

Argumentative Factors in Arabic and Their Role in Guiding Discourse

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Received: 24/11/2026

Accepted: 09/03/2026

Published: 01/04/2026

Abstract

The field of argumentative studies in the modern era has attracted increasing attention, becoming a central focus in contemporary research. This interest has manifested through a quantitative and qualitative accumulation of books and studies that have addressed argumentation through analysis and theorisation. As a result of this cognitive momentum, multiple theories of argumentation have emerged, laying the foundations of this pragmatic field. Among the most prominent of these theories are those of Toulmin, Perelman, and Tyteca, as well as the approaches of Ducrot. These theorists have worked to establish the features of this discipline and to define its operational concepts, thereby contributing to the formation of an independent epistemological identity for argumentative studies. If the subject of argumentation for Perelman lies in the study of the techniques of discourse to lead the receiver to acceptance and submission, thus constituting a logical phenomenon aimed at achieving persuasion, Ducrot, by contrast, considers argumentation a linguistic phenomenon concerned with the study of linguistic means and thus linked to the structure of utterances and discourse. Argumentative factors are considered one of these linguistic elements and components that realise the argumentative function of language, as highlighted in Ducrot's theory. In this paper, we seek to demonstrate the importance of argumentative factors in discourse and their role in persuading the receiver and achieving the speaker's intentions.

Keywords: language, discourse, argumentation, factors, connectors, integrated pragmatics.

INTRODUCTION

To approach the concept of argumentative factors and encompass its various aspects, it appears necessary to return to the conceptual framework established by Oswald Ducrot and Jean-Claude Anscombre, among the most prominent figures in the foundation of the theory of argumentation in language. This theory is based on a central idea, namely, that argumentation is not merely a communicative activity incidental to language; rather, it lies at the very core of its structure. According to Ducrot and Anscombre, language, within its internal constructions, has argumentative dimensions that are manifested in the texture of utterances and in the manner of their internal organisation. Thus, every utterance is encoded in a way that directs the receiver toward particular conclusions, even before it conveys any purely informational content. From this perspective, language is no longer merely a vessel for transmitting ideas; rather, it has become, in itself, an argumentative space in which meanings are produced and interpretations are directed.

Argumentation According to Ducrot

The theory of Ducrot and Anscombre proceeds on the basis of the premise that argumentation is fundamentally grounded in language. It concerns itself with linguistic means and with the capacities of natural language possessed by the speaker to direct discourse in a manner that enables the achievement of certain argumentative objectives. It proceeds from the idea that we generally speak in order to exert influence.¹ This theory demonstrates that language inherently has an argumentative function. There are numerous

indicators of this function within the very structure of utterances themselves. For this reason, Ducrot emphasises that the possible sequences within a given discourse are linked to the linguistic structure of utterances and not merely to the pieces of information they contain.²

For Ducrot, argumentation is rooted in language. Therefore, a speaker engages in argumentation when he presents an utterance (U1), and his aim in doing so is to lead the receiver to acknowledge another utterance (U2).³ In this case, argumentation consists of two acts: the act of stating the argument on the one hand and the act of drawing the conclusion on the other, whether the conclusion is explicitly stated or understood from (U1).⁴

Ducrot maintains that every utterance contains a persuasive act; to speak, therefore, is to argue, and there is no speech devoid of an argumentative charge. For him, argumentation is a semantic relation linking utterances within discourse resulting from the act of arguing.⁵ Every utterance thus has an argumentative dimension through which it aims to exercise a persuasive act upon the receiver. Language, in its overall structure, constitutes a field of argumentation. It does not rely on logical structures but rather on language itself. Consequently, Ducrot set aside philosophical and logical foundations and instead focused on the structure of utterances and the argumentative implications they carry. Thus, the meaning of utterances cannot be separated from their argumentative character. When Ducrot defines argumentative discourse, he states, "When we describe a discourse as argumentative, it is because this discourse contains at least two utterances (U1) and (U2), one of which reinforces and supports the other; the first is called the argument and the second is called the conclusion." Ducrot distinguishes between two meanings of argumentation:

a) Argumentation in the ordinary sense:

This refers to the manner in which arguments are presented and arranged to influence the listener. Here, the nature of the intended listener must be taken into consideration, as well as the suitability of the discourse for that listener and the effectiveness of the argumentative techniques employed in persuading him.

b) Argumentation in the technical sense:

This type denotes a specific class of relations embedded in discourse and incorporated within language as part of its semantic contents.⁶

Both Ducrot and Anscombe developed the theory of speech acts originally established by Austin and Searle. They proposed two linguistic acts: presupposition and argumentation. This implies that the act of argumentation is a linguistic act, similar to the act of presupposition.

