Evolution of Democracy. Psychological Stages and Political Developments in World History

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Abstract. There has been a long history of discussion whether intellectual or socio-economic factors caused the rise of constitutional state and democracy, replacing the previous authoritarian forms of government. Some authors emphasized the role developmental psychology could play in illuminating the intellectual causes to these political phenomena. According to Piagetian researches, modern humankind has run through a psychogenetic evolution during the past several centuries. This psychological transformation entails higher forms of socio-moral consciousness decisive to the loss of legitimacy of authoritarian forms and to the erection of more humane political forms such as constitutional state and democracy.
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INTRODUCTION

Apart from seminal forms of democracy in ancient Greece for a certain period, all pre-modern across continents and times have preferred authoritarian forms of government. The great transition from authoritarian forms of constitution and government to democracy and constitutional government started in the Western world after 1750. It needed centuries for Europe to establish and enhance democratic structures and to remove authoritarian forms. Not before 1990 Europe was freed from the last dictatorships. According to Freedom House statistics, worldwide Two Thirds of the nations around 1975 had non-democratic regimes, while since that time up to today the number of democracies has risen and that of dictatorships has decreased to a considerable rate. There seems to be a worldwide trend to democracy, concerning not only the advanced nations but also the three continents that contain the developing countries. This trend appears as a clear victory that the many

setbacks happening again and again cannot refute. The ideas of liberalism and democracy, coming into existence in France, England, and the U.S.A. around 1750, have spread to all nations meanwhile, stepwise conquering the peoples' hearts and minds. Their adversaries still have power but seem to be on the losing side of history, from generation to generation more and more (Oesterdiekhoff, 2005, 2006, 2013a: 391-394).

Which are the causing factors to the prevalence of authoritarian forms in the premodern world and to the continuous emergence of freedom since the rise of modern, industrial society? The discussion about the causes of the emergence of dictatorship, kingship, gerontocracy, aristocracy, and democracy traces back to ancient philosophy. I distinguish two general types of theories and explanations regarding this topic. The materialistic type of approaches emphasizes objective factors such as economic and institutional phenomena. According to this view, agrarian economies may foster feudalism, monarchy, and other authoritarian forms. Economic transformations leading to industrial society change class constellations and enrich the extent of middle classes, which overpower the feudal and military elites. The economic participation of broader classes enhances their capacity to gain more political influence, finally leading to liberalism and democracy (Wittfogel, 1957; Stüwe and Weber, 2004; Moore, 1969).

The idealistic type of approaches rather focuses on subjective, ideological or mental factors. The philosophers of Enlightenment would deny that their ideas of freedom mainly root in material interests and accidental class conflicts. According to their view, liberalism and democracy do not result from economic and social opportunities but from the will and capacity of people to live in social and political conditions, which correspond to higher moral standards and respectful social relations, and which secure the dignity of human beings. This view implies that some specific mental factors, a traditional or archaic mentality backed the persistence of authoritarian forms in the premodern societies, whereas the emergence of a new mentality, dedicated to progress and freedom, originated the ideas of constitutional government and democracy (Rousseau, 1983; Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2011a; Grab, 1973; Habermas, 1976; Rindermann, 2008).

While some social scientists maintained that only materialistic theories might fulfill scientific standards concerning this issue, others emphasized the role of the new ideas, or tried to combine materialistic and mental factors, in finding a theory of the rise of democracy.

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I think that only a theory of the subjective type has the chance to cover the phenomena, that is, to explain the prevalence of authoritarian forms in premodern societies and the emergence of democracy since the era of Enlightenment. My suggestion is that premodern populations prefer authoritarian political structures due to their mentality. Further, a transformation of mentalities has led to the continuous rise of the ideas of liberalism and to the strict refutation of serfdom and tyranny since the era of Enlightenment. Thus, my theory follows certain ideas of the enlightened philosophers and revolutionizes them by unfolding a new psychological theory that they didn't have and that bases these ideas in an unprecedented way. Clearly, historians can only describe the evolution of the new ideas of liberalism but have no explanatory theory to it. In case humans across history had always wanted democracy and constitutional government, then they should have always had a democratic attitude and not a mentality that favored authoritarian forms.

