Leibniz on Spontaneity as a Basic Value[1]

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Abstract: Leibniz sustains three arguments for spontaneity: the argument from the complete notion, the argument from substantial forms and the argument from monadic spontaneity. In order to see the nature of spontaneity and whether the spontaneity is an inferior value with respect to freedom, as it appears in the *Theodicy*, in the first part of the paper I will present spontaneity in connection with the theory of complete notion; in the second part, spontaneity and substantial forms; in the third part, spontaneity of monads; then I will finish with a more general view about spontaneity and freedom.
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In his *Theodicy*, Leibniz maintains that in the theological schools freedom has three features: intelligence, spontaneity and contingency:

I have shown that freedom, according to the definition required in the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we determine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity. (T 288; H 303)[2]

He claims that he will follow the classical definition of spontaneity, received from Aristotle and followed in the schools: spontaneity is the capacity to determine, to have in us the source of our actions. To be free means that there is nothing that can influence us in a full sense of the term. The explanation is that the human being has spontaneity like any other simple substance, as he had demonstrated in *The New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances, as well as of the Union between the Soul and the Body* (1695):

For better understanding of this point, one must know that true spontaneity is common to us and all simple substances, and that in the intelligent or free substance this becomes a mastery over its actions. That cannot be better explained than by the

System of Pre-established Harmony, which I indeed propounded some years ago. (T 291; H 304)

As Leibniz mentions above, in the *New System* he maintained that there is a communication between substances through which one can explain the relationship between soul and body. Given that the soul is a unity of substance, formal atom or metaphysical point, it has the source of its actions in itself:

It is only *atoms of substances*, that is to say, real unities that are absolutely destitute of parts, which are the sources of actions and the absolute first principles out of which things are compounded, and as it were, the ultimate elements in the analysis of substance. One could call them *metaphysical points*. They have something vital, and a kind of *perception*, and *mathematical points* are the *points of view* from which they express the universe. (NS 11; L 456)

Between substances there is no causality, but only a metaphysical influence, so the substances are autonomous. Beyond autonomy, the soul is in a connection with all things, including therefore the world of bodies, and it has spontaneity, given its representative nature:

God has originally created the soul, and ever other real unity, in such a way that everything in it must arise from its own nature by a perfect *spontaneity* with regard to itself, yet by a perfect *conformity* to things without. And thus, since our internal sensations, that is, those which are in the soul itself and not in the brain or in the subtle parts of the body, are merely phenomena which follow upon external events or better, are really appearances or like well-ordered dreams, it follows that these perceptions internal to the soul itself come to it through its own original constitution, that is to say, through its representative nature, which is capable of expressing entities outside of itself in agreement with its organs – this nature having been given it from its creation and constituting its individual character. (NS 14; L 457)

It is obvious that the accord that Leibniz maintains is not only between the simple substances, that is between the soul and the other entelechies, but also between the souls and bodies, given that the world of the souls and the world of the bodies is harmonic: the soul is accommodated with the body and the body is accommodated with the soul. The consequence of this thesis from the *New System* is very important for the body: the body itself must have spontaneity:

> And since it is the nature of the soul to represent the universe in a very exact way, though with relative degrees of distinctness, the sequence of representations which the soul produces will correspond naturally to the sequence of changes in the universe itself. So the body, in turn, has also been adapted to the soul to fit those situations in which the soul is thought of as acting externally. This is all the more reasonable inasmuch as bodies are made solely for the spirits themselves, who are capable of entering into a society with God and of extolling his glory. (NS 15; L 458)

But how is it possible for a material thing to act, especially given that the body obeys the soul? In these circumstances, what is the nature of spontaneity? Is it an inferior value with respect to freedom, as appears in the quotation above from *Theodicy*, given that it is a feature of freedom? In order to see the answer, in the first part of the paper I will present spontaneity in connection with the theory of complete notion; in the second part, spontaneity and substantial forms; in the third part, spontaneity of monads; then I will finish with a more general view about spontaneity and freedom.

