

## **Moral Argumentation: R.M. Hare's Dual-Level Approach to Handling Moral Complexity**

Liang Sun, Ph. D

School of Philosophy and Sociology, Hebei University, Baoding, Hebei, 071000,  
China

Sunliang0430@126.com

**Abstract:** R.M. Hare, an authority in the philosophy of morals, established a persuasive framework for moral reasoning that continues to impact modern conversations about morals. This study suggests a structure of consequentialism that includes R.M. Hare's dual-level consequentialism. Hare believes that cause and effect is the most feasible when discriminating between two kinds of moral thinking, such as analytical (act consequence theory) and intuitive (rule consequence theory). According to his argument, consequences theory can justify intuitive level thinking when the critical level chooses the content. By gathering the condition of intuitive, prima facie principles, Hare's paradigm is consistent with Childress's four-principle approach. The method of four-principle complements is supported by a dual-level structure. We describe the fundamentals and four situations to support this integrative framework. We show that his integrative structure for the consequences is both tenable and convincing. In the following arguments, we will look at R.M. Hare's dual-level model of moral reasoning, including its essential elements, strengths, objections, and consequences for modern moral theory.

**Keywords:** Moral, Dual-Level Approach, Consequentialism, Four Principle Approach

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Moral argumentation is a cognitive exercise in making decisions to ascertain the logic of a course of action while navigating a complex moral dilemma. It acts as the primary foundation for measuring, defending, and possibly reforming our core assumptions, values, and behaviours from the standpoint of morality (Kurdoglu & Ateş, 2022). It is a reflection on the dilemmas that are a part of our everyday existence, thus putting into question the fundamental themes of morality. The moral argument requires considering other values and positions because it is the view of the vast spectrum of human experiences and ideas that exist in the discussion of morals (Bednar & Spiekermann, 2024). Also, moral argumentation involves forming rational and coherent arguments, using tools such as logic and critical thinking to clearly and logically state an opinion on a moral issue (Sato, 2022). Whether we would like to justify a certain action, or whether we would like to challenge the prevailing

morality, moral argumentation requires one to be critical and objective and provides one with a framework through which he can arrive at a richer understanding of the moral framework within which we all live. Thus, it becomes clear that it is indeed through the process of moral argumentation that we attempt to build the road map to a more civilized and moral way of life (Aytac & Rossi, 2023; Laine, 2021; Stahl & Eke, 2024). To control moral complexity, it is necessary to use the framework that can describe the multifaceted aspect of moral aspects and their interconnection if they are present in the decisions made (Hare, 1981). It includes a proper understanding of the various aspects that may coexist in the moral universe; these would include value systems and dilemmas, duties and issues, and further probabilistic outcomes (Gram-Hanssen, 2021). This appeals to individuals to stop thinking in dual frameworks of good and bad, as the instances and the subtleties of moral dilemmas erase themselves in a myriad of different shades of gray. Max's story familiarizes individuals with the confusing image of moral work environments and shows that moral work entails choice and ambiguity (Baird & McCaig, 2022; Eckersley, 2022). This means accepting the uncertain nature of moral issues, recognizing that there are no easy solutions, along realizing that one does not possess infallible knowledge and vision of the world. Moreover, moral work requires a willingness to critically reflect on moral dilemmas and to employ not just one moral theory, rule, and attitude while making a decision (Killen & Dahl, 2021).

## 2. MORALITY AND DUAL-LEVEL CONSEQUENTIALISM

The meta-moral theory known as universal prescriptivism is primarily responsible for the recognition of 20th-century ethicist R.M. Hare (Häyry, 2021). However, we will discuss the subject of moral rules here, which will be regarded as separate from and credible independently of his meta-moral. According to Hare, the concept of act consequentialism dictates that we should choose the path of action that increases the good within our options and increases the inevitable convergence. Nevertheless, the rationale for the regulation according to consequentialism is that, if it may be certain that violating a rule would maximize the good, there is little use in enforcing the rule because observing it will usually advance the good. However, we may account for every pertinent element of the case and develop hyper-specific rules if we tolerate exceptions to the rules and limit them to specific circumstances to increase the good. Act


