

The Collapse Of Contemporary Democratic States: Endemic States

Juan Carlos Quintero Calvache¹, Helver Javier Cadavid Ramírez², Jhon Alexis Rengifo Carpintero³

¹ Profesor titular de la Escuela Superior de Administración Pública, ESAP. Correo: juan.quinteroc@esap.edu.co; ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6771-1777>

² Profesor asociado de la Escuela Superior de Administración Pública, ESAP. Correo: helver.cadavid@esap.edu.co. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3272-0526>

³ Magister en Filosofía. Profesor catedrático de la Escuela Superior de Administración Pública. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7527-1241>

Abstract

This work problematizes the concepts of State, power, and democracy in the face of the multiple Illnesses of Contemporary Democratic States that have led them to collapse. The methodology is critical as a thorough study of three theoretical sources of contemporary political philosophy: a) the theories of justice; b) theories of power; and, c) decolonial theory, although dialogues and debates are totally insufficient. It is concluded that Contemporary Democratic States are collapsing due to multiple systemic diseases: indebtedness with international banks, loss of territorial autonomy, corruption of the three branches of power, excess bureaucratization, co-optation of the state and its territories. by drug trafficking, and the phenomenon of civil disobedience typical of an exacerbated liberal sensitivity. Democracy itself is assumed as a problem.

Keyword: State, Democracy, Biopolitics, Necropolitics, Anti-systemic endemic.

INTRODUCTION

The following paper problematizes the concepts of State, power and classical democracy produced from the history of some currents of philosophy from certain geographies of the West, in the face of the situation of Contemporary Democratic States that are collapsing due to multiple diseases. In this exercise of problematization, both the theories of justice of John Rawls (1997) and Jurgen Habermas (1999), in a joint text such as *Debate on Political Liberalism* (1998), are totally insufficient, because the social, political and cultural reality of Contemporary Democratic States have become increasingly complex. The definitions made from theories of power are also insufficient, such as that of Foucault in the *birth of Biopolitics*, in what would be the nodal concept of *reason of State* (1979) since although the author starts from a very assertive description of the State as a being made, constructing, as a complex reality (1979, p. 18) which cannot be understood in the singular, but, in the plural, could not leave the abstract, totalizing and homogenizing concept of the State as a political, economic and social reality described from the perspective of a history of thought of a central Europe; in this same sense, decolonial theory from authors such as Achille Mbembe (2022) with its approach to Necropolitics or the politics of death fails to describe the reality of contemporary democratic states, since it

presents state power as limited to the disappearance of a specific subject: racial, sexual, class, without taking into account the order of knowledge that epistemologically governs an era, with this, a determined historical period, as well as other powers, other forms of State and the multiple mechanisms of creation of emerging apolitical subjectivities; likewise, the proposals of Enrique Dussel (2023), and Walter Mignolo (2023), on the need to redefine politics, power and knowledge from the denied materialities, which end up instituting mechanisms of criminalization towards the European from a Latin American Oedipal complex, are insufficient. Theories that together have been based on false social and political hypotheses taken from Marx (2019), essentially not very historical, or, for the most part, fictitious, built from their own theoretical apparatuses or linear historical method (Gonzalez, 2018). Finally, the text *Democracia S.A.* by Sheldon Wollin (2008), will allow us to understand this exogenous phenomenon of corporatism in the face of state autonomy. In this sense, the problem to be addressed is: what is the real situation of contemporary democratic states? The method is critical in that it puts question marks on theories of justice, theories of power and decolonial theory in the face of sick contemporary democratic states.

The growing, dynamic, heterogeneous complexity of real contemporary democratic states, which even advance within the same territory at different *vital rates of development*, have torn to pieces the political theories mentioned above. Such states, within the context of the digital age, have been trapped by a series of diseases clearly observed by all societal members: academics, researchers, politicians and the civilian population in general. These diseases have attacked all the organs of the same social body: its real and imaginary institutions at the economic, political, social and cultural levels. This anti-systemic endemic, asymmetrical, on the one hand, and pro-systemic on the other, has fractured, on the one hand, real political *praxis*; on the other hand, the old definitions of the very concepts of State, power and democracy.

The multiple diseases are as follows. Firstly, the growth of state loans with international banks that has led nations to systematic debt since the colonial period (fifteenth century); secondly, the loss of territorial, economic and administrative autonomy in the face of global *infocorporations*; thirdly, the unethical and political phenomenon of the systemic corruption of the three branches of power; fourthly, the co-optation of the State itself and its territories by drug trafficking and Multi-Crime Gangs; fifthly, the excess of state bureaucratization that submerges nations in a sea of economic needs to maintain the functioning of the government apparatus; finally, the generalized increase in civil disobedience to institutional norms in the face of the submission in some cases out of fear, in others voluntary and complacent, of the civilian population itself to the exo-state powers.

The concepts of State, Power and democracy in the Western philosophical tradition

There are countless academic works on the concepts indicated here within the history of Western thought that began with Plato and have not yet concluded. Among these, a long tradition of *natural law* and *contractualism* stands out, known by all scholars of the subject, and which has been systematized by authors such as Norberto Bobbio (1989) who start from generalizations, abstractions and definitions of a universal nature on the concepts of: State, power, democracy, civil society and that are studied from theoretical approaches such as: political theory, political science, history of institutions, political marketing, among others.