SPONTANEITY AND THE THEORY OF COMPLETE NOTION

In his middle metaphysics, Leibniz presents two arguments for spontaneity: the argument from the complete notion and the argument from substantial forms. The *Discourse on Metaphysics* certifies the idea that a simple substance, that is a complete being, has a notion so perfect that it contains all predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed (DM VIII; L 307). So, whoever knows the predicates of the subject will know its actions, both those of the things acting and those of the things acted upon. Nevertheless, the subject remains free (DM XIII; L 310). The explanation is that this kind of determination is not of an absolute necessity, but of a hypothetical necessity. The first one has as opposite a contradiction, the second has opposite no contradiction. One may think in the first case of a true proposition of geometry that cannot be falsified without arriving at a contradiction. In the second case, we can think of Julius Caesar crossing the Rubicon, because he has the power to do or do not do this action, even if the crossing of the Rubicon is contained in his notion (DM XIII; L 310−311).

Leibniz maintains that the soul and body communicate in a special way that is by harmony, so that "the passions and actions of one are accompanied by the actions and passions, or their corresponding phenom-

ena, in the other" (DM XXXIII; L 324). It is obvious that when the soul is active, the body is passive, and when the soul is passive, the body is active. The explanation for this "mysterious nature" of the body is given through the theory of expression. This explanation has a long duration in Leibniz's philosophy, given that even in 1710, in *Theodicy*, one can find the same explanation. So, in paragraph 62, he maintains, apparent paradoxically, that the body produces from itself what the soul ordains (T 62). But if the body makes something from itself, how is it possible to obey the soul? And if it obeys the soul, how is it possible to produce its actions from itself? The explanation is the theory of expression, from paragraph 66: the soul is active in the sense that it perceives distinctly and it is passive in the sense that it has confused perceptions. In the same way, the body is passive when it has confused perceptions and it is active when it has distinct perceptions (T 66).

The pressure exercised by the mysterious nature of body, and the necessity of a different explanation than those of the scholastics and Descartes, push Leibniz to maintain a theory with a consequence very unsatisfied: we saw that the actions of a thing are originated in the complete notion of the thing, that is in the nature of the thing. But it is difficult to maintain that there are two natures, one for the soul, and the other for the body. Leibniz always rejected the dualism maintained by Descartes, in which the thinking substance is different in nature from the extended substance. Nevertheless, it is very problematic that Leibniz would maintain two kinds of spontaneity, one for the soul and the other for the body. So, the theory of complete notion maintains the spontaneity of the thing *compounded* from a soul and a body (Nita, 2006), which is an explanation for a complete being (DM VIII; L 307). The problem is that between the lines, as we already presented, Leibniz maintains that the body has spontaneity.

SPONTANEITY AND SUBSTANTIAL FORMS

In this context, Leibniz gives another argument for spontaneity, the argument from substantial forms.[3] It is very challenging that this argument is proposed in the same period, moreover in the same works, as the argument from the complete notion. In a few words, Leibniz maintains that body, such as the human body or the body of living beings, is a substance. But this substance is one and the same as the substance of the

soul, so Leibniz has a supplementary argument to reject the extension of Descartes.

The argument from substantial forms maintains that the body has autonomy, in relation to both the soul and other bodies, and determination, because it has the source of its actions in itself:

> Assuming that the bodies which makes up a *unum per se*, for example man, are substances and that they have substantial forms, and assuming that beasts have souls, we must admit that these souls and substantial forms cannot entirely perish and more than can atoms or the ultimate parts of matter in the opinions of other philosophers. For no substance perishes, although it may become entirely different. Those substances, too, express the whole universe, although more imperfectly than do the spirits. But the chief difference is that they do not know what they are or what they do, and since, consequently, they cannot reflect, they are unable to discover necessary and universal truths. It is also because they lack reflection about themselves that they have no moral quality. (DM XXXIV; L 325)

Also in the correspondence with Arnauld, the character active, autonomous and spontaneous of the body is very well presented. The body of a living being is not like an object, so it contains not only the matter, given its phenomenal character, but also substantial forms or entelechies, because of which the body is substantial. Its nature consists in force, given that the matter of the body is a secondary matter (Fichant, 2003: 21). In this context, Leibniz can maintain a thesis that is very hard for Arnauld to understand: without substantial form, a man, animal or plant is a pure phenomenon, even if it is an "apparence bien fondée." This organic whole is named a "corporeal substance" and so Leibniz arrives at a new level of his metaphysics.[4] The corporeal substance is present at any level of a creature, given that there is the corporeal mass that is united with an infinity of corporeal substances for organs, tissues etc.:

> assuming that there is a soul or entelechy in beasts or in other corporeal substances, we must reason in this matter just as we all reason in regard to man. Man is a being endowed with a true unity given him by his soul, in spite of the fact that the mass of his body is divided into organs, ducts, humors, and spirits and that these parts are undoubtedly filled with infinity of other corporeal substances endowed with their own entelechies. (Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687; L 344)

One objection can be that the argument from complete notion does not support spontaneity in the same way as the argument from substan-

tial forms. Stuart Brown, for example, shows that the *inesse* principle does not underwrite spontaneity, while in the *New System* and the later works the argumentation is different. Given that the simple substances are autonomous because they have spontaneity and they have spontaneity because what is true of them can be deduced from their individual natures, Brown maintains that this line of argument is not clear, nor compelling (Brown, 1984: 159). We think that Brown wants to maintain the disanalogy in the sense that the complete notion represents the nature of individual substance only at the logic-linguistic level, while if we look more deeply we will need another explanation; at the metaphysical level, we need something further. But the ground of the individual substance is just the substantial form, given that the argument of substantial form works in parallel with the argument from the complete notion. It is obvious that the *inesse* principle is the reason that all that happens to a thing comes from its nature; but in these context, "all" means the set of the predicates. On the other hand, the substantial form explains the origin of all the states of a thing. From this point of view there is no discontinuity in the argumentation, both kinds of arguments give good reasons for the metaphysical system of Leibniz in his middle years.

THE SPONTANEITY OF MONADS

After the addition of the notions "monad" (after 1696, in a letter to Fardella (Fichant, 2003: 17)) and "organism" (after 1704),[5] Leibniz can explain spontaneity much better in the context of his dynamics.[6] The explanation in terms of force, active/passive forces and primitive/derivative forces, leads Leibniz to the idea that activity can be seen in connection with active force and passivity with passive force.[7] But, the dispute with Pierre Bayle[8] follows the argumentation for spontaneity without emphasizing this important aspect of his thought. Leibniz maintains his position in connection with, and in extension of, the argument from substantial forms. After the publication of *New System* (1695), Bayle presents the system of pre-establish harmony in his famous *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (2 volumes, 1696−1697). In order to elucidate the difficulties presented by Bayle, Leibniz answers in the paper *Eclaircissement des difficultés que Monsieur Bayle a trouvées dans le systeme nouveau de l'union de l'ame et du corps* (*Clarification of the difficulties which Mr. Bayle has found in the new system of the union of soul and body*), published in *Histoire des Ouvrages des*

savants, in July 1698 (GP IV, 517−524; L 492−497). A first objection is that it is hard to understand the chain of internal and spontaneous actions which would cause the soul of a dog to feel pain immediately after having felt joy, even if it were alone in the universe. Leibniz's reply is that a thing remains always in the same state in which it is at a time, unless something occurs to compel it to change. Even if there is no soul in the world, the body will be and will do the same, given the system of pre-established harmony. The nature of created substance is to change according to a rule that leads it spontaneously through all its states:

> in my opinion it is in nature of created substance to change continually following a certain order which leads it spontaneously (if I may be allowed to use this word) through all the state which it encounters, in such a way that he who sees all things sees all its past and future states in its present. And this law of order, which constitutes the individuality of each particular substance, is in exact agreement with what occurs to every other substance and throughout the whole universe. (L 493)

Even if Leibniz does not name here this rule of change for the body, he made the basic assertion that the body is a kind of automaton, i.e. it is programmed to execute the movement in an perfect agreement with the soul to which it is united:

> the soul is a most exact immaterial automaton [...], however simple it may be, always has a feeling composed of many perceptions at once, a fact which serves our purpose as well as if it were composed of parts like a machine. For each preceding perception influences those which follow in conformity with a law of order which is found in perceptions as well as in movements. [...] Perhaps it would have sufficed to say that God, having made material automatons, could also make immaterial ones which represent the former ones. (L 495−496)

The capacity of the soul to have the source of its perceptions in itself and capacity of the body to have the source of its movements in itself, in other words spontaneity, has a proper note that can sustain the autonomy of the world of souls in relation to the world of bodies. Leibniz can explain, for now on, a very important distinction between spontaneity and freedom: even if every voluntary act is spontaneous, there are spontaneous acts which are not chosen and, consequently, that can not be voluntary (L 494).