consequentialism and rule consequentialism can be differentiated functionally in this way (Miklós & Tanyi, 2024). Consequently, Hare contends that it is better to use the phrases act and rule consequentialism to differentiate between two schools of moral attention: intuitive and critical. The manner in which an act is the crucial stage is the consequentialism mentioned above. Illustrating how critical the stage thinking mechanism is, Hare asks to imagine archangels with no human weaknesses, superhuman knowledge, and supernatural abilities of thought. Because these archangels build a very particular principle upon which they act to maximize the good, they consider all morally significant facts while making decisions. As a result, when consequentialism is completely implemented, rule and act are functionally identical. But since we are fallible creatures, we also need to take intuitive thinking into account to comprehend how we should think. Hare uses the example of the prospects, "who have to depend upon intuitive and strong *prima facie* principles having positive dispositions" and who are "totally incapable to engage in critical [stage] thinking," to show the way intuitive level thinking works. "Firm and deeply held dispositions and thoughts," which guide everyday moral decision-making and, in certain circumstances, replace higher-order thinking, are Hare's definition of solid *prima facie* principles. These proles' basic beliefs are comparable to the rules of consequentialism; as they lack critical thinking skills, they are unable to build the highly particular beliefs that archangels do and to establish reasonable exceptions to their beliefs (Davis, 2004). Because of the method of choosing *prima facie* principles, however, if they are sound (that is, supported by a critical stage), they will always advance the good. According to Hare, our way of thinking should be determined by our unique situation and the ways in which we are similar to both archangels and the proletariat. They must adapt to the fact that in certain circumstances we have greater epistemic standing and more time to reflect than in others. Primarily, *prima facie* principles work best in situations that an agent is already familiar with. In these situations, intuitive, *prima facie* concepts relieve the agent of the need to reason critically, as they already know what is probably going to advance the good. However, we should think critically if we have the epistemic standing to comprehend a particular issue sufficiently and the leisure to deliberate about the course of action that would best advance the good. These unfortunate instances are uncommon, mostly because of our finite abilities and the limitations placed on practical situations. Compare these situations to others in which we have to make snap decisions. Since we

don't have enough time to use the crucial level, we have to rely on the *prima facie* principles to guide our actions instinctively. These instances requiring snap decisions, meanwhile, are also uncommon. The optimal strategy for instances on this spectrum, which frequently falls in between the intuitive and critical levels, depends on how many factors are present in the scenario. In these circumstances, we can use the essential elements and apply them to a specific case to resolve disagreements and distinguish between the presumptive principles, balancing one category with the other. To summarize, critical thinking is most suited to complicated scenarios with appropriate qualifiers, whereas intuitive judgment is most suited to familiar circumstances and quick decision-making (Beauchamp, 2010). Nonetheless, in several instances, the most effective method integrates these complimentary modes of thought. This combo might not seem possible at first. To optimize the good, the intuitive stage has a possibility in and of itself. However, Bernard Williams (Beauchamp & Wobber, 2014). opposed it, saying that he was unable to integrate perceiving a situation in that manner, through the specific perspective of instinctive characteristics, with observing it through the perspective of the archangel. The usefulness of behaving instinctively and having such inclinations is undermined by this exploitation of the intuitive level, which also distances the actor from it. This criticism can be defused in two ways. Firstly, by referring to moral psychology dual-process theory. Gary Varner explores this path in great detail. According to the theory, humans have two different ways of thinking that we can empirically switch between based on the situation (such as our time, place, or epistemic standing) (Campbell, 2021). These are analogous to the intuitive level and the critical level, respectively. Given the empirical data supporting our current integration of the critical and intuitive levels, a dual-process theory might explain why doing so is psychologically viable. However, empirical data does not prove normativity, which is why Derek Parfit's (de Lazari-Radek & Singer, 2020) further argument is required. According to consequentialism, they should strive for the best possible motivations. As a result, Williams's criticism is mitigated if a dual-process explanation of moral psychology is correct and a two-level structure is convincing, because psychologically, we could have normative reasons to choose a two-level framework. But a crucial question still stands: which presumptive beliefs should we apply? Henry Sidgwick (Preti & Preti, 2022) and David Hume (Vianna Da Costa E Faria, 2022) are echoed in Hare's response. He contends that many of our innate moral judgments and values evolved along Consequentialism lines, making them optimistic

when applied to everyday circumstances. It's not quite clear from this response, though, and it might take some work to figure out which of the starting premises the critical level supports. The details of these concepts are not fully explored, even though Hare delves into considerable length about applying them in a two-level architecture and offers criteria for selecting *prima facie* principles. The four basic principles presented by Beauchamp and Childress (B&C) represent suitable intuitive stage notions, as we argue in the following. Show how these ideas are supported by Hare's two-level framework as well as how a combined structure addresses several problems to enhance B&C's strategy. Such an integrated framework is convincing and tenable. But before going into these points, let me briefly discuss the four pillars of the method.