The act of argumentation consists of the speaker presenting an utterance (U1), or a group of utterances, directed toward leading the addressee to accept another utterance (U2) {or a group of utterances}, whether (U2) is explicit or implicit. This process of leading the addressee to accept (U2) as a conclusion resulting from the argument (U1) is called the act of arguing.⁷ The listener's acceptance of (U2) is thus the result of (U1), and this, from the perspective of speech act theory, constitutes an act produced by the argumentative act. Accordingly, for Ducrot, argumentation is a linguistic act that possesses both a performative dimension and a perlocutionary dimension.

Characteristics of Linguistic Arguments

a) Linguistic arguments are characterised by several features, the most important of which is that they are contextual: it is the context that renders a given semantic element an argument and grants it its argumentative nature. Similarly, a single expression containing one proposition may function as an argument, a conclusion, or neither, depending on the context.

b) They are relative: every argument possesses a certain argumentative strength. There are strong arguments, weaker ones, and still weaker ones.

c) They are refutable: linguistic argumentation is relative, flexible, gradual, and contextual, unlike demonstration, which is characterised by strictness.

Integrated pragmatics

Integrated pragmatics is a semantic theory that incorporates aspects of the act of utterance into the linguistic code.⁸ For this reason, Ducrot maintains that the conditions governing the conversational and situational use of utterances exist only insofar as they are embedded within meaning.

It is therefore a theory that rejects the separation established between semantics and the pragmatic dimension of discourse. Consequently, it rejects the linear hierarchical classification adopted by traditional linguistic theories, that is, the linear conception of the relationship between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.⁹ In this case, utterances are divided into successive levels beginning with syntax, followed by semantics, and ending with pragmatics. According to Ducrot, however, these components are not separate. Syntax concerns the rules governing the combination of linguistic elements to determine their grammaticality; semantics concerns the relationships between signs and their referents and the judgement of a sentence as true or false on the basis of the extent to which it fulfils conditions of truth; pragmatics, on the other hand, concerns the use of sentences in communication to examine their appropriateness to the context or their departure from the topic and to determine the speech act realised.

According to Ducrot and his colleague, the interpretation of any utterance requires tracing the intersection between the linguistic dimension, that is, the level of structure and the pragmatic dimension. In this theory, a connection is thus established between a set of linguistic data belonging to the linguistic component and another set of data belonging to the rhetorical component.

This approach, which does not separate the pragmatic dimension from the semantic dimension, led Ducrot to affirm that the meaning of any utterance, even in cases where we present the narrowest concept of a word, that is, its most strictly grammatical sense, cannot be described without invoking certain intentions behind its utterance.¹⁰ Thus, the task of language is not only to describe things or represent reality but also to perform linguistic acts.

With respect to the basic concepts of integrated pragmatics, Muhammad Tarus summarised them as follows:¹¹

- Many speech acts possess an argumentative function that manifests itself in the structure of sentences, and sentences carry elements that determine their pragmatic value within the syntactic structure.
- The independence of the uttered expression from informational content and, consequently, the impossibility of judging it as true or false, since the conditions of truth do not apply to it. Judgment concerning it, therefore, becomes based on the strength or weakness governing the relationship between arguments.
- Pragmatics becomes integrated into semantic description and operates directly upon syntactic structure; hence, it is termed integrated pragmatics. Semantic description is conceived as an instrument possessing the same competence as speaking subjects, linking meaning to utterance and presenting the linguistic event as an extension of subjectivity. However, the theory of integrated pragmatics has been associated with argumentative scales as well as with argumentative connectors and factors.

Accordingly, the subject of research, on the basis of this theory, is the clarification of the pragmatic meaning embedded in language structures rather than informational or descriptive meaning.

Concept of Argumentative Orientation

If language is pure argumentation, then argumentation is pure orientation. The *Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Pragmatics* states that argumentative orientation is the direction assigned to an utterance with the intention of reaching a particular set of conclusions rather than others. Argumentative orientation is a property of the sentence that constitutes the object of the act of utterance, and it is what determines the meaning of the utterance.¹² In this context, Moeschler considers orientation to be what determines the meaning of an utterance.