From the traditional definition of the State as a natural association (Aristotle, 2000) to the definition of it as an artificial construction, either to limit the malignancy of the human being (Hobbes, 1980), or to corrupt the goodness of man (Rousseau, 1923), or to leave him to the arbitrariness of his freedom (Locke, 2006). In one case or another, until the current theories of justice trapped in a political psychologism (Rengifo, 2015), the State is defined in the

abstract as if it were a dead and solidified entity that can be thought and defined under a specific theoretical framework (Foucault, 1979). Although theorists tried to account for the historical conditions of their time, and managed to build a conceptual apparatus that will allow the slow development of political reflection as a *field*, they did so in the light, it is well known, of purely hypothetical exercises. Concepts such as *human nature*, *natural law*, *consensus*, *state*, *civil society*, and *government* ran through the academic world at the expense of the development of real governments, and of the life practices of specific populations. The developments of these ideas moved within the intellectual field in universities, scientific journals and publishing houses; while the political field saw the emergence of: wars, debt, prestige and socio-political transitions. While, in the world of life, populations aligned themselves with their rulers if and only if, they were heirs to a rich family tradition with whom they shared a certain bond of patriotism: belonging to the same territory and the same ethnicity; On the contrary, the insurrection had more to do with leaders who came from other territories and who clearly identified as not belonging to their own people.

In this sense, this paper will not present the traditions already mentioned, but rather the problems that these traditions did not observe.

It is to Aristotle that the West owes the conceptual definitions, the universal reasoning, the categorizations to structure thought. After "*the philosopher*" certain territories of the West could no longer separate themselves from this way of seeing themselves and seeing others : "*All art and all research, and, likewise, all action and free choice seem to tend to some good; for this reason it has been rightly stated that the good is that towards which all things tend*" (Aristotle, 1985, p. 63) Aristotle, better still, the Greek people taught the world the value of definition, conceptualization, abstraction and the need for universalization. While the Roman Empire managed to configure a world based on the foundations of political law, where clearly military political practice managed to dominate territories and populations, the imaginaries and life practices of Carthaginians, Celts, Visigoths, Vikings, Saxons, among others, did not succumb to such domination. Although the political-military apparatus was effective in fact for 500 years, the same situation did not occur in the field of social imaginaries. Only when Rome succumbed to the Jewish New Testament creation, typical of a desert people, did it manage to unify the emerging and rebellious forces of the other peripheries (Nietzsche, 1984).

While since the Greeks we have resorted to an exercise of abstraction in definitions, Christianity, from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries of the current era, is valued at the systematic articulation of gradually solidifying a certain form of universal and homogeneous thought (Saban 2016; Pujol, 2022; Piñeiro, 2023) that will culminate with the social architecture of the systematic implementation of universities. The role of the university within the territories in which they were emerging was none other than to direct the order of knowledge towards specific purposes in which a game of knowledge, constituted powers and established hierarchies came into play, on the one hand; on the other hand, the gradual imposition of a regime of truth (Foucault, 1979), either that of faith or that of reason, was always a faith or a reason, the other was unknown. The transition from faith to reason occurs from the emergence of different orders of knowledge, different geopolitical situations, as well as from different ways of trying to order thought, without a linear process or constant evolution; but, from the interstice of disordered coupling (Foucault, 1968). Hence, there is no such thing as knowledge in the abstract or pure. Rather, there are orders of knowledge, ways of knowing grouped in the space of the social imaginary in a continuous, dispersed, fragmented way (Castoriadis, 1997), but under the premise of the need for reason to define, synthesize, group, limit in order to understand (Descartes, 1990).

In the sense indicated above, as he argues (Dussel, 2023; Mignolo, 2023; Grosfoguel, 2024) different territorial spaces of Western Europe since the French Revolution (1789), gradually managed to articulate three mechanisms of colonial imposition under a single paradigm. Reason as an epistemological substrate will unfold through systemic or empirical mechanisms: state administration, the knowledge of science and communicative pragmatics. This means the slow reconfiguration of the world through the predominance of reason deployed in three different, but complementary, orders of knowledge: the political field, the intellectual field and the field of representation. For the deployment of these fields, a social institution and two systems of action were articulated in a transversal way and slowly dispersed: the university, law and economics.

Knowledge about the state and its operational form, reason of state (Foucault, 1979) will make sense given the need to fight against an external enemy, and to control another possibly internal one (Mbembe, 2022). While the State must slowly define itself, the need arises to think about its own field of action. You need to know how to control populations while producing, administering, and managing wealth. In this order of ideas, the reason of State will be crossed by the legal and economic institution (Foucault, 1979).

The power of science that, on the one hand, defines what is or is not knowledge (Dussel, 2023; Mignolo, 2023; Grosfoguel, 2024); On the other hand, it consolidates a model for ordering representations of the natural world: its power lies in its predictive capacity at the same time that it managed to intersect with the renewed knowledge of technology. The university as a social institution will be in charge of deploying this epistemological paradigm. Universities will serve, in this sense, to direct populations on what is legitimately valuable as knowledge versus what is not. Subsequently, its field of action will go beyond the merely cognitive dimension and will dangerously intersect with the political field and the economic system. This crossing of fields will allow the emergence of a new paradigm: science and technology guided by an instrumental reason must produce knowledge at the service of the political system, which has been hijacked by the economic system, in order to reconfigure societies and put them at the service of the corporate financial machinery.

