

Talent Competition between the U.S. and the PRC: Tough Way for Chinese Students and Scholars Returning to the People's Republic of China from the United States in 1950s

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Abstract: During the Cold War, Chinese students and scholars studying in the United State became talents won over by both the United State and the People's Republic of China in 1950s. The United State issued exit prohibition and assistant policies on the Chinese talents to retain them, and the People's Republic of China introduced favorable measures to attract them back home. Through analyzing the policies and measures taken by the U.S and the PRC, this article investigates the experience of Chinese students and scholars in the talent competition between the U.S and the PRC, focusing primarily on the influence factors on the tough way back home for the returnees.

Keywords: Chinese Students and Scholars; Cold War; Talent Retention; Talent Return.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since China began sending students to the United States in 1870s, Chinese students and scholars studying in the United States have long been required to return to their home country after completing their education and are not allowed to stay in the United States. The Nationalist Government in Nanjing dispatched thousands of students to the United States in 1940s, also demanded that they had to return to China after completing their education. For China, returning students and scholars were talents trained by advanced western education systems, while for the United States, returning Chinese intellectuals were considered as “future democratic forces” who will be in the interest of the United States. But things began to change after the establishment of the PRC in the Cold War period, resulting in the returning problem of Chinese students and scholars studying in the United States in 1950s. In 1949, there were still over 5000 Chinese students and scholars studying in the United States, who faced the

problem of staying in the U.S. or returning to the PRC. This problem was not only decided by the Chinese students and scholars their own, but also influenced by the talent competition between the U.S. and the PRC. Between 1949-1950, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service still prohibited Chinese students and scholars from becoming permanent residents of the United States, while the U.S. Department of State supported the Chinese students and scholars staying in the U.S. and not to go to the PRC to help the construction of the communist country. Until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, The differences between the US Immigration Service and the State Department were gradually reaching a consensus. The U.S. government placed exit prohibition to Chinese scientific talents, while also granting financial assistance for stranded Chinese students and scholars, amending immigration laws to make Chinese intellectuals valid legal citizens. The U.S. government believes that Chinese students and scholars returning to communist PRC are aiding enemy and will threaten U.S. national security, and keeping Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. was more in line with U.S. interests. Therefore, most Chinese students and scholars eventually willingly or unwillingly applied for legal citizenship in the United States. They changed the status of Chinese people in American society, from "Yellow Peril" to model immigrants (Hsu, 2009). The U.S. government has passed a series of laws and regulations that have granted Chinese intellectuals nonquota visas, legal access to employment, stays of deportation, and permanent residency (Hsu, 2012). Chinese intellectuals staying in America have changed Chinese social structure as the lower class in the United States, and have also gained a place in the upper class of intellectuals, such as Chen-Ning Yang and Tsung-Dao Lee. Yet, this was just one aspect of the story. Not all Chinese students and scholars finally stayed in the United States, and some eventually returned to the PRC. In recent years, Chinese researchers have continuously collected and compiled a list of nearly 1800 Chinese intellectuals who returned to China from the United States from 1949 to the 1960s, mainly in 1950s. *Dictionary of Chinese Scholars Who Returned from North America in the 1950s* published by China Science and technology Press on 2023 provides the name and brief information of the 1800 students and scholars. Among them, the information of 1364 people is relatively detailed, and the information of others still needs to be supplemented. Xuesen Qian is one of the most renowned figures in the said returnees. It is well known that Qian's return from the United States to the PRC was a tortuous experience due to his important value in science, with the United States trying to detain him and China striving for his return.

Qian was also one of the main figures in the negotiations between China and the United States at the Geneva conference on the issue of Chinese students and scholars being detained. If Qian was an individual case, what about other returnees? What had they gone through to achieve the purpose of returning to their motherland? What impact did the talent competition between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China have on them during the Cold War? What was the situation after returning? This article will attempt to clarify these issues from the perspective of the returnees. Research on these Chinese students and scholars has generally focused on their staying in the US, such as the United States' policies towards them, their legal status in the United States, the economic assistance provided by the U.S. government to them, and changes in the American view of the "Yellow Peril", etc., while less focus on the returnees and their returning way. With the publication of the *Dictionary of Chinese Scholars Who Returned from North America in the 1950s* and interviews (2023) and interviews with some Chinese scientist who returned from the U.S. in 1950s, this group of returnees has become clearer, and research on them could be deeper and more expand.

2. U.S. GOVERNMENT'S EXIT PROHIBITION ON CHINESE STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS IN 1950S

The change in US policies is the most direct factor affecting Chinese students and scholars' return to their home countries. Since the establishment of the PRC, there have been changes in the US government's stance on Chinese students and scholars' return to PRC. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. government's policies towards Chinese students were moderately loose. Chinese students and scholars might encounter some practical difficulties when returning to the PRC, but it could be achieved. After the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. government' attitude towards Chinese students and scholars gradually changed and issue an exit prohibition in 1951 to Chinese students and scholars studying science and engineering to prevent their leaving from U.S. Many Chinese students chose to wait or applied for permanent residency in the United States. Until 1954, the prohibition gradually revoked and the Chinese again got the right to leave this country.

2.1 Before the Exit Prohibition on 1951

As mentioned earlier, the consistent policy of the United States in cultivating Chinese students was that they must return to China after

