never said those words, but the substantial content of his views indicated it. If not *homo homini deus* then at least Jonas adheres to *homo homini socius*, so humans are friends of each other. This responsibility for the future is proof of human attitudes towards fellow humans as friends. If people in the present can live decently as humans, they must also make efforts so that people in the future can still live decently as humans.

Fourth, with *Zukunftsethik*, Jonas has entered the area of thinking not only about human actions *morally* (*actus humanus*) But also about the nature of human actions *historically*. However, is the theory historical or transhistorical? The answer is historical. However, Jonas's understanding of historicity is new because future humans "do not exist". However, if we rely on Aristotle's metaphysics regarding *ens in actu* and *ens in potentia*, Then Jonas is right. Because "nothing" for Aristotle has two senses: first, *in sensu stricto* (in the strict sense) as "nihil" (*ens in actu*); secondly, *in sensu lato* (in the broadest sense) as *ens in potentia* (existing at the level of possibility), and

Jonas takes the meaning of "not existing" *as ens in potentia*.

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