From Ducrot's perspective, in order for an utterance (U1) to be presented as an argument leading to the acceptance of (U2), it is not sufficient that (U1) belong to the set of arguments that ensure assent to (U2). Rather, the linguistic structure of (U1) must satisfy certain conditions that qualify it to function as an argument leading to (U2).¹³

Argumentation is thus embedded within the linguistic construction of events, for it assigns to the linguistic structure of the utterance the task of orientation, on the condition that it contains the necessary elements enabling it to function as an argument leading to (U2). It describes a path from an initial state to a second state, representing the goal the speaker seeks to achieve.

According to Ducrot, argumentation passes through three stages. To argue, it means combining and properly articulating these stages and their elements, which are as follows:

*-The meaning of the utterance (the stage of orientation and the point of departure).

*- Its direction (the stage of orientation).

*- Its argumentative force (the conclusion stage).

Orientation extends across these three stages from the meaning of the utterance to its realisation, and in all these stages, there is no presence of the interlocutors; the presence belongs solely to the language itself and to the utterance alone.

According to Ducrot's theory, the argumentative value of an utterance is not merely the result of the information it conveys. Rather, the sentence may include morphemes and expressions capable of providing an argumentative orientation to the utterance.

Linguistic means are employed by the speaker to direct his discourse and to organise argumentative relations. These are the linguistic components that realise the argumentative function, and they are of two types:

➤ **The first type** consists of elements that connect utterances through syntactic devices, such as coordination. These are called argumentative connectors.

➤ **The second type** consists of elements that occur within a single utterance and intervene in predication, such as negation, affirmation, and restriction. These are called argumentative factors.

Argumentative orientation is the path that proceeds from the argument toward the conclusion. Every argument may be connected to one or more conclusions. Accordingly, argumentative orientation is divided into three types:

• **Unidirectional argumentative orientation:** the orientation of a single argument toward one conclusion.

• **Bidirectional argumentative orientation:** the orientation of one argument toward two conclusions.

• **Multiple argumentative orientation:** the orientation of one argument toward more than two conclusions.

It is also possible to distinguish between two types of arguments: supporting arguments and opposing arguments.¹⁴

Supporting Arguments:

Several arguments may support and reinforce a single conclusion. For example, (*The rain was pouring, and I was far from the bus station, so I hired a taxi*). These arguments must be combined rather than isolated or separated from one another so that they support each

other and move in the direction of a single conclusion. Another example is as follows: (*This is a useful book*) Argument 1, and (*its price is reasonable*) Argument 2; the conclusion is as follows: *buy it*. Among the connections whose arguments are supportive are (*ḥattā, lā siyyamā...*).

Opposing arguments:

Two utterances constitute opposing arguments if they lead to two contradictory conclusions. For example, (*This is a useful book*) Argument 1, *but* (*its price is high*) Argument 2. The first argument conflicts with the second: the first leads to the conclusion '*buy it*,' since it is useful, whereas the second leads to the opposing conclusion '*do not buy it*,' since it is expensive. Among the connectors whose arguments are opposing are (*but nevertheless*).

Argumentative Factors

Language, in its structure, contains markers that realise the argumentative function. Among the most significant of these markers that contribute to the interpretation of discourse are argumentative connectors and argumentative factors. Ducrot distinguished between these two types of markers in language: connectors and argumentative factors.

Unlike the argumentative connector, the argumentative factor does not link argumentative variables, that is, an argument with a conclusion or a set of arguments.¹⁵ Rather, it functions by restricting and delimiting the argumentative possibilities that an utterance may possess.

The argumentative factor is defined as a linguistic unit that, when applied within a given utterance, leads to a transformation in the argumentative potential of that utterance. The transformation produced by the argumentative factor in the semantic content in which it appears does not derive from the informational value that this factor adds; rather, it derives from its purely transformative argumentative function. It does not introduce new informational content; rather, it merely charges and transforms the existing informational content so that it performs a function consistent with the argumentative strategy of the speaker.¹⁶

Thus, when an argumentative factor enters discourse, it reduces the argumentative possibilities of speech and, consequently, assists the receiver in determining the intended meaning.

The category of factors includes particles such as *perhaps* (*rubamā*), *approximately* (*taqrīban*), *almost* (*kāda*), *little* (*qalīlan*), *much* (*kathīran*), *mā, illā*, and the particles of restriction.