completing their studies. When PRC was first established, the U.S. Congress retained hopes of achieving old goals so that Chinese students might return to lead China in friendship with America. At the beginning, the prerequisite for receiving economic aid from the United States was to ensure returning to China. Along with the National Government gradually lost power in Chinese Mainland, the economic resources of Chinese students became a serious problem. The United States Government's aid to stranded Chinese students began in 1948 and lasted for seven years. At first, each recipient was required to sign a pledge that upon completion of his education he would return to China and make his knowledge and skills available in his country's service. This condition of the grant was discontinued when the loss of the mainland to the Communists made return no longer feasible (Han, 1993). This 1948 program's goal was to train Chinese leaders to wield pro-American influence upon returning to China. Title II of Public Law 535(1950) provided an additional \$6,000,000 in emergency aid to assist Chinese students who were still in the course of their study. "Although the pledge to return to China continued to be a formal requirement in order to be eligible for the financial aid, the recipients were allowed to stay in the United States for a period of three years either after they graduated, or when they failed to maintain the full-time student status (Han, 1993)." Also, during this period, most of the travel expenses for Chinese students returning to their home countries came from economic assistance provided by the US government. 1949-1951 became the first peak period for Chinese students and scholars' returning to China. At least 292 Chinese students and scholars returned to the PRC in 1949, 597 returned in 1950, and 276 returned in 1951. (see Figure 1) At that time, most Chinese took steamship *Cleveland President*, *General Gordon*, *Wilson President* and so on by the APL (American President Lines) back and forth in the Pacific to return to China. Since September 1949, APL ships bound for China have only docked in Hong Kong, not in Chinese Mainland. In September 1949, the *Cleveland President*, bound for Hong Kong, carried more than 20 Chinese students and scholars who were the first to return to the Chinese Mainland after the founding of New China. According to incomplete statistics, during the two-year period starting from September 1949, about 20 batches of Chinese students and scholars returned to China by APL lines, with each batch consisting of a few to a dozen people, as well as dozens to hundreds of people. Although it was possible to transit through Hong Kong to return to the PRC, the process was not so easy. At the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the British Hong Kong government first stipulated that

Chinese scholars must hold a Chinese entry permit in order to apply for a transit Hong Kong visa. In order to address this issue, the PRC government issued open letters welcoming foreign students to return home at the end of December 1949, wrote “This is to certify that Mr. XX and all Chinese students are welcome to return to New China (Fu & Buchman).” On June 23, 1950 (at the outbreak of the Korean War), the British Hong Kong government announced that applying for a transit visa no longer required a Chinese entry permit. However, in November (when the Chinese People's Volunteer Army entered Korea in October), it was stipulated that only Chinese people who originally resided in Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi could obtain a Hong Kong transit visa. Afterwards, the British Hong Kong government revised the regulations, stating that only Hong Kong residents or those with relatives in Hong Kong could obtain a transit visa (Zhang, 2023). In fact, even if there were relatives to guarantee and help, the Hong Kong government would deliberately delay the processing time, and it might even take several months to get a transit visa. When the ship arrived near Hong Kong, according to the regulations of the British Hong Kong government, non Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi residents were not allowed to go to the coast of Hong Kong, while the Kowloon Customs of the PRC sent a small boat to transport the returning Chinese to Kowloon Station. At that time, China and the United States did not establish formal diplomatic relations.

As commissioned by the PRC government, the Indian Embassy in the United States acted as an agent for civil affairs between China and the United States. Chinese students could go to the Indian embassy to handle the procedures for returning to the PRC, and even apply for travel expenses from the Indian embassy. Wang Shouwu, his wife Ge Xiuhuai, and their underage daughter completed the procedures for returning as refugees through the Indian Embassy in the United States, and the exit permit was a refugee certificate. The family returned to China in September 1950 aboard the steamship *President Wilson*. As Wang and his wife were already working in the United States and had the ability to pay for travel expenses, they did not apply to the Indian embassy for advance payment of travel expenses. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 made Chinese students and scholars' returning home more completed. The steamship *President Wilson* (17th voyage), which departed on August 31, 1950, was the voyage with the largest number of Chinese students and scholars on board. At least 128 Chinese students were on board, and there was a list of these 128 Chinese. When the ship passed through Yokohama, Japan, the U.S. authorities intercepted and detained three Chinese students and scholars,

Zhao Zhongyao, Shen Shanjiong, and Luo Shijun. The officials from the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States summoned four Chinese scientists on board, Zhao Zhongyao, Shen Shanjiong, Luo Shijun, and Bao Wenkui. Bao stayed up late and didn't hear the broadcast, and escaped unharmed. Zhao, Shen, and Luo were interrogated and detained at the Yokohama Nest Duck Prison. When the ship arrived in Manila, Philippines, Bao was once again summoned and checked for luggage by US officials. However, due to the need to handle formal procedures for capturing people on Philippine soil or in the sea, and the need to set sail early the next morning due to the typhoon, the US officials did not have enough time to legally detain him. After questioning Bao for three hours, they finally released him but detained his notebook, saying that they were looking for someone to identify the scientific symbols on it. Other people on board sent a telegram to Beijing in the name of more than a hundred Chinese on board, requesting the PRC government to protest against this matter. After strong protests, the U.S. released the three on November 15th. Before their release, Kuomintang official Chen Yanjiong talked to them and advised them to go to Taiwan, stating that they could bring their mainland relatives to Taiwan. He also presented a telegram from the President of National Taiwan University, Fu Sinian, inviting the three of them to teach at National Taiwan University, but they all refused. In addition, Qian Xuesen's luggage returning to China was also checked in on this ship, but all of it was detained by U.S. customs. The remaining Chinese students and scholars on this ship finally arrived their destination (Wills, 2014). After this incident, the return of Chinese students and scholars to PRC became more complicated. The outbreak of the Korean War undoubtedly posed obstacles for Chinese students returning home. The number of people returning to China in 1951 was 276, which slumped compared to the number 597 in 1950. (see Figure 1) Zheng Zheming applied to return to China in 1950 and 1951, but neither of them was approved by the U.S. Immigration Service. The Immigration Service also questioned him on sensitive political issues concerning the CPC. By 1952, the Immigration Service had declared him an illegal resident. When he applied for automatic departure and was approved, the Immigration Service still refused to allow him to leave the United States, and wrote to him that considering that it is not in the interests of the United States for you to return to PRC, although we agreed that you can leave automatically, you are not allowed to leave, nor are you allowed to have any intention to leave. His passport was also confiscated by the immigration office. Zheng was eventually allowed to leave US at the end of 1954 and returned to PRC

in February 1955. Except for some special cases, the vast majority of Chinese students and scholars who returned to China between 1949 and 1951 were finally got there.