### 3. FOUR-PRINCIPLE METHOD AND COMMON MORALITY


An originally developed strategy for biomedical moral that has several arguments, including common morality theory have been presented for the applicability of B&C's four concepts, sometimes known as principles, to normative moral. Although B&C employs a different definition of the word than Hare, their ideas appear sound on the surface. According to them, if a behaviour is morally good or wrong on its face, it is also morally correct or incorrect "in ignorance of other moral concerns" that may change our conclusion. This concept requires both non-interference and the development of autonomy. According to B&C, an agent must fulfil three requirements to be considered autonomous and these requirements are presented in Figure 1.



**Figure 1:** Fulfilling Requirements for Autonomy

One of the four criteria, "other moral considerations," may take precedence over respect for autonomy. For instance, person C could

properly limit individual A's rights if the individual A intends to execute someone else by employing the non-maleficence principle, which involves "preventing a situation of harm." However, B&C does not claim that adopting the four ideas makes harmful activity justified. Assume that injuring person A is the only method for person C to stop person A from killing person B. Person C breaks the rule of nonmaleficence in this situation, yet it is acceptable since it harms person A to save person B. The concept of beneficence supersedes nonmaleficence in this situation. It is described as "releasing, reducing, and balancing advantages over costs and threats." Giving back could mean different things to different people depending on the circumstances. All principles including the fairness rule, which calls for "costs, risks, and moderately allocating benefits", are subject to the context-sensitivity mentioned above. This is arguably the most complex assumption made by B&C. Following their discussion, six theories are presented in Figure 2.



**Figure 2:** Theories of Justice

They argue that each theory on justice contains insightful information that must be carefully evaluated and that those arguments should be utilized as tools while arguing specific issues as they end their normative examination of the principle (Childress, 1997). In summary, each of the four principles is supported and based on common morality theory; they are also *prima facie*, context-sensitive, and complimentary. The common-morality theory proposed by B&C characterizes the four principles as universal norms recognized by all persons dedicated to morals suitable to all individuals in all destinations, allowing us to accurately evaluate each other by standards. Beauchamp claims that past events demonstrate how these norms and the concepts they engender might relieve or oppose the ability for the norms of life for individuals to fall apart while causing social networks to disintegrate (Beauchamp, 1996). The ideas generated from these standards have normative relevance since history supports their efficacy as such; this is why moral people across the world accept them. Common morality theory, however, takes cultural differences into

account by making a distinction between content-thick (i.e., specific) principles and content-thin (i.e., formal) concepts, the acceptance of which is more contextual. According to formal definitions, respect for autonomy is titular, justice is the treatment of equals equally, beneficence is doing well, and nonmaleficence is inflicting no harm. But how can we do well? What does equality entail? The formal principles are given substance by being specific to certain circumstances, which accounts for their sensitive context. B&C has concentrated on defining them within a biological framework. Moral people all around the globe concur that we should uphold liberty and act in a beneficent, fair, and nonmaleficence manner; the practical applications of these ideals differ according to how they're interpreted. B&C, to put it more precisely, means the method for decreasing the volatility of conceptual standards and generating rules with action guidance content." As previously said, there are differences in the ways that we define principles. Furthermore, as Beauchamp points out, these differences in definitions can result in challenging moral disputes. We might provide some qualifications to address such disputes, but this is not B&C's primary method of resolving conflicts. Another tactic involves balancing and weighing, in which we consider the strength of arguments for violating principles, the likelihood of accomplishing the goal at the existence of a preferable alternative, the degree to which the modified principle is violated, the degree to which the violation's detrimental effects are minimized, and the degree to which everyone was treated equally. Some situations (like the one with individuals A, B, and C above) make it obvious some principles are more important than others, while other situations don't. They may use the reflective equilibrium approach, which was the second tactic that B&C supports, if weighing and balancing prove to be futile. According to B&C, reflective equilibrium was the result of morally sound decisions made by people with the moral and epistemic faculties required to form a cohesive moral framework. For these individuals, "a shortage of discrimination, relevant expertise, integrity, and a level of compassion and understanding for the needs of others" are prerequisites. So, reflective equilibrium attempts to integrate these people's sound moral judgments (such as their descriptions of the four principles and standards of common morality) into a cohesive moral framework, modifying their descriptions and judgments when they appear to be in conflict with one another or miss anything crucial. It was practically important to resolve contradictions between norms, concepts, and requirements through reflective equilibrium, and in the process, to enhance certain moralities. Believing that these tactics are questionable,