However, ancient philosophy and worldview even never formulated a "bill of rights" or a "déclaration des droîts de l'homme et du citoyen". Their ideologies rather preferred authoritarian forms and strictly denied liberalism. Thus, premodern peoples favor authoritarian systems due to their cognitions and mentality, as surveys across developing countries and Islamic peoples have repeatedly documented (Tibi, 2000; Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 415-456). I explain this attitude saying that premodern peoples stood on lower stages of psyche and cognition. Developmental psychology has convincingly evidenced that peoples on lower stages of cognition prefer authoritarian forms. Consequently, the psychogenetic development of modern humans, leading to higher forms of cognition and psyche, has caused the denial of authoritarian forms and the rise of liberalism. Thus, my theory explains both the premodern preference of authoritarian forms and the modern preference of democracy by referring them to different stages of psychological development. I regard the respective psychogenetic stage of peoples as the source of their political consciousness and preferences. These again are the roots of the two types of government and constitution (and their intermediary states). The materialistic theory refers the non-democratic consciousness of premodern peoples as a mere reflex of institutions, of serfdom and tyranny,

which are said not to exist due to mental but to economic and institutional reasons. The psychogenetic theory, however, regards the lower psychological stage as the root of authoritarian institutions and the higher stages as cause to democracy and liberalism. It seems to me that Hegel was more correct than Marx with this regard (Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 391-494; 2013b, 2014, 2011a).

The idea is not completely new that developmental psychology is helpful to explain forms of political consciousness and institutions. Charles Radding (1985) referred the medieval preference of authoritarian forms to lower psychological stages. Jürgen Habermas (1976) used developmental psychology in explaining the rise of democratic ideas, modern law, humanism, and morals. Rosenberg et al. (1988: 160) wrote that developmental psychology may deliver the main theory of the political sciences:

> We therefore conclude that only genetic-epistemological theories currently provide the psychological theory and cross-cultural validity (not to mention the normative support) required for a normative-psychological theory underlying a general political development. (Rosenberg et al., 1988: 160)

They emphasized that the political sciences base on a wrong assumption, namely that peoples across history and continents might have been staying on the same psychological stage, thinking in the same forms and structures. The fact that different peoples have been staying on different stages opens the way to reconstruct political sciences and the history of political systems as well. "We advance a Piagetian reconceptualization of political culture, which is then used to define political development" (Rosenberg, 1988: 131). However, all these researchers did not develop a complete psychogenetic theory of democracy and of the democratization of the world. The authors, however, prepared the work I have done.

PSYCHOGENESIS AND HISTORY

The idea that history follows psychogenetic developments from childhood to adulthood roots in ideas of the era of Enlightenment. Hegel, Saint-Simon, Condorcet, Feuerbach, Comte, Carus, Bastian, Tylor, Lubbock, Clodd, Spencer, Haeckel, etc. supported such views. Many classical representatives of ethnology, sociology, and psychology shared corresponding ideas. Nearly every (!) founder of child psychology emphasized the similarities between children and the so-called "primitives,"

the peoples of premodern societies (Oesterdiekhoff, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012c; Werner, 1948; Stern, 1924).

Jean Piaget described these parallels with regard to uncountable phenomena, covering the whole range of logical, physical, social, and moral issues. Children and premodern adults share the animistic and magical worldview, the belief in ghosts and sorcerers, and the belief in the realistic character of dreams and ideas. They share the same physical concepts regarding the understanding of nature and reality, down to the smallest details such as the movement of bodies, shadows and waters. Both groups believe that nature is ruled by a social and moral order, that incidents and objects, rocks and rivers observe and judge the deeds of human beings. Children's "immanent justice" bases the fire-, water-, and poison ordeals to find in premodern societies around the globe since the oldest times. Both groups share the same moral concepts such as the objective responsibility, the holy nature of laws, and the law-and-order moral. Both groups have the same problems with mastering logical and abstract concepts, for example, both groups fail in understanding syllogisms. Piaget ascribed the mental age of archaic peoples to that of preschool children, the Ionian philosophy to the stage of concrete operations, and only the modern sciences since the 17th century to the adolescent stage of formal operations. Premodern peoples are thus characterized by an "arrested development" of psyche and cognition, as already Heinz Werner, Pierre Janet, and Édouard Claparède had formulated (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; Piaget and Garcia, 1989; Piaget, 1932, 1959; Oesterdiekhoff and Rindermann, 2008).