For example, "approximately" in the sentence:

The project has been approximately completed.

Here, the factor "approximately" reduces the number of possible interpretations. If it were omitted, we would then face a range of interpretations, including a purely informational meaning, a question, and others. From this perspective, argumentative factors constitute the primary indicator and evidence that argumentation is embedded within the very structure of language itself.

Among the functions of the argumentative factor are as follows:¹⁷

- **Eliminating the multiplicity of implicatures** by transferring the receiver from multiplicity and ambiguity to the unity of the conclusion and the intended meaning of the utterance. In this way, the receiver does not become lost among the various conclusions to which the argumentative utterance may lead. Consequently, the interpretative paths are no longer multiple, as the argumentative factor restricts them so that they lead to a single conclusion, thereby shifting the utterance from an informational function to an argumentative one.

- **Activating and prompting argumentative loci**,¹⁸ where the locus constitutes the principal basis for the connection between (U1), that is, the given premise and the

conclusion (U2). The factor is also regarded as one of the guarantees ensuring the continuity of discourse and as an element contributing to its organisation.

• **Strengthening the orientation toward the conclusion (C)** at the level of what are called **argumentative scales**.¹⁹

Thus, among the functions of argumentative factors is that they trace an argumentative path that ensures the attainment of the conclusion; they may stimulate and activate argumentative loci or even invalidate or suspend them.

The argumentative factor does not merely restrict the possibilities of argumentation within a set of sentences; rather, it constrains them through paths linking the argument to the conclusion. Accordingly, the argumentative act becomes a network of loci representing argumentative paths that must be followed to reach a particular conclusion.

Argumentative factors in the Arabic language include particles such as negation and restriction, exception, perhaps (*rubamā*), almost (*kāda*), approximately (*taqriban*), little (*qalīlan*), much (*kathīran*), at least, and others. Some of these particles may be illustrated through examples from the Qur'ān.

Negation as an Instrument of Orientation

Negation is considered an argumentative factor through which the speaker achieves their purpose of securing the receiver's assent and acceptance by directing the utterance toward a particular conclusion. The particles of negation in Arabic include **lā, lan, mā, laysa, and lam**.

For example:

Zayd came to me, not 'Amr.

Here, the speaker negates the possibility that the one who came was 'Amr.

Another example with negation using **mā** is as follows:

1. *I did not strike Zayd.*
2. *It was not Zayd that I struck.*

Each utterance displays an argumentative function. In the first example, the arguments are substituted, as the speaker denies that he struck Zayd. In the second example, the speaker negates what had been established in the receiver's mind, namely, that the act of striking was directed at a person and that this person was Zayd. Here, the act of striking did occur, but it was not directed at Zayd. This is what 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī referred to when he stated that the striking occurred from you upon a person, and it was assumed that this person was Zayd; therefore, you denied that he was the one.²⁰

Thus, negation constitutes an orientation upon an orientation. Once the negation factor is incorporated, the conclusion (C) becomes determined, and the receiver encounters no cognitive burden in grasping the meaning. In addition to its orientational function, the negation factor is necessary for describing the deep semantic structure of the utterance. In the verse:

Arabic Qur'ānic verse:

وَقَوْلِهِمْ إِنَّا قَتَلْنَا الْمَسِيحَ عِيسَى ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ وَمَا قَتَلُوهُ وَمَا صَلَبُوهُ وَلَكِنْ شُبِّهَ لَهُمْ

Translation:

That they said (in boast), "We killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah"; but they killed him not, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them. Sūrat al-Nisā', 4:157

In this verse, negation occurs as a response to what they claimed, namely, the denial of the killing and crucifixion of Christ.

Similarly, in the verse:

Arabic Qur'ānic verse:

أَلَا يَوْمَ يَأْتِيهِمْ لَيْسَ مَصْرُوفًا عَنْهُمْ وَحَاقَ بِهِمْ مَا كَانُوا بِهِ يَسْتَهْزِئُونَ

Translation:

Indeed, on the day it comes to them, it will not be averted from them, and that which they used to mock will encompass them. Sūrat Hūd, 11:8

Here, the negation particle **laysa** serves to orient the discourse toward an emphatic confirmation that the punishment they deny cannot be averted but will inevitably descend upon them and destroy them.