The Psychologism of Theories of Justice

As has been argued up to this point, philosophy in the West from different regional environments has been characterized by a strong tendency towards theoretical universalizations, linguistic abstractions, hypothetical-deductive experiments, the methodological application carried out in a specific context, under a specific theoretical framework, to different situations, historicities, territories and cultures. Until the twentieth century this has been the constant. Worse still, towards the 90s the theories of justice born from an Anglo-Saxon context characterized by a history of progress in the sciences, a political situation of predominance of a constitutional liberal tradition, based on the discourse of Human Rights, which will lead to a business neoliberalism and a model of New Public Management, a cultural situation of consolidation of individual, atomized, porous liberal sensibilities that will slowly eat away at different geographies, territories, and populations.

Rawls and Habermas, within this context of action, respectively (1998), propose theories that can be considered reflections on justice for contemporary democratic societies. In Rawls the name is totally clear: *theory of justice* (1993), in Habermas, although there is no similar denomination, his theory is presented as a kind of social promise based on the best of the possible theories on the just society. In this way, each author constructs a theoretical edifice to propose to Western sociologists the best of all possible worlds, if and only if, their theories are received and applied by societies. However, both authors start from hypothetical

theoretical frameworks, again, made behind the backs of real, empirical, historical, sentient (Borda, 1958), geographical societies and individuals. In Rawls, the theoretical apparatus is totally pregnant with a psychologism applied to politics that clearly posits an abstract social space, ideal democratic societies, imaginary political figures, citizens devoid of autobiographical contents, who decide on binding principles pre-established by the pragmatic philosopher. Methodological constructs such as: *the original position*, *the veil of ignorance*, *the reflexive equilibrium*, *the intersecting consensus* (1998), among others, present a theory, which, in order to be political, is constructed without the exercise of a real politics; due to the empirical vices, real, in fact, that it can present: continuous dissent. On the contrary, the author starts from the psychological theoretical elements described that would allow him to think about the constitutional democratic society without historical, ethnic, passionate subjects on the role of a space in the book format, with the pretension of absolute scientificity. While the *original position* is conceived by the author as a starting point for the representatives of the citizens and the citizens themselves, on whom a *veil of ignorance* is applied, in order to choose principles of justice: political freedom of action, equality in the basic scheme of opportunities (1998, p. 31), the second moment, the *intertwined consensus*, to enter into a *reflexive balance*, he proposes it as a construct for the communities in which they are oriented, or in which citizens participate as voters for the consolidation of political justice. In both cases it is not a question of real citizens and communities, but simply of a psychological, hypothetical, inductive, totally fictitious process.

Thus, Rawls' democratic society is a society that does not exist, societaries are rational and reasonable talking individuals (Rawls, 1998), who do not exist either, so theory is a theory in opposition to what really exists: societies that are increasingly fragmenting and dissolving due to multiple endemic mechanisms that have put the current constitutional democracies in check.

In Habermas, reflection does not start from the world as it is, but from the world as it should be. Habermas's theory is born from a desk and from the fertile imagination of a sociologist who drinks from various theoretical sources, who is quite capable of putting them at his own service. The sociologist articulates George Mead's (2016) behaviorist psychological theory very well, puts Max Weber's (1999) *theory of action into operation, and unites it with the theories of speech acts* of the pragmatics of language typical of the North American tradition (Searle, 1996; Austin, 1997). Through this weaving, this conceptual interweaving, Habermas tries to present a sociological theory of political scope, but with an ethical basis, for the consolidation of fairer democratic societies. To this end, the sociologist characterizes societies as structures composed of three systems: the political, the cultural and the economic. Each system in turn has subsystems of action: government, education, business. Individuals capable of language and action operate under these systems, but also under spheres of value: autonomous art, natural sciences, religious ethics, and rational law (1999, p. 20-23). Contemporary democratic societies are thus pregnant with role-plays where social actors constantly move between systems of action, subsystems and spheres of value. However, this linear movement within the *plexuses of life* only makes sense to the extent that the social partners are characterized as communicative subjects capable of understanding each other about something in the world (1999, p. 198) Communication will be the cornerstone of this theory, which will allow: *a*) the development of a *formal ethics* based on the dialogue constitutive of a *public use of reason* (1998); *b*) the development of a policy based on legitimacy over legality (1998); *c*) the achievement of a communicative consensus that allows limiting social conflicts (1999). However, real societies, even the most democratic, lack any theoretical presupposition and are being submerged in a sea of consented, permitted and desired actions that call into question all these theories. Faced

with the proposal of a formal normative social ethics born of an exercise of practical reason, different populations respond with empiricisms that demolish, strike and deconstruct all formal ethical principles. Black and indigenous territories where Western norms attempt to apply principles of good order fall in the face of flows of interactions that celebrate communal insubordination to such norms. Faced with the legitimacy of positive legal principles, entire communities move under regulative principles of pragmatic legality imaginatively co-constructed. On the other hand, conflicts circumscribed to different, different territorial logics are not resolved through the political proposal of establishing dialogues or communicative agreements of social, ethical and legal scope, but, on the contrary, the social actors voluntarily submit in many cases, in others less voluntary, to the situational and statutory power of a given group: legal, illegal, mixed. The public use of reason is called into question in the face of the pragmatic communicative phenomenon of social networks turned into spaces for social political discussion, but from an infodox approach (Díaz, Rengifo, 2024): the empire of public opinion turned into a judgment of common legitimacy of all corporate members. The public use of reason has been reduced to the public exercise of simple opinion turned into civil truth. In this sense, the logic of the best argument as an operative mechanism of communicative consensus is reduced to constant flows of opinion, to the uncontrolled situation of phenomena of social clash: internal and external wars, constant social movements of social demand, partisan, state, civil and group power struggles. Social dissent is the constant.