weighing and balancing are good methods for making moral decisions, but their applicability depends on how trustworthy the underlying principles are. According to B&C, the four principles are trustworthy because common morality theory supports them. Based on implicit references to common morality theory and the assumptions that morally and epistemically sound individuals make good normative judgments with minimal argumentation, B&C claims that reflective equilibrium was dependent on these individuals. As a result, common-morality theory is necessary for the four-principle method to succeed. All three of the normative, conceptual, and empirical grounds for the common-morality concept that B&C investigates remain unconsidered. Therefore, from a normative perspective, the four-principle structure is ungrounded. Hare argues that although normal agents need the intuitive stage, it is a serious mistake to ignore fundamental ideas when making tough decisions, and resolving disputes between them becomes arbitrary. This was why that was a significant problem (McIntyre & McIntyre, 2021). When faced with situations like these and others that require further analysis, relying just on intuition to provide answers is an extremely self-defeating process. Nonetheless, Beauchamp makes an effort to defend common morality theory in a different, earlier piece. He contends that common morality's norms are supported by history and that its guiding principles, which are normative, foster "human flourishing by overcoming conditions that lead the standard of people's lives to worsen." Beauchamp provides a brief description of the four-principle system, but he doesn't define flourishing or go into any depth. Consequently, there is no normative backing for the method. In the part that follows, we will argue for each of the four principles as being intuitively sound at first glance and show how the four-principle approach was given normative grounding by a Consequentialism defence of the common-morality concept (TICL, 2022). To give a summary of our integrative structure, it would also show how other components of B&C's methodology fit inside a two-level framework.

#### 4. COMBINING THE FOUR-PRINCIPLE METHOD WITH TWO-LEVEL CONSEQUENTIALISM

Let's start by demonstrating criticism of the four-principle method is defused by an integrated framework. The four principles are lexical if they are valid intuitive-level conceptions in a dual-level Consequential



framework. Both their use and the methods for resolving disputes between them would be facilitated by the critical level. Furthermore, the four-principle approach would enhance the intuitive level's considerable substance. However, there are several underlying assumptions to this reasoning. Primarily, the four tenets of B&C are justified; secondly, B&C's methods for resolving conflicts align with consequentialism; and thirdly, consequentialism both bolsters and harmonizes with the standard moral assumption. Let us first argue the basic arguments in favour of recognizing beneficence, nonmaleficence, fairness, and autonomy respect as foundational principles (Beauchamp & DeGrazia, 2004). Hare offers two essential criteria for ideas that are deemed to be true at first glance: the effects of endorsing them on both our own and other people's lives, as well as "the magnitude of the favourable and unfavourable effects" in the circumstances in which we would apply these rules in relation to the likelihood or unpredictability of such incidents occurring in our actual experiences. Consequentialism rules are designed to choose principles whose application will be optimal. The first criterion is crucial, and the second is significant since it measures an agent's projected practical efficacy in Consequentialism terms. Considering how B&C supports the four principles, satisfy these fundamental requirements. Recall the notion of common morality. It asserts that history demonstrates how its values successfully advance the good. Consequentialism has good cause to consider them seriously if this is the case. We must think about Sidgwick and Hume to better understand this argument. According to the former, justice is normative because it was essential to a functioning society, which has Consequentialism value since it presumably improves members' quality of life. As such, it is in the interests of all members of the society for individuals within it "to regulate their conduct by certain rules." This assertion is expanded by common-morality theory to include beneficence, respect for autonomy, and nonmaleficence in addition to the justice concept. Therefore, common morality theory holds that individuals adopt these values because past evidence indicates they lead to a better quality of life. Due to their demonstrated ability to advance the common good and their propensity for acceptance, these ideas are *prima facie* principles under the dual-level consequentialism structure. Think about Sidgwick, who notes that social standards vary between cultures. The rules that govern conduct inside a civilization will change depending on its surroundings. Since these differences are based on the real or imagined impact that behaviours allowed or banned by the code would have on general well-being, a society's laws may alter to effectively