The Piagetian Cross-Cultural Psychology researched the psychological stage development across numerous continents, cultures, and milieus. 80 years of research accumulated huge masses of data, revealing the psychological stages peoples of every known culture occupy. The result is that the adults of the weaker, illiterate, semiliterate, traditional or archaic social settings within the developing countries remain bound to the preoperational or concrete operational stages but do not develop the adolescent stage of formal operations. This result is held regarding the whole range of world experience such as logical, physical, social, and moral issues. Only peoples of the modern, industrial societies attain the adolescent stage of human development. Thus, thousands of cross-cultural empirical surveys have been supporting the early observations of Piaget (Dasen and Berry, 1974; Dasen, 1974, 1977; Lurija, 1982; Hallpike, 1979; Oesterdiekhoff, 2009, 2011a).

Table: Psychogenesis and history

Typical age (in modern societies)	Piagetian stage of psychological development	Societal evolution	Some characteristics of reason and practice
From birth to 2 years	Sensory-motor stage	Mammal societies	Practical intelligence in space and time.
2-8	Pre-operational stage	Some pre-modern societies	Belief in oracles and ordeals, punishment of unintended consequences, and belief in eternal and divine rules (non-differentiation between nature and society). Animism and personification of nature. Belief in man-made magical power over things and beings. Belief in myths and fairy tales. Weak reasoning abilities and low sense for reality. Adherence to authorities and support of hierarchies. God himself rules law and government.
6-12	Stage of concrete operations	Some pre-modern societies	Belief in man-made magic disappears gradually. Animistic schemes and other irrational belief systems still persist somewhat. Attenuation of the adherence to unilateral social relations and hierarchies.
10-20	Stage of formal operations	Modern, industrial societies	The preconditions to the rational and scientific worldview emerge. Disappearance of magical beliefs, animistic schemes, and other forms of mysticism. Disenchantment of the worldview. Emergence of Enlightenment, sciences, industrialism, democracy, and human rights.

Habermas, Hallpike, and Oesterdiekhoff have been among those who have drawn decisive conclusions upon these psychological surveys referring to several social sciences and to the reconstruction of the history of humankind as well. I showed that the lower stages reveal the core structures behind the historical development of economy, population, politics, law, sciences, philosophy, religion, literature, music, and further cultural domains. The new theory delivers the key to explain the rise of the modern, industrial society, too. Modern society consists of industrialism, sciences, enlightenment, democracy, and humanism. They evolved nearly

simultaneously in the Western culture after 1700. Sciences, enlightenment, and humanism are merely mental phenomena. Their temporal and spatial coincidence with the rise of industrialism and democracy results from a common source behind all of them. They all are manifestations of the adolescent stage of formal operations. We know from the above-mentioned empirical surveys that modernizing peoples raise their mental ages and climb to higher psychological stages. Thus, a dialectical or self-reinforcing loop of culture, education, and schools on the one side and stage development on the other side must have taken place in the early modern times, thus causing and shaping the emergence of the modern, industrial society. Therefore, my theory of the rise of democracy is rooted both into a complete theory of the rise of the modern, industrial society and into the empirical findings of the Piagetian Cross-Cultural Psychology (Habermas, 1976; Hallpike, 1979; Oesterdiekhoff, 2009, 2011a, 2012a).

Next to this branch of cross-cultural psychology exists another branch, namely the psychometric intelligence research, qualitatively inferior but quantitatively superior to the developmental approach. Over hundred years of empirical research found out that adults of all premodern societies across all continents and races have IQ scores below 75, when compared to present-day adjustments. Even the Europeans, Chinese, Japanese, and Americans before 1930 performed with scores below 75. These peoples raised their intelligence for over 30 points in less than 70 years, as numerous surveys found out. Flynn effect is the name to this phenomenon of rising intelligence. Obviously, both branches of cross-cultural psychology evidence the same phenomenon, namely the lower stages of premodern humankind and the emergence of higher stages in modern populations. The lower IQ scores correspond to the lower Piagetian stages, while the rising scores match the rise of the adolescent stage (Flynn, 2007; Oesterdiekhoff, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Oesterdiekhoff and Rindermann, 2008).