2.2 During the Exit Prohibition from 1951-1954

The exit prohibition letter sending to Chinese students and scholars studying in science and technology on 1951 made it almost impossible to return to the PRC. There were about 70 percent of Chinese students and scholars were in science and technology, and only 30 percent were in humanities and social science. The scope of this prohibition was very broad. In September 1951, the steamship *Cleveland President* carried a group of Chinese students back to the PRC. When the ship passed through Honolulu, the U.S. government intercepted and detained nine Chinese students and scholars on board, presented them with the U.S. government's newly issued exit prohibition, and deported all nine of them back to the United States. Afterwards, the return of Chinese students and scholars began to be subject to clear prohibitions. *Chinese Science Bulletin* reported on this matter on November 1951, stating that on September 20th, nine of Chinese students including Liu Anhua, Ling Han, Wu Jiangbo, Zhu Yong, Wang Debao, Xie Jialin, Wu Xuan, Li Baokun, Wang Liangneng, and 12 other students, traveled from San Francisco to Cleveland to return to their home country. On September 25th, when the ship passed through Honolulu, Liu Anhua and nine others were suddenly searched by personnel from the US Immigration and Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and armed police, and were illegally detained and brought ashore. The other 12 students on the ship have arrived in Guangzhou. Later, five of the nine detained Chinese finally returned to the PRC and four of them stayed in the U.S. Among the five returnees, Zhu Yong, Wang Debao, Xie Jialin and Wang Liangneng who were studying in science and technology returned during 1954-1955 and only one Li Baokun who was studying in management returned in 1951.

On October 9, 1951, Wen-Shao Wang also received a letter from Immigration and Naturalization Service of United States Department of Justice, which restricted his freedom to leave the United States. The letter said:

“Dear Sir:

Section 223(a) of the Act of May 22, 1918, as amended (22 U.S.C. 223(a)) provides that it shall be unlawful “for any alien to depart from or enter or to attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations

and expectations as the President shall prescribe.”

Section 225 of said Act (22 U.S. C. 225) further provides that any person who shall willfully violate any of the provisions of section 223, or of any order or proclamation of the president Promulgated, or of any permit, rule, or regulation issued thereunder, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than \$5,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Pursuant to the authority contained in said Act of May 22 1918, as amended, and the President's Proclamation No. 2523 of November 14, 1941, and the provisions of Part 175, Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, you are hereby ordered not to depart or attempt to depart from the United States, whether or not you have a permit to depart, until you have been notified that this order has been revoked (MacFarquhar et al., 1987).” Wang obtained a Ph.D. in Civil Engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1952, followed by research work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and finally returned to China in December 1954. Wang's experience was not an isolated case, as the vast majority of Chinese scholars in science and engineering had received such letters, making it almost impossible to return home. Section 215(a) of the 1952 McCarran Walter Act further provided legal basis for preventing Chinese from leaving the country (Howe, 1953). Actually, as long as Chinese student or scholar, especially in science and technology, submitted an application to the immigration office to leave US, he or she would receive a prohibition instead of a permit for leaving. This has caused many Chinese to stop going to the Immigration Bureau to apply for departure (Croddy, 1997). As a result, the number of returnees decreased significantly from 1952 to 1954. Returnee number was 53 in 1952, 37 in 1953, 51 in 1954. (see Figure 1) A data from the Committee on Educational Interchange Policy showed that approximately 150 Chinese, whose technical skills might have aided the Communists, were temporarily detained after 1951. Although the number provided by the Committee was only 150 Chinese students and scholars received the prohibition, the issuance of the exit prohibition clearly affected the entire group of Chinese students and scholars. It is said that if Chinese students studying science and engineering apply to the immigration office for departure, they would receive a prohibition instead of a permit for leaving. Under such threats, many Chinese students who wanted to return chose not to apply for departure temporarily to avoid trouble. Some Chinese students and scholars' passports were taken away and not returned because of their applying for departure procedures. From the summer of 1955, when the detention orders were lifted, however, though the end of last year, only 39 of those 150 detained actually chose to

leave the United States (Liu, 1956). At this time, Chinese students were in a very awkward situation. On the one hand, it was almost impossible for them to leave the U.S. and return home, and on the other hand, their identity in the U.S. was illegal as their passports and visas had expired, which was a common problem for them. In order to solve the problem of passport and visa, Chinese immigrants applied for new passport from the Consulate General of the Nationalist Government in the United States and a new visa from the U.S. Immigration Service, but the process was not smooth. When they went to the Nationalist consulate to apply for a new passport, their old passport was confiscated, but the new passport was not issued. Someone applied to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Service for a new visa, and after their old passport was confiscated, they were issued a paper to replace their passport and visa, which was valid for one year and still needed to be replaced after expiration. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the US immigration authorities directly confiscated the passports of Chinese students who applied for visa extensions. The worst case was that without a passport, those who requested to return to the PRC might be considered illegal residents by the U.S. immigration authorities. Du Lian Yao, Mao Hanli and other overseas Chinese who applied to return to China were detained by the U.S. immigration authorities on the grounds of not having a passport (Liu, 2013). In order to legalize the academic status of Chinese students stranded in the United States, the US government enacted the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, allowing Chinese students to obtain permanent status. Section 4(a)(13) of this act, Special nonquota immigrant visas were allotted “not to exceed two thousand visas to refugees of Chinese ethnic origin whose passports for travel to the United States are endorsed by the Chinese National Government or its authorized representative (Auerbach, 1953).” Five months after the Act was enacted, Samuel Kung conducted a survey in the New York area. Of 208 students surveyed, 51(24.5 percent) had applied for permanent resident status; 42(20.5 percent) said they wished to apply; 44(21percent) said they did not wish to apply; and 71(34percent) were undecided (Kung, 1955). For reference, the latest research data shows that the number of people who finally returned to PRC was about 1800. Based on the calculation of total more than 5000 foreign students and scholars in the United States at that time, the number of people who returned accounted for more than 35%. According to Kung's data, 21% of them should be determined to return to China, while the highest proportion of those who hesitate was 34%. From the final proportion of those who returned to China, which was 35%, it can be seen that only a small portion of those who hesitated eventually

return to China. Because, the United States provided many conveniences for residency, while returning home was relatively more difficult. However, there were still a few Chinese students and scholars leaved the U.S. though some abnormal ways and finally arrived the PRC in this prohibition period. Xie Xide graduated with a PhD in 1951, but due to the exit prohibition, she was unable to directly return to the PRC. She applied for a travel permit to enter the United Kingdom on the grounds of marrying her fiancé Cao Tianqin in the UK. After going to the UK to get married, the couple boarded the steamship *Guangzhou* from Cambridge, England in August 1952 and returned to the PRC in 1952. Wu Zhonghua and Li Minhua, the couple, under the guise of traveling to the UK, took a plane out of the U.S., detoured through Switzerland and Moscow, and returned to PRC in 1954. When discussing on the problem of detained Chinese students and scholars, people usually pay attention to the official channels of the Geneva talks between the People's Republic of China and the United States. It is worth noting that some Chinese students and scholars themselves had been making efforts and attempts to fight for their right to return home before the Geneva Conference.