support its citizens in the context of its particular conditions. B&C supports Sedgwick's assertion by differentiating between specific and universal (or common) moralities. The basis of common morality is frequently reinforced by the beliefs of unique moralities, which define formal notions like beneficence that go beyond done good to include doing well in a particular, culturally appropriate way (Hare, 1997). According to Beauchamp and Hume, a society needs its members to uphold moral principles for it to operate. However, B&C and Sidgwick point out, that the environment plays a role in how individuals define these tenets, which explains why some individuals accept the common morality while others reject it. That might be able to support these claims, it makes sense to accept them as the fundamental premises of the arguments that follow; like Beauchamp, and we don't think they make too many claims. But we also need to take into account Hare's criteria for these reasons to demonstrate how these Ideas must be regarded as *prima facie* perceptions within a dual-level framework as they're considered normative.

According to common morals theory, the four guiding principles of promoting the good by enabling society and the greater level of life it generates are demonstrated by history. The specifics of a society's four principles vary depending on what best advances the common good and are influenced by its surroundings and context. A society's implicit norms also change based on the types of situations and situations that it faces regularly (Hare, 1965). As a result, a society's unique morality grows to advance the welfare of its members and is proven by history to be successful in doing so; As Beauchamp points out, the concepts of common morality would not have evolved if they were ineffectual. Now consider Hare's second criterion about a principle's projected practical usefulness. The common morality's tenets fit this requirement since history demonstrates that they frequently and typically advance the good. There is a related explanation as to why the four principles satisfy Hare's first requirement. Specifically, as Beauchamp asserts, the four principles are functionally normative since history verifies their ability to further the common good. Therefore, instilling these ideas comes at a low cost, satisfying Hare's first need. Since the existence of society depends on its members accepting and internalizing these principles, Hume tenably contends that this cost is particularly low if society teaches and supports its members to do so. If Hume is correct, then individuals of a community satisfy both of Hare's requirements since they embrace the four principles for both non-moral & moral reasons. But B&C points out


that empirical evidence that individuals embrace the four principles does not normatively establish the principles; more reasoning is required. A Consequentialism framework with two levels offers this kind of explanation. According to a Consequentialism defense, even if the theory that the four concepts came to be necessary for society does not demonstrate that the principles are acceptable, the fact that the principles are necessary for society. Moreover, the principles satisfy a prerequisite for standard agents, namely, suitability as *prima facie* principles, according to Hare's criterion. We should thus embrace and assimilate these concepts on good normative grounds. Norms are generated by the four-principle framework and concepts of common morality, and the Consequentialism basis of the dual-level structure gives substance to the intuitive stage. This explains how these approaches are complementary. Naturally, the intuitive level and our integrative framework are not limited to this. Firstly, B&C hires the phrase *prima facie* inversely than Hare. The latter refers to a strongly held principle that an agent has and that has an impact on her moral psychology, whereas the former refers to an appraisal that is independent of specific variables. This raises the issue, "Are the basic principles of B&C viable in the sense of Hare?" Yes, due to the principle of shared morality.

People are predisposed to adopt and absorb the four principles, as we said in our brief exploration of moral education; in this instance, they have both moral and nonmoral reasons to do so. The social repercussions of breaking or refusing to accept these standards are the nonmoral rationale, whereas the normative nature of these standards is the moral one. Because of this, it is frequently impossible for agents to avoid internalizing the four principles in the manner that Hare outlines. As a result, there is no problem with the divergence of definitions. B&C has several dispute resolution techniques, including specification, reflective equilibrium, and balance and weighing. There is no doubt that the first two tactics are consistent with two-level consequentialism. The crucial level can help with balancing and weighing; consequentiality already handles the rest of the process. The standard of our justifications for action depends on how well they advance the good. The sound process of balancing and weighing is dependent on the validity of the concepts discussed. Based on our integrative framework, the four principles are deemed dependable. In addition to being something consequentiality already do, specification is compatible. Sidgwick (Sidgwick, 2011). notes that civilizations define their values to advance the common good; this is why the Consequentialism theory is valuable. Hare suggests that we