Theories of Power: Biopolitics vs. Necropolitics

Theories of power, on the other hand, can be located in the development of the 1970s and have managed to reach the context of the twenty-first century in authors such as: Frantz Fanon (1952), Foucault (1979), and Achille Mbembe (2022), develop this theory from an oppositional political approach, but which, for some academics, they can be complementary. They were born from a political context clearly constituted by the conflict: Vietnam War, the Algerian War of Liberation, the Cold War, youth movements in opposition to neoliberal governments, among others.

Biopolitics and necropolitics emerge then, as two nodal concepts to try to understand the logics of power in relation to knowledge in the production of techniques of control, parameterization and domination over populations and territories. However, each concept presents a different vision of power over the control of states.

For Foucault (1979), there is no State in the singular, but States in the Plural (1979, p. 22-23), which allows the author to intuit that the exercise of reflection will start from a real basis on what is a real State?, and not, as the theorists of justice did, on what a State hypothetically should be like, act, constitute? In this sense, Foucault deploys a historical analysis focused on an approach to the investigation of the eventual (1980, p. 60-61) of how the Modern State emerged in Europe since the seventeenth century under a very complex category, but constitutive of this type of State: the *reason of State*. By reason of the State Foucault understands the ordered, analyzed, systematized calculation of what the State is as an act, and what it can be in prospect as a power, of the State inwards (endogenous), and outwards (exogenous) over itself in relation to two complementary constitutive concepts: territory and population. In this analysis, Foucault discovers some fundamental elements: the limits of the state and *state planning*. The limits are given by the territory, the population and the resources. Planning is given by its relationship with: political economy, law, police medicine. The limits of the State must, reflexively, lead to the internalization of State Planning. Thus, territory and resources are the object of reflection in the face of the external that limits the reason of State, what would be political economy and law; while the population, in its raw form, is the object of the

reflection that the reason of State makes inwardly (endogenous), from the perspective of medical discourse. Biopolitics was born, then, as the process that the Modern States of Europe carried out, of reflecting from the concept of reason of State, on the technical, pedagogical and medical control over the life of their own populations, but in the face of two fields: political economy and modern rational law. From this reflection, a power is born that regulates the body (architectural, medical, pedagogical and criminal orthopedics), dominates knowledge (regime of truth), produces specific practices of behavior (normal vs. pathological; legal vs. criminal), legitimizes certain discourses (psychiatric, educational, legal, economic), over others. While it is true that biopolitics is presented as a theory that allows us to describe the emergence of modern European states, the concept of reason of state is presented as an abstraction of European thought, which is only applicable to certain geographies, territories and populations of Europe. In the same way, the systems of internal and external control: modern rational law, political economy, the discipline of the population (prison, school, psychiatric hospital), only functioned until the twentieth century in countries such as: France, England, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Holland; but, not in territories such as Russia, Turkey, Croatia, Bosnia, in the case of Europe, even less, in non-European territories: Africa, Asia, Latin America where the *vital development rhythms* of their populations and territories have been totally different. Black communities in countries such as Colombia only discovered the school mechanism from the middle of the twentieth century; while the 125 indigenous peoples of the same country do not have any of the mechanisms of social parameterization: there are no prisons, since they have their own jurisdiction that has a punishment mechanism other than confinement; they do not have closed schools but open spaces for social interaction (malocas), they do not have a psychiatric hospital since mental illness does not exist, on the contrary they have social mechanisms of intervention in the face of the vibrations of negative energies: cleansing rituals. On the other hand, Achille Mbembe (2022) sees in Foucault's biopolitics the development of a theory plagued by Eurocentrism, since it only exposes European and Western states, coated with the varnish of systematic rationality. While for this one, European states have operated under a conceptual category not only of medical gridding on the regulation of their own populations: *biopolitics*; but, they have gone further. They have been located from a politics that conquers death: *necropolitics* focused on the negation of other bodies, other feelings, other skins, other imaginaries. Race as a negative category is the cornerstone of the politics of death. However, biopolitics and necropolitics are in the same situation of origin: history as the space-time in which life and death circulate under a rational state administrative logic, through the articulation of a medical discourse that regulates, nominalizes and registers that life, that death. However, while biopolitics is thought from the concept of freedom: to allow freedom, increase freedom, to produce freedom circumscribed to the veredictive space of the neoliberal economy; necropolitics operates on the concept of material slavery, cognitive negation, invisibilization of the social imaginary. Hence, the annihilation of the other is fully justified. It is not a question, then, of producing life even if it is limited by the economy, or produced for it; It is about producing a politics of death that works under the calculating gaze of the internal enemy and the external enemy. The internal enemy may be characterized by a social imaginary or ideology different from the regime of truth legitimized by state power; while the external brings together a series of well-known categories throughout history: the other, race, the infidel; xenophobia, racism and nationalism are brought together under this concept. Necropolitics can only understand the world from which it has been the result of a devastating event such as racism; however, it denies, makes invisible or trivializes the forms of racial discrimination created by black African and indigenous communities before the colonial period, and after the consolidation of contemporary democratic states. In the same way,

necropolitics is also situated in the theoretical defect of the West that it criticizes: abstraction, universalization and theoretical-methodological imposition to other latitudes. There are different territories and populations where it has not been necropolitics that has prevailed, but the excess of freedom, the production of social value and the conservation of one's own worldviews in such a way that there is no universal necropolitics, just as there is no universal biopolitics.