The expression “**ghayra anna**” (**however/nevertheless**) may also function as a negating device and thereby orient discourse, as in the following examples:

- *The evidence was very strong; nevertheless, the judge was not convinced.*
- Despite the presence of strong evidence, the first argument, which would normally lead to the expected conclusion (that the accused would be convicted or acquitted) is **that**, the actual outcome is that the judge was not convinced, a conclusion contrary to expectations.
- *I exerted great effort in my studies; nevertheless, the results were disappointing.*
- The first statement constitutes the argument (*I exerted great effort in my studies*), while the conclusion is (*the results were disappointing*).

Some particles negate the occurrence of an event absolutely, such as **lā**, which directs discourse toward impossibility, for example:

Work hard ;the sky does not rain gold.

Restriction as an Argumentative Factor

Linguistically, **restriction (qaṣr)** signifies confinement or limitation. God Almighty says,

Arabic Qur'ānic verse:

حُورٌ مَّقْصُورَاتٌ فِي الْحَيْمَاتِ

Translation:

"Fair ones reserved in pavilions," meaning that their gaze does not extend to anyone other than their husbands.

Restriction refers to the specification of one thing exclusively by means of another through a particular device.²¹

Restriction is among the argumentative factors the speaker employs to direct discourse toward the orientation he or she intends. Among its forms is as follows:

Restriction through Negation and Exception

This form functions to confine something exclusively to its proper subject, excluding all others, and it is commonly used in contexts where the receiver denies or doubts the claim.

In this context, al-Jurjānī states the following:

"As for the informative statement by negation and affirmation 'this is nothing but such-and-such' or 'it is nothing but such-and-such' it is used in matters that the addressee denies or doubts. When you say 'he is nothing but correct' or 'he is nothing but mistaken', you say this to someone who rejects that the matter is as you describe. Likewise, if you see a person from afar and say 'it is none but Zayd', you would not say so unless your companion suspects that he is not Zayd and insists in denying that he might be so."

Among the Qur'ānic examples is the following:

Arabic Qur'ānic verse:

﴿ قُلْ لَا أَقُولُ لَكُمْ عِنْدِي خَزَائِنُ اللَّهِ وَلَا أَعْلَمُ الْغَيْبَ وَلَا أَقُولُ لَكُمْ إِنِّي مَلَكٌ ۚ إِن أَنْتَبِعْ إِلَّا مَا يُوحَىٰ إِلَيَّ ۚ قُلْ هَلْ يَسْتَوِي الْأَعْمَىٰ

وَالْبَصِيرُ ۚ أَفَلَا تَتَفَكَّرُونَ ﴿ [الأنعام: 50]

Translation:

Say (O Muhammad SAW): "I do not tell you that with me are the treasures of Allah, nor (that) I know the unseen; nor I tell you that I am an angel. I but follow what is revealed to me by inspiration." Say: "Are the blind and the one who sees equal? will you not then take thought?"

In this verse, the expression "illā mā" restricts following exclusively to revelation and does not extend beyond it.²²

Another example is the verse:

Arabic Qur'ānic verse:

﴿ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَنْفِقُوا مِنْ طَيِّبَاتِ مَا كَسَبْتُمْ وَمِمَّا أَخْرَجْنَا لَكُمْ مِنَ الْأَرْضِ وَلَا تَيَمَّمُوا الْحَبِيبَ مِنْهُ تُنْفِقُونَ وَلَسْتُمْ بِآخِذِيهِ إِلَّا أَنْ تُغْمِضُوا فِيهِ ۚ وَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ غَنِيٌّ حَمِيدٌ ﴾

[البقرة: 267]

Translation:

O you who believe! Spend the good things which you have (legally) earned, and of that which We have produced from the earth for you, and do not aim at that which is bad to spend from it, (though) you would not accept it save if you close your eyes and tolerate therein. Moreover, know that Allah is Rich (Free of all wants) and Worthy of all praise. Sūrat al-Baqarah, 2:266

In this verse concerning spending, the restrictive construction "illā an" narrows the argumentative possibilities by directing the reader toward the conclusion that spending should be from good wealth rather than from inferior wealth, thereby dispelling any assumption that one may give charity from any wealth whatsoever.