should optimize our principles in certain instances, such as archangels' hyper-specific principles. For consequentialism, a reflective equilibrium is more difficult to achieve. B&C contends that the reflective equilibrium approach should start with well-considered conclusions that appear indisputable, from which competent people develop until they have a consistent set of moral convictions. Given the several assumptions at play, this technique is questionable and is discussed. Nonetheless, B&C's implicit dependence on common-morality theory is acceptable because it is now supported by consequentialism. To reconcile reflective equilibrium with our integrative framework, all have to say is that adopting a Consequentialism norm as our primary, considered judgment is just as tenable as adopting a different norm. Assuming that consequentialism can be extended to produce reflective equilibrium, the method becomes indispensable for developing a feasible two-level framework. According to B&C's description, reflective equilibrium would function intuitively by building on the foundation of the four principles to produce an ordered structure of intuitive inclinations, beliefs, and principles. We would hone down on these occurrences at the crucial level, adding the clarifications and modifications required to make our integrative framework comprehensible and applicable. Reflective equilibrium is therefore both required and consistent with two-level consequentialism. Currently, we have made these components of our integrative structure clear, let's see it in action.

## 5. SUPPORTING OUR INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK

Let's take a closer look at our integrative framework's operation. The principles of morality are presented in Figure 3.



**Figure 3:** Morality Principles

What are the other four secondary considerations that we should have while applying the reflective equilibrium approach since consequentialism validates common-morality theory? Start by thinking about beneficence and nonmaleficence. The concepts that fit consequentialism the best are these. These concepts could be used as good instances of the agent-neutral, optimizing consequentialism concept in a two-level framework. While it is often inaccurate to characterize act consequentialists as those who weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a decision before making it, in this instance, the idea makes sense. When they come upon a case, agents are unable to pause and carefully evaluate every detail because they frequently lack the time and epistemic standing to do so. Consequentialism advises against behaving like archangels. This suggests, from a psychological perspective, that we should be reluctant to cause damage and more likely to do well. We should also feel satisfied when we behave in accordance with these principles and unhappy when we don't. Significantly, this satisfaction point is true for every principle. Now think about justice, which legally mandates that we handle equals fairly. B&C examines several difficult principles, with justice being one among them. They contend that any theory of justice offers lessons we should take into account when making judgments, rather than outlining or supporting a specific theory. As a result, justice is likewise a complicated concept at an intuitive level. Our integrative framework can typically accept non-utilitarian notions of justice because it is self-effacing. Sometimes being an egalitarian is preferable to being a communitarian, depending on the situation. There is merit in alternating between these many conceptions of justice, even if it can occasionally be challenging since all contribute to enrichment. Lastly, take responsibility for autonomy, which consequentialists occasionally overlook. The most obvious argument was among the strongest supporting consequentialists' respect for autonomy. Autonomous decision-making unless there are additional moral considerations. Consequently, we have strong fundamental motives to value and protect autonomy that suggests a preference for transparency, non-intervention, and a focus on informed consent. However, these inclinations might be overruled by other moral reasons, just like with the other principles. One challenge was the sporadic clash between act consequentialism and beneficence that was, paternalism and respect for autonomy. While the proper path of action was obvious in certain situations, it is less obvious in others. While dependency is a complicated subject that was outside the scope of this work, our integrated structure provides a theoretically solid means of resolving these kinds of

disagreements. This was inevitable and acceptable, despite the possibility that we occasionally apply these ideas incorrectly and that this approach is practically unsuccessful. To illustrate the potential functionality of this integrative framework, let us examine four scenarios. Differentiating between the four types of cases as identified by Varner (Varner, 2012), where agents might apply critical-level thinking will be helpful. In the first, there is a fresh situation that the agent is not familiar with, thus intuitive level thinking is not appropriate; in the second, there is a conflict between *prima facie* principles; and in the third, there is a constant procedure where the critical stage is used to perfect the perceptive point. The final category is less common than the other three; it refers to situations in which something (like an action) seems counterintuitive. We shall explore several situations and analyse them using our integrative framework to fill in these categories in the paragraphs that follow; in the process, certain key aspects will be made clear.