Some Chinese students and scholars believed that the exit prohibition violated their basic rights and personal freedom, causing great inconvenience for those who wanted to return to China. In this situation, some progressive individuals among these Chinese students and scholars consciously carried out self-rescue activities. Li Hengde was one of the most active people. Li contacted American lawyer Ira Gollobin who gave Chinese students three advises. First, united and appealed to return to China to US government; second, obtained support of the PRC government; third, rally support of progressive groups in the United States, although the help of these groups might be limited. Li and other Chinese acted in these three directions in the next few years until the revoke of the exit prohibition. Li and other Chinese students wrote some letters to Chinese government and asked more than one American to find a way to pass them on to China. Li recalled that he didn't know if they brought those letters to China and didn't know what connection they have with China or how they brought the information to China, and it's not convenient for them to ask. That was a very risky thing. Yu Jun wrote a letter to Albert Einstein on September 8, 1954, hoping that he could speak up for the plight of Chinese students and scholars. Einstein replied on September 12, 1954, but due to his own disadvantaged situation, he did not agree to Yu Jun's request. Einstein's reply wrote that: "I am very sorry to learn that the young Chinese who have been studying in this country are being prevented

to return to their homeland. A recommendation from my side, I regret to say, would not help, for I have repeatedly criticized the condition prevailing in this country and therefore have no influential friends who could assist in the matter (Li, 2021).” Chinese students from the East (26 people) and the West (9 people) of the United States wrote two open letters to President Dwight Eisenhower on August 5, 1954 and September 2, 1954, respectively. The letters wrote that “We sincerely appeal to you, Mr. President, to make it possible for any Chinese students to be allowed to leave the United States whenever he so chooses, and we petition you to revoke this restraining order. In doing so we believe that the security of this great nation would not be in any way endangered. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that by so doing a firmer bond of friendship and understanding would be established between our two peoples.” “The sole reason for restraining their departure is their acquisition of technical training. We would respectfully point out that the technical training we have received here involves no codes of secrecy, indeed the spreading of scientific knowledge and technical know – how has been the very spirit of a great tradition of this country ever since its establishment (Miller, 1967; Shafig, 2016).” Chinese students mailed the letters to many media, and their detained prohibition on leaving in the U.S. were reported around the world, which caused pressure on the public opinion of the U.S. government. Later, Committee on educational interchange policy emphasized in its investigation that, “unfortunately, such ‘front page’ incidents involving Chinese received the banner headlines while the financial, occupational, educational and medical assistance that was provided to thousands of persons went almost unnoticed in the world's press (Han, 1993).”

2.3 Revocation of the Exit Prohibition after 1954

After the revoke of the restraining orders on return, there was a small upsurge in Chinese returning to PRC in 1955, but the number of returnees declined significantly compared with that before 1952. The number continue to decline in the late 1950s, and by the 1960s, there were only very few returnees. According to the terms of study, Chinese students almost all finished their study at the time of the revoke of the prohibition. During the prohibition time, most Chinese students and scholars, without the exit permit, had managed to stay in the United States and started their own families and career. Therefore, even if the prohibition on returning was lifted, it would be difficult for them to choose to change their established life and work status and return to their home country, unless they had a firm desire to return. The anti-rightist movement by the CPC also raised

doubts among them about returning to PRC. The returnees' number was 51 in 1954, 115 in 1955, 101 in 1956. (see Figure 1) The expansion of the anti-rightist movement was an important reason for the retreat of the high tide of returning to the United States in the 1950s. Although the leaders of the Chinese Academy of Sciences tried to protect a large number of scientists in many ways at that time, the impact of this movement on intellectuals and the resulting adverse effects at home and abroad cannot be denied, and the trend of a large number of overseas students' returning has slowed down since then. The U.S. immigration bureau had successively issued notices to some Chinese students and scholars to revoke the exit prohibition and allowed them to return home. Wang Wenshao again received a letter from Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice, wrote that:

“Dear Sir,

You are hereby informed that the order of October 9, 1951 prohibiting your departure from the United States is hereby revoked. Accordingly it will now be permissible for you to depart from the United States.

However, it is requested that as soon as you have made arrangement for your departure that you promptly notify this office as to the date of your contemplated departure, as well as the port from which you will depart, and the name of the vessel on which you will depart. It is also requested that pending your departure from the United States you advise this office promptly of any change in your address and employment. You will still be required, as in the past, to appear at this office in person every three months until you have effected your departure from the United States (Kiely, 1995).”

For those who wanted to return home, the two letters of prohibition and lifting the prohibition of departure were too important, which directly changed their fate. At the end of 1954, after the exit prohibition was lifted, Li Hengde returned to the PRC aboard the steamship *President Wilson*, with more than a dozen Chinese students and scholars, including Xu Baojiu and his wife, Jiang Shifei, Luo Huiyuan, Jiang Xikui, Wang Ying and Xie Hegeng. The couple Wang Ying and Xie Hegeng were deported by the U.S. Immigration Service because of their identity as underground members of the Communist Party of China. After 1949, the U.S. Immigration Service arrested them and imprisoned them. After solemn representations from the Chinese government, they returned to Beijing on New Year's Day 1955. On the returning ship *President Wilson*, they were held as prisoners in the same cabin as other prisoners, not allowed to come out and without anyone to take care of them. Afterwards, the U.S. and the PRC reached a consensus