After the publication of the second edition of the *Dictionary*, when Bayle discusses the answers given by Leibniz, the dialogue continues

with the *Reponse aux reflexions contenues dans la seconde Edition du Dictionnaire Critique de M. Bayle article* Rorarius*, sur le systeme de l'Harmonie preétablie* (*Reply to the Thoughts on the System of Pre-Established Harmony contained in the Second Edition of Mr. Bayle's Critical Dictionary, Article* Rorarius*)*,[9] and *Extrait du* Dictionnaire *de M. Bayle, article* Rorarius*, p. 2599 sqq. de l'edition de l'an 1702 avec mes remarques* (*Extras from the* Dictionary *of M. Bayle, article* Rorarius*, p. 2599 sqq., edition 1702, with my remarks*) (GP IV, 524−554). So, in the *Extras*, one objection is that the principle of action must be a unity, but our body is something composed; therefore, the spontaneity must vary at infinity the effects and, even more, can disturb the effects, given that the collision must imply any perturbation for the natural spontaneity. Leibniz's reply is that effects are varied *ad infinitum*, but do not disturb (*troubler*) these unities or souls, because the collision determines a change in the mass of the body, and not at all in the soul or monads, that follow spontaneous its way in a complete agreement with what is made in these mass (GP IV, 539).

In his late metaphysics, as is upheld in the *Monadology* and other late works, Leibniz presents the relationship between spontaneity and freedom in a different way in relation to the argument from the complete notion, even if there is much continuity with the argument from substantial forms. Given that all that exists are the monads and their states, perception and appetition, Leibniz can explain the existence of freedom through the capacity of monad to be active, unique, eternal, autonomous and spontaneous. The demonstration begins with the affirmation that all monads, entelechies, souls or spirits (Mo XIX, XXIX; L 644, 645), have in them a perfection, a sufficiency (*autarcheia*) which makes them the sources of their internal actions (Mo XVIII; L 644). Through perception, the monad is a multiplicity in unity, and it can represent all that happens in the other monads that constitute the existence as a whole (Mo XIV; L 644). Through appetition, one can explain the change that means the passage from one perception to another (Mo X; L 644). When the perception is distinct, the monad acts, while when it is confused, the monad is passive, that is suffers the actions of the other monads (Mo XILIX; L 647).

The theory of expression can be understood now in connection with the argument from substantial forms (and especially with corporeal substances), given that the souls are united with bodies (except, of course, God). The body is an organic thing that is a divine machine or a corporeal automaton in its smallest parts:

So each organic body belonging to a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton infinitely surpassing all artificial automata. For a machine made by human art is not a machine in each of its parts; for example, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which are not artificial so far as we are concerned, and which do not have the character of a machine, in that they fit the use for which the wheel was intended. But the machines of nature, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts, into infinity. It is this that makes the difference between nature and art, that is, between the divine art and ours. (Mo LXIV; L 649)

In order that each part of a body can represent the universe or God, Leibniz needs to maintain that *each portion of the body* must contain something simple. So, he introduces a very important notion, from the point of view of our theme – spontaneity – the "dominant monad."[10] The dominant monad can explain the unity, identity, activity, autonomy and spontaneity of the whole compound from one soul and one body: "Hence we see that each living body has a dominant entelechy which is the soul in the case of an animal; but the members of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, and animals, each one of which also has its dominant entelechy or soul".[11] We can see that Leibniz, even if he uses the theory of expression, does not use the argument from the complete notion, nor the argument from substantial forms, to explain the spontaneity.

The same explanation through the concept of dominant monad can be seen, even more clearly, in his *Principles of nature and grace based on reason*. One monad, as a simple substance, is the center of a creature, that is a compound substance, and it is its principle of action. The body appears as a set of subordinate monads, because it is a machine of nature in all its parts, however small they may be.