Decolonial Theory: Inconsequential Metaphysical Theology

Decolonial theory, on the other hand, arises from the intersection of the real political field (African liberation movements, subversive movements in Latin America, structural racism in the United States of America), different currents of thought in France with Franz Fanon (1961), in Latin America: Leonardo Boff's *Theology of Liberation* (1969), Fals Borda's *action and participation research* (1958), Enrique Dussel's *Philosophy of Liberation* (1970), Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972), Aníbal Quijano's theory of decolonial (1979), Augusto Boal's *Theater of the Oppressed* (1973), Manuel Zapata Olivvella's population studies (1989), its entire theoretical structure is born from a structural category that they present with biological nuances. but, that its background is totally theological, the category of race. Race as the category that sustains all power relations and struggles of gender, class, ideology, among others (Quijano, 2015; Mignolo, 2023; Grosfoguel, 2024), is the founding category. However, the entire theoretical and conceptual architecture is based on the same problematic that it rejects. Decolonial theory denies, rejects, and criticizes the development of European thought, but it falls irreducibly into the thought that rejects: *a)* it starts from abstract categories such as: race, power, capitalist state, modernity, among others, beyond the *vital rhythm* of populations, their imaginaries and real practices; *b)* they make history a dead, fossilized event, under an abstract system of interpretation enclosed in its own theoretical framework, in which they make it say things, situations, relations that never occurred in that way in the complex history of relations between homogeneous or heterogeneous populations, cultures based on endogenous or exogenous relations within specific territories; *c)* they conceal a new Semitic religious paradigm based on the political paradigm of *salvation*, no longer spiritual, but rather earthly. In such a way, they sell to the populations of the world, who supposedly suffer the domination of the white, European, colonialist, hetero, patriarchal man, the hegemonic idea that these are the bad guys of history. Decolonial theory, in this sense, is synthesized in the Semitic dialectic good versus bad: the good are the poor, the reprobate, the others indoctrinated by science and Jewish colonial ideologies versus the others, the non-Judaized. The non-Judaized are the bad guys in a long tradition of political propaganda. From 1200 BC, the kingdom of Judea constructed, as Israel Filkenstein (2022) points out, a discourse of power that started from the systematic elaboration of a political identity project elaborated in the Torah, or, Old Testament, and later, towards the first century of the current era, built an expansionist political project (new testatment), but, not from forced imposition, but from the acceptance of a plan of spiritual salvation.

On the other hand, decolonial studies ignore a long tradition of linguistic elements that different peoples elaborated to exclude other peoples. The Jews called *goim* the peoples not chosen by their god; the Greeks called *barbarians* those who did not belong to the Greek culture, the same expression that the Romans would internalize to refer to the peoples of the territory later called Europe; Christianity erected the category *pagans* to refer to the peoples who practiced polytheistic or animistic religious rituals; the Muslim Arabs call *infidel* To all those who do not belong to the Islamic religion, the list is very long in the history of humanity, and with it, the only certain thing is that the linguistic categories of inclusion at the same time

represented *lexical* categories of exclusion. *Ontological* identity only makes sense because there is an enigmatic outside (nature), and in that outside an other possibly different from the perceiving ego, and with it, dangerous. There is no people that does not have within its language and framework of categorical representation, within its imaginary instituting world, nominal, phonic and lexical expressions to refer to the other, the others, the other as an unpleasant, dangerous, bad being. Distinction through the use of language is a condition of the biological form of the human being. The way in which the brain constructs reality is only possible through conceptual distinction, the hierarchy of values, the creation of values, the systematization of the relationship of those same values. There is no grammar without morphosyntactic opposition values. There are no phonations proper to the language of a people that do not contain racial self-affirming values, and exclude other ethnicities. Every language of a people structures a world that is represented from that unique way of perceiving reality. With this, the expressive and organizational forms of a society are part of the way of being biologically human. That is, the cultural being is limited by the limits of the biological being and its cognitive capacity. The cognitive capacity of a people is limited by its geographical natural world and the capacity of its language to account for it. The structure of thought is trapped in the coded structure of a specific form of communication, which in turn is enclosed in the structure of the natural, geographical, social, historical, spiritual possible world. Neither the spirit of a people can exceed history, nor can history escape the specific form of the spirit of a people. In this way the spirit creates the conditions for the possibility of knowledge in the historical period in which it is trapped. With this, the social categories, the classifications, the advances, the discoveries and the very order of knowledge, the form of power, the discursive mechanisms, are crystallized in specific historical periods on which an anachronistic exercise of judging them with modern cognitive, political, social and cultural categories, or those of the knowledge of the current era, cannot be made. This is where decolonial studies irreducibly fall. As Nietzsche pointed out in the *Genealogy of Morals* (1989), the notion of the good, developed by the priestly caste, only makes sense when it is sold to the most reprobate classes of the empire: the plebs, who were characterized by their laziness of life, the idea that they are the good ones, chosen by God, the others, The active, the conquerors, those who create civilization are evil, therefore, they deserve to perish in hell. This is a clear example of how the structure of communication through a coded language represents the values of an era. Values totally in accordance with the field of knowledge and the forms of power of that historical moment.