at the Geneva talks, and the “Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China” signed on 10 September 1955, guaranteed the legal right for Chinese students and scholars to return home. The announcement states that, “the United States recognizes that Chinese in the United States who desire to return to the People’s Republic of China are entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return (Klingaman et al., 1990). ” Before and after the Geneva Conference between the PRC and the United States, the U.S. government took measures to expel a small number of Chinese intellectuals who the US believed were unfavorable to the U.S., posed a threat to the U.S., or did not comply with the U.S. will. On September 17, 1955, Qian Xuesen and his family left the United States on steamship "*President Cleveland* " with a total of 24 Chinese students and scholars. Lu Xiaoyi returned on the same ship with Qian, but he was deported as his identity as an underground member of the Communist Party of China was exposed. When the ship passed through Honolulu, Yokohama, Manila and other places, other passengers could come ashore for sightseeing, but Lu could only stay in the cabin and was not allowed to go on deck or land. Lu was the only underground member of the Communist Party of China among the 24 people on board. After returning to China, Lu Xiaoyi was suspected by the party organization for a long time and suffered setbacks in the political movement, because he lost contact with the party from 1949 due to changes in the international situation. In 1970, he was even persuaded to quit the party. It was not until 1979 that Lu was rehabilitated and his issue was finally clarified (Yu, 2017). In addition, the anti-rightist movement in New China was an important reason for the retreat of the wave of returning to the PRC in the 1950s. The impact of the movement on intellectuals has caused concerns among overseas Chinese who have not yet returned to China about their fate after returning, and doubts about whether they can engage in scientific research work normally after returning, thus delaying their plans to return home. At that time, Chinese in the U.S. were very concerned about the situation in China, and news about the movement could always come through. Many people began to be afraid and wait and see. Some people were originally very eager to return to China, but they remained silent for those two years. By the late 1950s, there were only a few returned to the PRC. Overall, the changes in US policies towards Chinese students and scholars had directly influenced the choices and travel plans of Chinese students and scholars to return to the PRC. Meanwhile, the CPC and New China had also done a

lot of work striving for Chinese intellectuals' return, and obtained some results. But from the proportion of those who eventually returned to the PRC and those who did not, it can be seen that compared to China's striving policy towards international students, the United States' prohibiting policy has played a more direct role.

3. THE PRC AND CPC'S STRIVING FOR CHINESE STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS' RETURN

From the perspective of the motherland of the Chinese students and scholars, the change of the regime caused flight in returning home. The PRC's strategy of striving for Chinese students and scholars returning was related with the change of U.S. policy.

3.1 First Phase from 1949 to 1951

In May 1949, Qian Baogong and others returned to the Chinese Mainland from the United States. He was the first group of Chinese students and scholars studied in the U.S. who returned home before and after the founding of New China. In his own words, he was a pathfinder. After his returning, he made a suggestion to the central government that, in the future, we should provide convenience for returning students and there should be specialized institution to receive them. The central government has adopted the suggestions and established Commission on Returned Students Affairs in December 13, 1949. According to the regulation of the committee, the specific tasks of the committee were: a. Investigate international students who are still abroad and mobilize them to return home as soon as possible; b. propagate and educate the returned students before and after their return; c. reception for returned overseas students; d. overall plan for the work of the returnees (Shen & Wang, 2024). The committee also set a "Reception Center for Returned Overseas Students" as a specialized residence responsible for receiving returned overseas students, which also provided a platform to arrange their work. In 1949, the Ministry of Higher Education first established a reception center for returning overseas students in Xidan, Beijing. Subsequently, reception centers for returning overseas students were established in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Shenyang and other places. Among the returnees early in the 1950s, many people recalled that in the early days of their return, they received good reception and stayed in the reception center for returning students. The Ministry of Education sent a person in

charge to coordinate the work arrangements of returning students to the positions with the scarcest talents and the most effective roles. Work arrangements were based on the preferences of returnees and the needs of the country. Mei Zuyan recalled that: 'There were two reception centers. One received returnees from socialist countries, and another received returnees from capitalist countries, which we lived after returning. Huang Xinbai was director of the Ministry of Higher Education, who talked to returnees to decide where to work. Huang wanted Mei to work at Tsinghua University, which was currently recruiting people. Actually, Beijing Petroleum Institute and Shenyang Petroleum Factory had all approached Mei before. Mei followed Huang's advice and went to Tsinghua University finally. Wang Mingzhen recalled, "After returning to China, the Ministry of Education asked us to make demands and asked me where I was willing to go. I said, follow the assignment and go wherever needed. At that time, all the international students who returned to China followed the assignment. The Ministry of Education assigned me to Tsinghua University." Shu Songgui lived in Beijing reception center after returning and filled in work preferences there. The Institute of Mechanics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences hoped that Shu would work there. At that time, Lin Tongji and Qian Xuesen had talked to Shu, but Shu believed that he was engaged in engineering design, which was different from the theoretical and laboratory based approach of mechanics. Later, he chose to work in the Automation Research Laboratory of Changchun Institute of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Wong, 2016). On the other side, the CPC's mobilization of Chinese students and scholars in the United States began even earlier. In the wave of studying in the United States that began in 1943, the Communist Party of China began to intentionally send underground Communist Party members or progressive individuals to study in the United States, who could help the CPC carry out the work of uniting international students. Before the establishment of New China, Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A. was established as a student organization. Actually, it was the American branch of the China Association for Science and Technology, which did not publicize to public to avoid trouble. This association began to plan to establish in 1948, growing from a regional association to a national association with increasing influence among Chinese students and scholars. Starting from January 1949, local associations began to be organized in various parts of the United States, laying the foundation for the birth of the Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A. Until the establishment of the

association in June 1949, there were already 13 regional associations in the United States, with a total of about 340 members. By August 1949, there were 19 regional associations with 410 members. In March 1950, the local association expanded to 32 (almost covering major regions of the United States) with 718 members. By the time of the dissolution of the Association in September 1950, the number of members had reached over 800. The 32 local associations were in Blacksburg, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Colorado, Columbia, Columbus, Cornell, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa City, Iowa State, Kansas, Los Angeles, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Penn. State, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Purdue, Raleigh, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, Stanford, Urbana, Utah, Wisconsin and Yale (Suttmeier, 2008). It can be seen that the influence of the Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A. had spread throughout the country. The central task of the association was uniting the Chinese students and scholars especially in science and technology in the U.S. The association provided assistance for Chinese students and scholars returning to PRC. San Francisco Association established a Chinese Student Return Service Agency providing assistance for the returnees who departure from west coast of the United States. As the transportation from the west coast of the United States to the Chinese Mainland is more convenient, many Chinese choose to travel from the west coast to return home. The establishment of the agency is to facilitate the convenient turnover of Chinese students and scholars. The San Francisco District Association also edited a ten-day magazine to be distributed throughout the United States, reporting practical information about the US government's policies on Chinese students returning home and how to transit through Hong Kong to return home.

The Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A. also sought to establish contacts in Hong Kong to facilitate transit through Hong Kong on the way to Chinese mainland, such as Cao Richang, who was director of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Branch of the China Association for Science and Technology, had provided assistance for many returnees. Early in April 1949, Cao sent a telegram to Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in Central America, wrote that if the United States did not have a direct ship to Tianjin, they could first go to Hong Kong. The association could help arrange in advance and also hoped to be informed in advance of their name, expertise, and brief experience (Shafiq, 2016). Later, Cao provided a lot of help for those who wanted to return to the PRC, including referring some Chinese students and scholars who had no other personal

connect in China to the one in China who arrange work. In 1950, the resolution of the second expanded meeting of the board of directors and supervisors of the Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A. had a "letter of thanks to Mr. Cao Richang in Hong Kong", which mentioned that "Since the establishment of this association, Mr. Cao Richang has continuously assisted members who cannot return to China to transit through Hong Kong and provided many instructions and conveniences. This association should write a letter to express the gratitude of all members of this association (Mahmoud & Mohamed, 2022). At that time, many returnees' travel expenses were subsidized by the US government. One of the important tasks of the Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A. was to compile and print the *Newsletter of Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A.*, which coordinated with the activities of the Association. Printing and distribution began in July 1949, and by September 1950, a total of 12 issues had been published, and the 13th issue was printed but not released. The Newsletter often published discussion sessions of the Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A, which reflected the attitudes of Chinese students and scholars on the problem of return. In May 1950, at the farewell party celebrating the returnees, they discussed about the question that should we return to home country immediately or study and research for more years before returning? The reason for not rushing back to China was that we had not learned enough and cannot shoulder the heavy responsibility of building the country, and doubts about one self's work ability and need to continue learning to strengthen knowledge and work ability.

The reason for advocating immediate return to China was: Firstly, as the war had just ended and the country was in dire need of rebuilding, there was an urgent need for talent in all positions, and it was necessary to return to China immediately. Secondly, everyone had been studying in the United States for one or two years, or even three or four years, and had learned some knowledge and skills, which could definitely contribute to the construction of the country. Thirdly, even if one continued to stay in the United States, what they learned might not necessarily match the construction of China, and they still needed to return to their home country to participate in practical activities and continued learning through practice. Continuing to stay in the United States might be a waste of time. Fourthly, some members mentioned that after communicating with other students, their doubts were dispelled, and mutual support and encouragement were important conditions for returning to China immediately. Fifthly, for the

plan of work arrangement after returning to China, it was mainly necessary to cooperate with the needs of the country. Currently, in the United States, we were not very familiar with the Chinese situation, so the plan often became empty talk. We should return to China and play our own role according to the national conditions (Daszkowska-Golec et al., 2013). The Newsletter also published a lot of information about the domestic construction situation, domestic letters, and information about members returning home, calling on Chinese students and scholars to return home. After the birth of the People's Republic of China, various constructions had gradually begun, and there was an urgent need for talents in every aspect. All members who had expertise and advanced thinking were welcome to return to PRC and participate in work as soon as possible. The U.S. government enacted Internal Security Act of 1950(McCarran Act), which was not favorable to the Chinese student's organization. According to Section 3 (3)(a), if an organization was "substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement", it would be defined as a "Communist-action organization", which should register with the Attorney General. According to Section 7 (d), the registration should contain.

"(1) The name of the organization and the address of its principal office.

(2) The name and last-known address of each individual who is at the time of filing of such registration statement, and of each individual who was at any time during the period of twelve full calendar months next preceding the filing of such statement, an officer of the organization, with the designation or title of the office so held, and with a brief statement of the duties and functions of such individual as such officer.

(3) An accounting, in such form and detail as the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, of all moneys received and expended (including the sources from which received and the purposes for which expended) by the organization during the period of twelve full calendar months next preceding the filing of such statement (Eaton Jr, 1951)." In order to protect the safety of members and avoid unnecessary trouble, the Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A. announced dissolution in September, 1950, and its activities came to a halt, and the *Newsletter of Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A.* also ceased publication. From then on, the Chinese Communist Party and the PRC government lost its platform to unite and mobilize Chinese students and scholars in the United States. Yan Minggao was detained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

on Ellis Island for 4 days as a key member of the Chinese Scientific Workers' Association in U.S.A. After his release, he was not allowed to return to his home country. He sued the Federal Bureau of Investigation for illegally imprisoning him and preventing him from returning to his home country, and won the lawsuit. Later, the U.S. Immigration Service deported him, and Yan returned to PRC in February 1951 aboard the steamship *Cleveland Presidential* departing from San Francisco.

3.2 Second Phase from 1956 to 1957

After the end of the Korean War, tensions eased to some extent, but the CPC also lost the best period for direct mobilization on Chinese students and scholars in the United States. Since 1956, the CPC had done a lot of work domestically, hoping to mobilize overseas Chinese to return home through the relationships of family and friends. However, many Chinese students and scholars have already established themselves in the United States, and the domestic political movements had also made them fearful. Therefore, the number of returnees was far from reaching the expectations of the Communist Party of China in the late 1950s. On February 22, 1956, the Central Committee of CPC forwarded the Report on the Issue of Seeking the Return of International Students from Capitalist Countries (January 27, 1956), which pointed out that the approximately 7000 international students still in capitalist countries are a great reserve force for China's socialist construction, and we must vigorously strive to persuade them to return to China to participate in the construction. The Report provides a detailed analysis of the difficulties that overseas Chinese students and scholars might encounter when returning to the PRC, including.

(1) being willing to return but facing various difficulties or threats from the United States, some even falling into various traps set by the United States (such as applying to become “refugees”).

(2) being willing to return but there are still some specific difficulties, such as the professor's term of appointment has not yet expired, wife will have a child or the child is too young, be afraid of losing their job after applying to return to China, and unable to sustain their early life after returning to China, the shipping schedule is few, it is difficult to obtain a Hong Kong visa, some people are not yet familiar with the content of the Sino-US Geneva talks Announcement and the ways to return.