Restriction by (innamā):

The particle **innamā** affirms an action for one entity while negating it for others. Al-Jurjānī states, "Know that it conveys, in the speech that follows it, the affirmation of the action for one thing and its negation for anything else. When you say, 'Only Zayd came to me', it is understood that you intend to deny that anyone else was the one who came. The meaning of the statement with it resembles the meaning of your saying: 'Zayd came to me, not 'Amr', except that it has a particular advantage: with it, you comprehend the affirmation of the action for one entity and its negation for others, in a single state. This is not the case with the expression 'Zayd came to me, not 'Amr',²³ for there you understand them in two stages. A second advantage is that it makes the matter manifest in indicating that the one who came is Zayd, whereas this clarity does not appear when the statement is formed with *lā*, as in 'Zayd came to me, not 'Amr'."

In the verse:

Arabic Qur'ānic verse:

﴿ إِنَّمَا يَعْمُرُ مَسَاجِدَ اللَّهِ مَنْ آمَنَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ وَأَقَامَ الصَّلَاةَ وَآتَى الزَّكَاةَ وَلَمْ يَخْشَ إِلَّا اللَّهَ ۚ فَعَسَىٰ أُولَٰئِكَ أَنْ يَكُونُوا مِنَ الْمُهْتَبِينَ ﴾

[التوبة: 18]

Translation:

"The Mosques of Allah shall be maintained only by those who believe in Allah and the Last Day; perform As-Salat (Iqamat-as-Salat), and give Zakat and fear none but Allah. It is they who are expected to be on the right track. Sūrat al-Tawbah, 9:18

The argumentative factor in this verse, **innamā**, restricts and constrains the argumentative possibilities. It confines the maintenance of mosques to belief in God and the Last Day and restricts this role to believers alone, excluding others. The verse was a response to the polytheists who claimed the right to maintain the Sacred Mosque.

Similarly, in the verse:

Arabic Qur'ānic verse:

﴿وَإِذَا لَقُوا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا قَالُوا آمَنَّا وَإِذَا خَلَوْا إِلَىٰ شَيَاطِينِهِمْ قَالُوا إِنَّا مَعَكُمْ إِنَّمَا نَحْنُ مُسْتَهْزِئُونَ﴾

[البقرة: 14]

Translation:

"And when they meet those who believe, they say: 'We believe,' but when they are alone with their Shayatin (devils - polytheists, hypocrites, etc.), they say: 'Truly, we are with you; verily, we were but mocking.'" Sūrat al-Baqarah, 2:14

Their statement "*We were but mocking*" restricts itself to mockery. The restriction expressed by **innamā** specifies the true nature of the Jews in this context, presenting mockery as the characteristic that distinguishes them; thus, the factor serves to express that meaning.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it may be observed that, in Ducrot's theory, argumentation is inherent in the very essence of language, regardless of its use; it is therefore a purely linguistic phenomenon independent of the facts of the external world. The fact that language possesses an argumentative function means that discursive sequences are determined not only by the facts expressed within utterances but also by the structure of these utterances themselves and by the linguistic materials employed and activated within them, as Abū Bakr al-ʿAzzāwī states. Ducrot developed several concepts, such as integrated pragmatics, in which the semantic and pragmatic dimensions are integrated, as well as the argumentative scale and argumentative loci. Among his fundamental concepts are argumentative orientation and argumentative direction, which involve assigning a particular direction to an utterance to reach specific conclusions. The linguistic structure determines this direction through argumentative factors. These factors constitute an essential component of Ducrot's theory. They are linguistic morphemes that confine and restrict the argumentative possibilities of the content of utterances, thereby tracing an argumentative path that ensures the attainment of the conclusion. Consequently, they function as stimulants and activators of argumentative loci, as well as elements capable of invalidating or suspending them. Argumentative factors in the Arabic language include particles such as negation and restriction, exception, perhaps (*rubamā*), almost (*kāda*), approximately (*taqrīban*), little (*qalīlan*), much (*kathīran*), and at least.

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12. Oswald Ducrot and Jean Claude Anscombe. *L argumentation dans la langue*. Collection Philosophie et Langage. Bruxelles Pierre Mardaga Editeur, 1983, 7.

13. Endnotes:

¹ Oswald Ducrot and Jean Claude Anscombe. *L argumentation dans la langue*. Philosophie et Langage. Bruxelles Mardaga Editeur, 1983, 7.

² Ibid., 7.

³ Ibid., 8.

⁴ Abdallah Soula. *Al Hijaj fi al Quran al Karim min Khilal Aham Khasaisihi al Uslubiyya*. Beirut Dar al Farabi, 1st ed., 2001, 33.