Thus, from these classes arose the religious movement that managed to colonize the political (human rights), economic (market law), ethical (decolonial humanism) and legal (liberal democracy) worlds, where, as already pointed out, there is a single evil being; the white man, European thought, capitalist politics. All abstract categories that only hide a new metaphysics. The white man never existed in Europe. Europe as a linguistic denomination was born in the nineteenth century, therefore, the Greeks do not represent the population of this specific territorial space called Europe today. In the same way, the Romans did not represent that supposed Europe either, in fact, the Roman Empire remained for 500 years living in constant tension with peoples such as: Goths, Visigoths, Vikings, Normans, Franks, Saxons, among others, who occupied those territories to which today the decolonial theory applies the name of Europe. The concept of heteropatriarchy denies the historical reality of hundreds of women who were leaders, queens, decided within different territorial geographies and peoples. Now, a problem that is not contemplated by decolonial theory is the following: after 200 years of liberation movements and political emergence of leftist or progressive governments, in equal economic, social and political opportunities, what has happened to the peoples and

territories that were subject to colonization? What kind of administrative form of their territory has been developed?, Under what parameters of social organization of their own population do they move?, Are these knowledges, political, administrative, legal, imaginary forms better than the heteropatriarchal Western ones, the same, worse, or simply different? While it is true that black communities in North America and Latin America managed to create different autobiographical mechanisms of reparation: rhythm turned into song and dance (Díaz, C; Rengifo, J, 2018), there has not been an analysis of the mechanisms that they have created in the same way to deny the other: the exaggerated mockery of the corporeality, ability or dexterity of others has been one of those mechanisms, evidenced through the dance, artistic and expressive rhythms created by them; through which they measure the bodily, rhythmic or sensitive intelligence of the other in front of their own creations. Black communities impose logics of consumption, production of art and culture outside the life horizon of the cultural being of other materialities.

Similarly, porosity or loss of identity is a constant that is occurring in ethnic communities that have internalized a multiverse of discourses and are assuming them as their own: LGTBIQ+ discourse, radical feminist discourse, transhumanist discourse, among others, which dangerously places these communities in the terrain of existential, ontological, and with it, politics.

State or States, power or hierarchical systems of organization, democracy or identity relationship?

There is no such thing as the State as an abstract and universally valid category. There is no such thing as power in the abstract. There has never been a human organization grouped under the category of democracy whose exercise of power lies exclusively in the will of the people. What then has existed? Different *vital rhythms of populations located in geographically specific territories*: States in the plural, powers in the plural, multiple organizational forms, different organizational logics.

Contemporary Democratic States, in their rational organizational structure of New Public Management, are a kind of tangle in which we find strong tensions that can be described through categories such as: imaginaries, practices, empiricisms, ideologies. Social, neighborhood, tribal, collective, teleological imaginaries. Political, administrative, cultural practices. Academic, business, neighborhood, popular empiricisms. Ideologies of all kinds: political, sexual, racial, religious. Externally, states seem to be fracturing, breaking, cracking. International economic and military pressure puts them in check, the internal tensions of their own cancerous tumors fissure, weaken them, bring them to their knees. Porous, heterogeneous and dispersed civil society problematizes every possible form of government. Populations grow in demands and privileges, and cease in functions, knowledge and skills.

Contemporary Democratic States are forced to try to govern inwardly a multitude of heterogeneous, dispersed and multi-identity populations. Externally, they must fight to maintain themselves in the face of the market and the expansionist or warmongering logic of other military and politically power-hungry states. Internally, States suffer from the social disorder of the multiple emerging discourses that divide the civilian population into increasingly complex and porous strata. Social and political unity does not exist, it does not appear: there is only room for the requirements of all *liberal sensibilities* that want their own demands to be satisfied.

The role of universities seems more like that of a servile servant of the market, the meta-discourses of division, the phraseology of pseudo-intellectuals, journalists, politicians, Youtubers and influencers. Research is either alien, or is directed by a purpose attached to the

administration of the government of the day, or is an exercise in repetition, with a change of language, of fetishized schools of thought and authors. As a result, students parrot speeches that they neither know how they came about, nor do they know what the social consequences of them are, nor do they really understand the power structure they hide.

The political field hijacked by the economic field pushes the educational and cultural field to obsolescence and absolute anarchy. Critical thinking has prostituted itself before the bourgeois legal concept of freedom of expression. Saying one's own word has become a social exercise, not the use of the faculty of judgment; rather, of moral super-tribunalization of the behaviors and actions of the other corporate members.

The Diseases of Contemporary Democratic States

The multiple diseases are as follows. First, the growth of *state lending* to international banks has driven nations into systematic debt since the colonial period.