(3) There are various concerns regarding the issue of returning to China, and this group of people has the highest number. The most common

concerns they have are: (a) fear of being persecuted by the U.S. government after returning to the PRC; (b) Politically, they are afraid of 'brainwashing' after returning to China, afraid of not having freedom in life, and afraid of not having religious freedom (many of whom are Catholics); There are also a considerable number of people who have some political issues themselves, such as having obtained American citizenship or joined the Kuomintang or the Youth League, and having had some reactionary words and deeds in the past. These people are afraid of pursuing political issues, inquiring about the motivation for returning to China, political struggle, and discrimination; (c) Economically, they are afraid that their income will not be sufficient to sustain their livelihood after returning, and the property they bring back will not be guaranteed; (d) At work, they are afraid of not being able to find a job, afraid of not being assigned according to their preferences, afraid of not being able to work together as a couple, and afraid of not having the conditions to conduct scientific research work; (e) For those who have foreign wives, they are afraid that their wives cannot be resettled. (4) There are still a few who are unwilling to return. The report also proposes a solution: "In the context of the strong and prosperous People's Republic of China, for the first two types of people, if we can effectively help them solve various difficulties and concerns, they will be easily able to return. For the third and fourth types of people, if we strengthen our efforts to fight for them and relieve their numerous concerns (including those who originally decided to return but fell into the trap of the United States after being blocked), we still need to do a lot of arduous and long-term work. Because most of them had poor original thinking and were deeply influenced by reactionary propaganda, after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, they had less contact with the domestic and found it difficult to access domestic propaganda materials; Especially in the past six years, most of the returning international students have not communicated with American students, and some bad guys have even made some counter propaganda, which has increased their suspicion. This situation must also be fully estimated (Pope, 2016)." In order to better cooperate with the specific implementation of the report, the Ministry of Education has also specially compiled the "*Directory of Students Studying in the United States*" sending to higher education institutions, research institutions, agencies, organizations, factories, mines, enterprises, or district People's Committees of Directly Controlled Municipalities for public borrowing. In the "Several Points Explanation" section of the Directory indicates that, firstly, after seeing this Directory,

please choose the candidates who can be strived to return (after selecting them, please report to the leaders of your workplace so that they can help solve difficulties in the work in a timely manner), and secondly, please provide accurate supplements and corrections. As of February 29, 1956, the Directory collected basic information of 3477 Chinese students and scholars still in U.S., including Chinese and English names, disciplines, and domestic and international addresses or communication locations, etc. In addition, the Directory also noted willingness to return of some of them. The information mainly come from materials provided by students who had returned and studied in the United States in recent years and materials provided by letters from a small number of students who were studying in the United States and their families in China in recent years (Hayhoe et al., 2012). The above-mentioned Report mentioned that 637 American-educated Chinese students expressed their willingness to return, and these 637 people are all included in this Directory, who were the main targets to strive for. Therefore, this Directory was specially compiled to meet the goal of striving for the return of students and scholars in the United States as stated in the Report. However, from the number of returnees after 1956, the mobilization effect obviously did not meet expectations. Actually, there were only 88 returnees from the U.S. in 1956. This is far from the target of striving for one thousand people in 1956 set in the Report. The reason for this phenomenon is directly related to the complex political environment of the PRC at that time and the policy changes of the US government towards Chinese students. The work of striving for students in the U.S. to return home after 1957 was not effectively carried out (Delu & Hong, 2014).

4. ANALYSIS OF THE RETURNEES' GROUP

The returnees in 1950s were a special group who had cross-culture, cross-era and cross-nation experience. They generally had a good educational background and have obtained higher degrees. This is exactly the talent that New China urgently needs. This group have made important contributions to the development of science and technology in New China.

4.1 The Returnees' Education Background in the U.S.

Out of over 5000 people, 1800 returned to New China as a result of the combined effects of policies from both New China and the United States, as well as the self-selection of these students and scholars. This section will

conduct data statistics on the year of return and educational background in the U.S. of the returnees. The data is collected based on the returnees with clear information, and those with unclear information are not included in the statistics.




Figure 1: The number of returnees from the U.S. to the PRC from 1949-1967 (Source: Edited by Wang Delu, etc.: *Dictionary of Chinese Scholars Who Returned from North America in the 1950s*, China Science and technology Press, 2023.)

This figure shows total 1595 returnees with a confirmed year of return to the PRC from 1949-1967. Returnees whose year of return is uncertain are not included in the calculation. It can be seen that influenced by the policies of China and the United States, the highest number of people returned to the PRC between 1949 and 1951. During the period from 1951 to 1954 when the United States issued the exit prohibition, the number of returnees to the PRC sharply decreased. After the lifting of the exit prohibition in 1954, the number of returnees rose slightly in 1954-1956. With the rise of the PRC anti rightist movement, the number of returnees tends to decline. By the 1960s, there were only few returnees. There is also data showing that only more than 50 Chinese students returned from the U.S. to Taiwan from 1950-1957, who were all students and no scholars (Yang, 2011). Obviously, Taiwan was not the ideal affiliation for the returnees at that time.

Table 1: Colleges and Universities the Returnees Studied in the U.S.

Person-Time of the Colleges and Universities the Returnees Studied in the U.S.			
Collages and Universities	Person-Time	Collages and Universities	Person-Time
University of Michigan	110	University of Pennsylvania	25
Columbia University	104	Purdue University	24
University of California (System)	60	Ohio State University	22
Harvard University	56	California Institute of Technology	22
University of Illinois	54	Yale University	16
University of Minnesota	53	Illinois State University	14
University of Wisconsin	50	Stanford University	14
University of Chicago	35	Michigan State University	14
Cornell University	34	University of Utah	13
Massachusetts Institute of Technology	33	Washington University in St. Louis	12
University of Washington	32	Johns Hopkins University	10
New York University	29	University of Kansas	10
University of Iowa	29	Colorado State University	10
University of Missouri	28	Carnegie Institute of Technology	10
Washington State University	28	University of Southern California	10
Iowa State University	26	University of Oregon	10
Other College or University		357	
Total		1354	

*The person-time of returnees less than 10 are all counted towards other college or university. (Source: Edited by Wang Delu, etc.: *Dictionary of Chinese Scholars Who Returned from North America in the 1950s*, China Science and technology Press, 2023.)

This table counted a total of 1364 returnees from the *Dictionary of Chinese Scholars Who Returned from North America in the 1950s*. The above table records the school information of 1126 returnees studying in the U.S. Due to some returnees having attended more than one American university of college, the total person-time 1354 in the table exceeds the total number of

the returnees. In addition to the data listed in the table above, other 169 returnees, not as students, continuing education, working, or interning in the United States, 53 returnees with unknown college or university information and 16 studying in Canada are not included in this table.