Everywhere there are simple substances actually separated from each other by their own actions, which continually change their relations. And each outstanding simple substance or monad which forms their center of a compound substance (such as an animal, for example), and is the principle of its uniqueness, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other monads which constitute the body belonging to this central monad, corresponding to the affections by which it represents, as in a kind of center, the things that are outside of it. This body is *organic* when it forms a kind of automaton or natural machine, which is a machine not only as a whole but also in its smallest observable parts. (PNG 3; L 636−637)

The hierarchical organization makes there be a miniature world in each level of the world, so the changes in the corporeal automaton will

follow the changes of simple substance with which the body is united, so that they appear as a natural consequence of the prior states.

> Together with a particular body, each monad makes a living substance. Thus not only is there life everywhere, joined to members or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of it in the monads, some of which dominate more or less over others. But when the monad has organs so adjusted that by means of them the impressions which are received, and consequently also the perceptions which represent these impressions, are heightened and distinguished (as, for example, when rays of light are concentrated by means of the shape of the humors of the eye and act with greater force), then this may amount to *sentiment*, that is to say, to a perception accompanied by *memory* – a perception of which there remains a kind of echo for a long time, which makes itself heard on occasion. Such a living being is called an *animal*, as its monad is called a *soul*. When this soul is raised to the level of *reason*, it is something more sublime and is counted among the *spirits*. (PNG 4; L 637)

The body has spontaneity in so far as can act upon other bodies, but only with respect to the laws contained into its nature, that is in the virtue of its substantial character. Just so far as it is a whole organized of monads, therefore of simple substances, the body has in itself the principle of action. Leibniz needs only perception and appetition to explain spontaneity in existence as a whole.

SPONTANEITY AND FREEDOM

After presenting some historical notes of the problem of spontaneity, we can finish with some systematical aspects of this problem. We saw that the spontaneity is a basic feature of the monads. Both for entelechies (simple substances with perception and appetition), and for souls (simple substances with perception, appetition and memory), and spirits (simple substances with perception, appetition, memory and consciousness), the capacity of action has its source in itself. The spontaneity originates in the nature of monad, so that it can be put in connection with perception and appetition. If we call perception and appetition qualities of a monad of first degree, we can call spontaneity a quality of the monad of second degree, and therefore spontaneity appears at all levels of existence.

This definition of spontaneity as the capacity of action by internal reasons, makes spontaneity into a concept that is not at all confused,[12] nor lacking in clear and compelling argumentation.[13] Probably, the misunderstandings are based on the difficulties of the metaphysics of Leibniz and,

more exactly, on the historical evolution of his thought. Therefore, without the historical aspects, Leibniz's argumentation for spontaneity can lead to such interpretations.

Given the qualities of the monad (both of the first degree and of the second degree) and the conditions of freedom (intelligence, spontaneity and contingency), one can see that freedom needs a more nuanced approach. First of all, one can see that the human being has freedom given that he can choose between more alternatives. He has spontaneity, because the source of his actions is in him and because he has consciousness of good and evil.

One can object that the choices are caused by any interest, therefore the freedom is blocked. Leibniz's reply is that even if the acts have a reason, they remain free given that this reason is not at all of an absolute necessity, but it inclines without necessitating. The choice is free because it realizes between many possibles, and our will is determined only by the goodness of the object (T 45), therefore is free when the choice of the most powerful reason is prevalent.[14]

The second observation is on animals, which have a soul, but do not have the elements that allow the passage from spontaneity to freedom; therefore, animals have spontaneity, but not freedom. The explanation is that freedom uses intelligence and the will: the intellect has as a reason the finding of the truth, and the will obey the practical aspects. In this way, the more reasonable the choice is, the more free it is, and the less reasonable the choice, the less free it is (Davidson, 2011: 222). The animals lack consciousness, and so they cannot have the notions of good and evil.

It is obvious that spontaneity, as a necessary condition of freedom (Phemister, 2007: 9), is not only a basis for freedom,[15] but is a metaphysical value more important than the freedom. Besides, spontaneity as a ground for freedom is not true if one sees the argument from the complete notion. In this case, spontaneity offers a logic-linguistic basis for freedom. Therefore, when we say that spontaneity is more important than freedom we count on the fact that spontaneity works at a deeper level, that is, at the metaphysical level of the world. In these circumstances, existence as a whole has spontaneity as its metaphysical value, while freedom is a value only in the case of some living beings, that is, in the case of spirits (human beings and God).