Loans as a mechanism for financing States is not a current practice. As early as the fifteenth century, the Absolutist States were financed by the nascent private family banks, which slowly became central banks. Without the financing of these families, geopolitical events such as the Renaissance, the conquest of America, the birth of science, slavery, independence movements, among others, would not have taken place.

Contemporary democratic societies today succumb to internal crises because their external situation is debt. Debt has been instituted for nations as the only mechanism to be able to ensure three things: first, the maintenance of the growing bureaucratic apparatus; second, state financing of social programs; third, the constant need to generate work for their populations; a fourth and fifth place have emerged after the pandemic; the need to create a debt system based on ensuring vaccines that could counteract present and future pandemics, which does not imply improving the public health system; finally, the growing arms race to try to have mechanisms for a military State response, in the face of multiple internal and external enemies. As Sheldon Wolin (2008) argues, contemporary democratic states have lost territorial, economic and administrative autonomy in the face of global *infocorporations* that produce a new social reality: the *digital information empire* turned *kratos*. As is known by the vast majority of sociologists within contemporary democratic societies, today's world is reduced to a click. Google defines the mechanisms for searching, managing and transmitting information above all nation states. Microsoft defines knowledge production formats for businesses, educational institutions, and organizations of all types and scopes. Facebook defines the relational logics of tribes, multi-identities, political, social and religious parties. The world is reduced to the Facebook window through which one looks at the world of the other. Netflix defines the consumption of entertainment about which they dialogue, converse, socialize: public use of reason (Habermas, 1998), (*infodoxa*) the societal. Chatgpt defines the academic content to be presented in the intellectual field: conversations, assignments, writings, conferences, books, scientific articles. Infocorporations transcend geographically real, concrete territorial states, and subject them to the tyranny of the logics of production of new *infocommunicative* meanings for porous, translucent, blurred liberal sensibilities.

The social phenomenon of state administrative corruption of the systemic of the three branches of power. While the power of the executive increases the bureaucratic pyramid to pay political favors to the powerful: bankers and drug traffickers, through the creation of new ministries, programs and positions; The Judiciary turned the right to liberty into a business by turning it into a mechanism to get: promotions, bonuses, points, vacations, money. Freedom was transformed into a profitable, lucrative business. Crime turned him into a business. The criminal transformed it into raw material to perpetuate that business. Prison, as Foucault (1976) pointed out, became the only possible form of social penalization. The judicial

apparatus transformed justice into a mechanism of social appearance: the important thing is to show results. The freedom and dignity of an honest individual is prostituted to the procedural mafias of the systemic fiscal apparatus. The Prosecutor's Office and journalism are articulated to create socially relevant cases, jointly produce criminals, point out culprits who do not exist, cover up people of economic-political power, paradoxically, at the same time, the real criminals are protected. The judicial branch creates, together with journalism, social imaginaries of social blame, social criminalization, social super-tribunalization, about certain individuals who cannot make use of legal tools to defend themselves. The legal apparatus functions over those who have no power, while protecting and granting multiple benefits to those who possess status, power, and money. On the other hand, the branch of the legislative power produces laws that are circumscribed, tied up, redefined according to the guidelines of the real transnational state: the UN, or the *disguised global* financial infopower *Blackrock, the Bilderberg club*.

The co-optation of the State itself and its territories by drug trafficking, the Multicrime Gangs were born in countries such as Colombia since the 30s, first from the power of the Jewish-American international elite, then, from a Creole elite, as German Castro Caicedo (2015) and Eduardo Sáenz (2023) argue, but it has its place of privilege and point of greatest growth and socio-political complacency. since the 80s (Quintero, Rengifo, 2023). Since that time, the governments in power have been drinking from the money, relationships and powers of the different drug lords and the different families of the oligarchy that have given rise to them. As a result, the State as a political institution and civil society as an imaginary institution were coupled, sold out, ceded their freedom to the power of money born of the business system of drug trafficking. From this socio-political phenomenon other malignant tumors emerged: the dismantling of the large drug cartels between the 1990s and 2010s resulted in criminal metastasis: the emergence of criminal gangs, narco guerrillas, narco paramilitary movements, narco armies. In the absence of a strong central state power, mafia, delinquent and criminal territorial powers emerged in the different Departments and Municipalities. This form of exponential growth of drug trafficking is aligned with the reduction of the world to a click: the global world also produced a globally drugged world subjected to transnational drug trafficking. Democratic states succumbed to the power of drug traffickers and the new multicrime gangs. Although drug trafficking is not the only criminal factor, it is the cornerstone of any illegal gang, insofar as it is the most efficient mechanism for the production of money for the organized constitution of these transnational companies. Democratic states are co-opted by drug trafficking not because it has overtaken them through criminal actions, but, and this is the dangerous thing about the case, because it produces social logics of pleasure: increased consumption, economic growth, employability, improved urban infrastructure, increased foreign investment, movement of capital, organization of peasant lands transformed into rural condominiums, among other socially visible phenomena.

The excess of state bureaucratization that submerges nations in a sea of economic needs to maintain the functioning of the government apparatus is another of the many diseases. This disease is very concrete and produces three symptoms: *a)* systematic periodic increase in public spending, which produces a codependence of *infocorporations* and transnational drug trafficking; *b)* constant outsourcing of processes that produce diversion of state funds and crystallize the phenomenon of administrative corruption; *c)* spatio-temporal linearity in administrative processes that end up being recycled, which produces phenomena of circular continuity in different territories. This explains why the territories within a democratic state advance at different rates, in the same way that nations do.