Table 2: The Returnees' Highest Degree Obtained in the United States

The Returnees' Highest Degree Obtained in the United States	
Degree	Number
PhD	388
Master's Degree	538
Bachelor's Degree	14
Internship/Working	169
Total	1109

* Returnees with unknown degree information are not included in this table. (Source: Edited by Wang Delu, etc.: *Dictionary of Chinese Scholars Who Returned from North America in the 1950s*, China Science and technology Press, 2023.)

It can be seen that returnee mainly pursues master's and doctoral degrees. That is to say, they already have a certain educational foundation before going abroad. Among them, the number of master's degree holders is the highest with 538 and next are doctoral degree holders with 388. Due to the lack of information of some returnees, the actual number will be larger than the above. In addition, 169 people are taking a refresher course or internships, with a significant number working in the medicine.

4.2 Development after Returning

The returnees' value for the New China can be seen from their overseas education background. Most people have obtained postgraduate degrees or above, which is crucial for the newly founded China where there is a severe shortage of highly educated talents. There were only 7000 teachers with associate professors or above in Chinese universities, and only 400 people with associate researchers or above in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Among all the returnees, about 70% are studying science and technology, and about 30% are studying humanities and social sciences. From the perspective of the returnees' career development after returning to China, their achievements in science and technology are most evident. Many outstanding scientists have emerged from the returnees, making significant contributions to the development of science and technology in New China. Returned scientists participated in the formulation of China's scientific and technological plans, the development of the "two bombs and one satellite" program, the establishment of many blank disciplines, and the cultivation of a large number of scientific and technological talents.

Of the 468 members of the academic department of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (later called Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) in 1955, 1957 and 1980 in the first three batches of New China, 112 were returned scientists from the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, accounting for 23.9% of the total number of the first three batches. Among all the returnees, 136 are Academicians of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 30 are Academicians of Chinese Academy of Engineering, and 10 are Academicians of both, namely Hou Xianglin, Lu Yuanjiu, Luo Peilin, Min Enze, Qian Xuesen, Shi Changxu, Yan Dongsheng, Zheng Zhemin, Zhu Guangya, and Wu Liangyong. Moreover, 8 of the returnees had won China's top sci-tech award. They are Min Enze(2007), Shi Changxu(2010), Wu Liangyong (2011), Xie Jialin(2011), Xu Guangxian (2008), Ye Duzheng (2005), Zhang Cunhao (2013), Zheng Zhemin(2012). Returnees studying natural sciences generally receive relatively good treatment whether they return to their home country or stay in the United States, while those studying humanities and social sciences face relatively difficult situations. Due to the ideological opposition between China and the United States, Chinese students and scholars studying humanities found it difficult to find suitable jobs in the United States, and their role after returning to China was also limited. Therefore, it is relatively easy to research on the returnees work in science and technology, while it is relatively difficult to research on the returnees work in humanities and social science.

5. CONCLUSION

Looking back at the Cold War history of the 1950s, the competition between the capitalist camp led by the United States and the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union was comprehensive. The competition surrounding the arms race is largely a competition of scientific and technological strength, especially in the field of high-precision defense science and technology. Ultimately, it is a competition of scientific and technological talents. Chinese students and scholars with higher education and strong development potential are naturally involved in the defense development of China and the United States. At that time, Chinese students and scholars studying in the United States, especially those studying science and technology, were bound to become targets of competition between China and the United States. Winning over this group of talented individuals means enhancing one's own reserve of scientific and technological talents, while avoiding the potential threat of talent aiding enemies. Because of this,

the group of Chinese students and scholars studying in the United States in the 1950s faced the unique issue of whether to return to China or not, which caused difficulties in returning home during this period. The group of Chinese students and scholars studying in the United States was torn apart by both China and the United States during the Cold War. Regarding the situation of these Chinese in U.S., there has always been different emphasis in narrative between the government as well as the public opinion of the United States and the PRC. Actually, in 1950s, both China and the United States believed that obtaining these individuals will benefit their own national interests in Cold War. The United States wanted the world to know that these Chinese students and scholars preferred to stay in the United States rather than return to PRC, and they had got enough assistant by the US government and society, so these people were doing well in the United States and have achieved great success, such as the Nobel Prize winner Yang Chenning and Tsung-Dao Lee. However, the PRC criticized the inhumane and undemocratic nature of the United States by stating that Chinese students and scholars who were stranded in the U.S. were unable to return home and their situation were not good. This is the talent competition between the United States and the PRC in Cold War history. It is undeniable that the narratives of each country tend to lean towards their own interests. From the American perspective, "How shall we judge the actions of the U.S. Government toward the Chinese students who found themselves refugees and stranded on American shores? A generous nation has given substantial financial support and educational assistance to thousands of destitute students, offered them transportation to their homes and provided them with the opportunity to earn a living. Many would argue that humanitarian values alone justified a program of this scope and that it created a deeper understanding of democratic values. In this broad sense a humanitarian approach can be profoundly political." However, the United States is unwilling to emphasize whether these Chinese students want to go home. From the perspective of China, no matter how the regime changes, Chinese overseas students and scholars should certainly still serve the motherland. Therefore, the New China strongly condemned the U.S. on stranding Chinese students and scholars. Regardless of whether the United States provided many forms of assistance for these students, the United States' obstruction of Chinese students returning home is a serious violation of humanitarianism and the spirit of world democracy that the United States has always advocated. However, for the Chinese students and scholars themselves, their fate was inevitably carried by the Cold War, and even whether they could go home was not

something they could decide for themselves. Their individuality can only be realized within limited historical choices. If an individual's fate cannot be determined by themselves due to hostility between countries, is it about to be seen as a tragedy of the times? Although personal destiny can never be completely unaffected by national politics, the original intention of cultural exchange between countries should be friendly communication and cooperation among humans, rather than conflict and competition between countries. Humanity should be more open and inclusive, reducing the negative impact of regional and political biases on individuals. As the first and foremost participants in international exchanges, international students often keenly reflect the progress or regression, friendship or conflict between countries in a certain era. International students carry diverse facets of harmony or conflict between different cultures, nations, and ethnicities.

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