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[2] Abbreviations used: H = Leibniz, *Theodicy*, trans. by EM Huggard, Chicago: Open Court, 1990; L = Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, trans L Loemker, second edition, Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 1969; AG = Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, translated by Roger Ariew, Daniel Garber, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989; GM = *Leibnizens mathematische Schriften*, hrsg. CJ Gerhardt, 7 vols., Berlin, 1849-1863 (repr Hildesheim: Olms, 1962); GP = *Die Philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz*, hrsg. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols., Berlin, 1875-1890 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1960-1961); NS = *New system of the nature and the communication of substances, as well as the union between the soul and the body;* DM = *Discourse on metaphysics*; T = *Theodicy: essays on the goodness of God, the freedom of man, and the origin of evil*; Mo = *Monadology*; PNG = *The principles of nature and of grace, based on reason*.

[3] On rehabilitation of the substantial forms, see: Michel Fichant. "Mécanisme et métaphysique: le rétablisment des formes substantielles (1679)." *Science et métaphysique dans Descartes et Leibniz*. Paris: PUF, 1998. 163−204.

[4] On the corporeal substances see: Justin Smith, and Ohad Nachtomy. Eds. *Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2011; Pauline Phemister. *Leibniz and the Natural World*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005.

[5] See Justin Smith. *Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, 102. The secondary literature on Leibniz's "organism" is already

very rich; some references: Justin Smith. Ed. *The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; A.M. Nunziante. *Organismo come Armonia. La genesi del concetto di organismo vivente in Leibniz*. Trento: Pubblicazioni di Verifiche, 2002; Hide Ishiguro. "Unity without simplicity: Leibniz on organism." *The Monist*. 81.4 (1998): 534−552; F. Duchesneau. *Modèles du vivant de Descartes à Leibniz*. Paris: Vrin, 1998; E. Pasini. *Corpo e funzioni cognitive in Leibniz*. Franco Milan: Angeli, 1996; Catherine Wilson. *The Invisible World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, etc.

[6] See Leibniz, *Specimen dynamicum* (1695); GM VI, 234−254. On Leibniz's dynamics, see: Michel Fichant. "De la puissance à l`action." *Revue de métphysique et de morale* 100e année. 1 (1995); Leibniz, *La réforme de la dynamique*, trans. and commentary by M. Fichant. Paris: Vrin, 1994; Michel Fichant, "La «réforme» leibnizienne de la dynamique." *Studia Leibnitiana Suppl*. Tome 13 (1974): 195−214; M. Gueroult. *Leibniz: dynamique et métaphysique*, deuxième édition. Paris: Aubier, 1967, etc.

[7] For further details, see Daniel Garber. "*Materia*, force, and corporeal substance in Leibniz's philosophy." *Materia*. Eds. Delfina Giovannozzi, and Marco Veneziani. Firenze: Olschki, 2011. 409−421. Also, see Daniel Garber. *Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

[8] On the philosophical ground, especially with regard to the conformity between the faith and the reason, see Paul Rateau. "Sur la conformité de la foi avec la raison: Leibniz contre Bayle." *Revue philosophique*. 4 (2011): 467−485.

[9] Published in *Histoire critique de la république des lettres*, 1702; GP IV, 554−571; L 574−585.

[10] Brandon Look maintains that the first appearance of "monas dominans" is the letter to De Volder of 1703; see Brandon Look. "On monadic domination in Leibniz's Metaphysics." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 10.3 (2002): 379−399. Other scholars, like A.M. Nunziante, hold that it is not easy to see the exact moment, but some references can be between 1695 and 1700; see A.M. Nunziante. "Continuity or discontinuity? Some remarks on Leibniz's concept of 'substantia vivens' and 'organism'." *Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz*. Eds. Justin Smith and Ohad Nachtomy. Dordrecht: Springer, 2011.. 131−143.

[11] Mo LXX; L 650.

[12] As is maintained by John Hostler. *Leibniz's moral philosophy*. London: Duckworth, 1975, 35.

[13] As is maintained by Stuart Brown. *Leibniz*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1984, 159.

[14] See Leibniz to Coste, 1707; AG 194.

[15] The spontaneity as a metaphysical basis for the freedom is maintained by Donald Rutherford. See his chapter "Leibniz on spontaneity." *Leibniz: Nature and Freedom*. Eds. Donald Rutherford and J.A Cover. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 176−177.