#### 5.1. Report: 1. Drowning Child for Discussion was Made by Peter Singer



**Figure 4:** Child-Drowning Report

*As I go by a little pond, I see a toddler drown. Since no one else is in the area, I could easily step in and save the child's life if I didn't act quickly. That being said, if I go into the water and assist the youngster, I will get my clothing muddy. Must I preserve the child?*

The case study that the author examines pertains to the integrative framework and involves a drowning child. Figure 4 represents the report of a child-drowning. The case cannot be used at the critical level because of time limits. Nonetheless, the author feels that the beneficence principle supports this choice and understands the psychological and motivational traits that make a suitable agent in these circumstances. The author raises suspicion on the possibility and similar occurrences in their experience. There are several situations in which an agent is anticipated to react

naturally and advantageously, such as supplying resources or pausing to offer assistance, even if the specifics are often unpredictable. The concept of beneficence is a good fit for The Drowning Child, even if it is unlikely, since in these situations, responding instinctively frees up time for more important things. Other unlikely situations, however, are not like this.


## 5.2. Report: 2. medical moral case from B&C's area of expertise:

*I'm a medical specialist, and I have two patients, but I only have enough materials to treat one of them. Patient B is a social butterfly with several fulfilling connections, whereas Patient A is a lonely introvert without friends or family. As a result, patient B is more useful to society than patient A. To whom shall I provide take concern?*

This situation fits within Varner's second category, which is a situation when professional moralities and intuitionary principles clash. The four guiding principles of the biomedical field are essential to providing patients with equitable care. Through these professional criteria, medical practitioners have built public confidence. Although treating patient B based on her social usefulness is beneficial, it goes against their definition of fairness and betrays their distrust. In the long run, the drawbacks of undermining public confidence in medical experts would exceed the advantages of treating patient B for her social usefulness. Consequently, medical rationing advises abiding by the specific morality of the field.

## 6. OBJECTION

The moral discourse in principles is not limited to utility and consequences. Figure 5 represents the important aspects of enhancing moral discourse.



**Figure 5:** The Moral Discourse Enhancement Aspect

Benthamite utilitarianism and other more advanced forms of consequentialism are not taken into consideration by this criticism. Philosophers have shown that consequentialism may accept and defend ideas that are not consistent with consequentialism, such as self-effacing consequentialism. Since consequentialism may require agents to have comparable moral feelings and beliefs, which functions similarly to our integrated structure's use of *prima facie* ideology, Parfit's arguments are consistent with our theory. Another objection argues that humans cannot consistently decide which of the common morality tenets is the most important or that individuals are not archangels and hence cannot make such decisions. In logical moral thinking, I shall have put as in a position to use this logic supplemented with other ingredients in moral reasoning about the practical issues by Hare (Hare, 1981). This does not, however, follow. Morality is the inability to always find a solution to a contradiction between ideals, and we are not very good at applying critical-level thinking. Even if we are not excellent users of the critical level, we can identify and defend *prima facie* concepts, reconcile conflicts between them, and, in appropriate situations, approximate critical-level thinking. Even when individuals agree on common morality theory and consequentialism, conflicts can still arise across cultures and individuals. It will be easier to settle these differences if these ideas are grounded in consequentialism, assuming that it is true. In our integrative paradigm, the intuitive level takes into consideration our practical restrictions, while the critical level offers a sound method to think through practical moral challenges.

## 7. CONCLUSION, UNADDRESSED ISSUES, AND FUTURE SOLUTIONS

Now, let's talk about some subjects missed and potential directions going forward. Firstly, it was on purpose that the consequentialism demands of us are progress, and that's meant by "the good". Since the theory of value is outside the scope of this research, with minor adjustments, our integrative framework may be used in conjunction with a number of rival value theories. Second, normative theory will have to suffice as moral psychology was only skimmed; Varner goes into more detail on moral psychology. It was unable to give moral psychology the attention it deserved in this study. Finally, since consequentialism cannot be justified here, take it to be a plausible moral theory. Future research



will focus on the topics of alienation & instrumentalization. Further research is required to fully address it and provide a more compelling contribution, considering its complexity. In a similar vein, further conversation on moral blame, particularly its public dimension, as well as the psychological ramifications of Hare's first ideas is necessary. Notable are the attributes that Douglas W. Portmore terms reason-responsive attitudes. Given the similarities between these facts and Hare's description of prima facie principles, it would be worthwhile to examine how these concepts differ and ascertain whether or not they fall under a two-level framework. Lastly, it is important and exciting to talk about the several levels of conservatism in our integrative technique as well as the social aspect of the idea of common morality.

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