The generalized increase in civil disobedience in the face of institutional norms in the face of the submission, in some cases out of fear, in others, voluntary and complacent, of the same civilian population to the exo-state powers is one of the latest tumors of a society trapped in a system of knowledge-power based on a constitutional democracy. Civil disobedience has been sold as an alternative phenomenon of *public use of reason* (Habermas, 1998), to legitimize violent citizen actions, previously planned by internationally based organizations, with interests in drug trafficking, with the sole objective of producing fragmented, weak and docile states subject to the global logics of *infocorporations*.

CONCLUSIONS

The concepts of State, power and democracy with a long academic tradition in certain Western territories have unfortunately been developed from abstract and hypothetical theoretical apparatuses tending to impose on other geographies as universal truths applicable to their realities and their populations, so that it was tried to demonstrate that there are no such universal concepts, but, rather, that we must think about the concrete realities of the territories and their populations: ways of being, being, existing, saying and thinking about their own world.

In this order of ideas, it was attempted to show that theories of justice, theories of power and decolonial theory are insufficient in the face of the different *rhythms of vital development* specific to each State geographically and territorially located in a specific historical, social and political context.

Chaos produces money. The chaos resulting from multiple state diseases is fully produced with the sole intention of producing weak states, which can collapse, which can be subjected to the tyranny of infocorporations for the imposition of new social imaginaries, new relational logics, new liberal sensibilities, new systemic dependencies, new epistemological colonialisms.

Acknowledgements

The article is the result of the research project submitted to the National Call for Research Projects 2025-2026 of the Higher School of Public Administration.

References

1. Achille, M. (2022). *Necropolitics*. Spain: Melusina.
2. Aristotle. (2000). *Politics*. Spain: Gredos.
3. Bobbio, N. (1989). *State, Government and Society*. Mexico: FCE.
4. Caicedo, G. (2015). Conference, our war of others. Taken from: <https://youtu.be/aFlu8RDQMh0?si=Tosc8o9D7bDJ-jgz>
5. Dussel, E. (2023). Colonialism, Decolonization and Neocolonialism. Summit March 30. Taken from: <https://youtu.be/O6fmC90Ap-g?si=zhaq1oV5e2MC2tZD>
6. Filkenstein, I; Romer, T & Silverman, N. (2022). The Bible Unearthed, taken from: https://youtu.be/_HJqYKlaPLM?si=zMlI6LhjaAWxYsj
7. Foucault, M. (1979). *The birth of Biopolitics*. Buenos Aires: FCE.
8. Franz, F. (2009). *Black skin, white masks*. Madrid: Akal.
9. González, E. (2018). Abraham's anguish. Conference: University of São Paulo. Taken from: https://youtu.be/Jm7GOUXnMqY?si=UT9Zj_3ip-Ivjpbb
10. George, M. (2016). *Spirit, Person and Society*. Barcelona: Paidós.
11. Habermas, J; Rawls, J. (1998). *Debate on political liberalism*. Barcelona: Paidós.

12. Habermas, J. (1998). *Facticity and Validity*. Madrid: Trotta.
13. Habermas, J. (1999). *Theory of Communicative Action Volume I*. Madrid: Taurus.
14. Hobbes, T. (1980). *The Leviathan*. Madrid: FCE.
15. Locke, J. (2006). *Second Treatise on Civil Government*. Bogotá: Tecnos.
16. Marx, C. (2019). *The manifesto of the Communist Party*. Madrid: Alianza.
17. Mignolo, W. (2023). Colonialities, de-Westernization and geopolitics. Interview, Taken from: https://youtu.be/rXiGeeujtE0?si=6_odaM-Y6aEJUaDo
18. Nietzsche, F. (1984). *The antichrist*. Mexico: Taurus.
19. Piñeiro, A. (2024). Early Christianity and the Dead Sea Scrolls, taken from: https://youtu.be/t7e_mwke1WQ?si=kngpTpZEHoyxjtTS
20. Pujol, Ll. (2022). Jesus existed. Taken from: <https://youtu.be/KC3xTyGz5rI?si=32AmKvqtFo6ZbpVi>
21. Quintero-Calvache, J.-C., & Rengifo-Carpintero, J.-A. (2023). The phenomenon of cultural, political, and educational corruption in Colombia. *Thought and Action*, (35), 52–71. <https://doi.org/10.19053/uptc.01201190.n35.2023.14078>
22. Rengifo, J (2015). Weaknesses of Rawls' political theory and inadmissibility of the intersecting consensus in Political Liberalism. *Revista Escritos*, 23 (51), p. 409-438.
23. Rousseau, J. (1923). *Discourse on the origin of inequality among men*. Madrid: Calpe.
24. Saban, M. (2016). The origins of Christianity. Taken from: <https://youtu.be/3BABbPNyvIo?si=Bb7lijk9dXRubM9a>
25. Sáenz, E. (2023). Interview: Taken from: <https://youtu.be/kCfi95twzeo?si=iwXXsZsDAHi7gpGo>
27. Weber, M. (1999). *Sociology of religion*. Madrid: Elalhep.com
28. Wollin. S. (2008). *Democracy S.A.* Madrid: Katz.