⁵ Abu Bakr al Azzawi. *Al Lugha wa al Hijaj*. Beirut Muassasat al Rahab, 2009, 14 to 15.

⁶ Saber Habacha al Habacha. *Al Tadawuliyya wa al Hijaj Dakhil wa Nusus*. Damascus Safahat lil Dirasah wa al Nashr, 1st ed., 2008, 21.

⁷ Oswald Ducrot and Jean Claude Anscombe. *L argumentation dans la langue*, 2.

⁸ Jacques Moeschler and Anne Reboul. *Al Qamus al Mawsui lil Tadawuliyya*. Translated by a group of researchers. Tunis Dar Sinatra, (2010), 353.

⁹ Chokri Mabkhout. "Nazariyyat al Hijaj fi al Lugha." In *Aham Nazariyyat al Hijaj min Aristu ila al Yawm*, edited by Hammadi Samoud. Tunis Universite de la Manouba Faculte des Lettres des Arts et des Humanites, 2011.

¹⁰ Abdellatif Adil. *Balaghat al Khitab fi al Munazara*. Beirut Manshurat Difaf, (2013), 96.

¹¹ Mohammed Tarous. *Al Nazariyya al Hijajiyya min Khilal al Dirasat al Balaghiyya wa al Mantiqiyya wa al Lisaniyya*. Morocco Dar al Thaqafa li al Nashr wa al Tawzi, 1st ed., 2005, 106 to 107.

¹² Jacques Moeschler and Anne Reboul. *Al Qamus al Mawsui lil Tadawuliyya*, 377.

¹³ Oswald Ducrot and Jean Claude Anscombe. *L argumentation dans la langue*, 81.

¹⁴ Patrick Charaudeau and Dominique Maingueneau. *Dictionnaire d analyse du discours*. Translated by Abdelkader Meheri and Hammadi Samoud. Tunis Dar Sinatra, 1st ed., 2001, 73.

¹⁵ On the argumentative connector, see Patrick Charaudeau and Dominique Maingueneau, *Dictionnaire d analyse du discours*, 12. There are also important differences between the argumentative factor and the argumentative connector. The argumentative factor links two semantic units within the same linguistic act. It therefore functions as a propositional connector, whereas the argumentative connector links two linguistic acts and is therefore considered a pragmatic connector. See also Hazim Tarish and Hatim al Saidi, *Al Tarakib al Taliliyyah fi al Quran al Karim Dirasah Hijajiyyah*, PhD diss. Iraq, 2014, 88.

¹⁶ Rachid al Radi. "Al Hijajiyyat al Lisaniyya bayna al Manhajiyya wa al Bunyawiyya." In *Al Hijaj Maqhumuhu wa Majalatuhi Dirasat Nazariyya wa Tatbiqiyya fi al Balagha al Jadida*, introduction by Hafiz Ismail Alawi. Amman Alam al Kutub, 1st ed., 2010, 50.

¹⁷ Izz al Din al Najih. *Al Awamil al Hijajiyya fi al Lugha al Arabiyya*, 30.

¹⁸ According to Ducrot and Anscombe, the transition from an argumentative utterance to a conclusion utterance occurs through the application of a set of general principles called loci. These are commonly accepted ideas shared by a wide audience and upon which reasoning in language is based. Their acceptability does not derive from their inferential form but from their connection with widely shared opinions. Every argumentative relation requires the presence of a locus between the argument and the conclusion, and it is this locus that allows the argument to lead to a specific conclusion rather than another.

¹⁹ Argumentative scales are among the concepts of Ducrot's theory. They represent an ordering relation among arguments. According to Ducrot, any argumentative field that contains an ordering relation among arguments is considered argumentative. For further details, see Abdellatif Adil, *Balaghat al Khitab fi al Munazara*, 101.

²⁰ Abd al Qahir al Jurjani. *Dalail al Ijaz*. Edited by Mahmoud Mohammad Shaker. Cairo Matbaat al Madani, 3rd ed., 1992, 126.

²¹ Al Khatib al Qazwini. *Talkhis al Miftah fi al Ma ani wa al Bayan wa al Badi*. Edited by Yasin al Ayoubi. Beirut Al Maktaba al Asriyya, 2011, 93.

²² Abd al Qahir al Jurjani. *Dalail al Ijaz*, 332.

²³ Ibid., 336.