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY EXPLAINS THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY

Piaget documented that psychogenetic maturation is the single cause to the evolution of democracy. He evidenced that children initially do not master democratic ideas and procedures due to their cognitive immaturity and deficits. Only adolescents on the formal operational stage

elaborate a democratic consciousness and exert democratic rules. To my opinion, these findings are the theoretical breakthrough in finding a general theory of democracy the political sciences should follow. Piaget, not Rousseau, was the first to disclose the true sources both of tyranny and democracy. His methodological procedure based on an analysis of the marble game children use to play without any adult influence. His famous description of the game is to find in his book "The moral judgment of the child" of 1932, basing on empirical research among Swiss children of that time. He discovered three stages of understanding the game among children. During the first stage the children have no understanding of the rules at all but play it only for the joy to the see the marbles rolling. The second stage lasts from the fifth to the tenth year of life roughly. Now the children learn some rules, obey to the rules, and cooperate with other children in the game. However, their practice is imperfect and their capacity to cooperate is limited. Further, the children of this stage do not develop a system of strict rules but may change them from time to time without noticing the arbitrary character of their rules.

They don't think about rules for unusual or hypothetical situations. Moreover, the children of the second stage believe that the rules are unchangeable, are made by their parents, by the elderly, by the mayor of the city, or by god. The rules are as old as the creation of the world by the first humans or god. The children do not differ human laws from physical regularities. They believe that they have not the right to change the rules on their own will, on the free choice of the members of the game, on democratic procedures children carry out on their own. Thus, a combination of a scanty practice and a holy understanding of the rules together characterize the second stage, the children´s understanding of rules, customs and laws. The lower stage causes both dismal practice and its mystical interpretation.

The third stage comes into being as a part of the evolution of the adolescent stage of formal operations after the tenth year of life. Now the teenagers grasp that the rules are not as old as the world is, that the elderly and divinities did not made the rules, that rules do not have the status of physical regularities, and that rules are solely made by the gamblers themselves. They understand that rule legitimacy should follow only from a correct rule installation, that is, from the choices of the players involved. Thus, they regard only rules correctly chosen as obliging rules. Only democratic choices install legitimate rules. Youth on

the formal stage surmount therefore the holy understanding of rules by the democratic understanding. They replace an authoritarian understanding of rules, laws, and customs by a democratic one. Thus, they invent democracy in consequence of their cognitive maturation. Next to their new consciousness of rules they clearly improve their game practice. Their ability to obey and to exert rules, to invent and to institutionalize rules has risen. While children of the second stage combine holy ideas with a scanty practice, the youth of the third stage link democratic ideas with an improved rule obedience and social praxis (Piaget, 1932: 30-110).

The Piaget following research in modern societies has replicated and verified his early findings up to now again and again. Contemporary psychological research has confirmed the early findings of 1932 (Tapp and Kohlberg, 1971; Lickona, 1976; Durio, 1976; Easton and Hess, 1962; Damon, 1977). Furthermore, Piagetian Cross-Cultural Psychology applied Piaget's procedure to pre-modern populations. The researchers found that children all over the world initially develop the first two stages of rule understanding the same way as Piaget had described regarding European children. However, premodern adolescents and adults do not surmount then the second stage typical for modern children by their tenth year of life. They answer as the children do, namely that humans are not allowed to change rules, which are said as being made by the gods and the first humans. For example, Havighurst and Neugarten discovered that several Indian tribes in North America do not develop the third stage of rule understanding but manifest instead all those characteristics typical for the second stage. Most of the natives aged 18 or older answer that neither game rules nor other moral orders should be changed because they had been created by gods or first humans. Even the game rules are believed to be holy and mystical, not only the moral codes and customs. Every game has a legendary tradition tracing back to the creation of the world, being told again and again during the holy feasts.

These remarks all refer to legends concerning the origins of the games –legends which are well known to the children. The Navaho games were taught to the Navaho people by their ancient supernatural predecessors and are always played the same way. In response to the question, *who made the rules first*? the answer was usually, *the holy people*, though occasionally it was *the animals*, often with the explanation that

the holy people taught the animals and the animals taught the Navaho. (Havighurst and Neugarten, 1955: 139)

Piaget (1932) himself had already contended that children's law concepts correspond to premodern principles of government, authority, and law. Moreover, he knew about the correspondence between the third stage and the evolution of democracy in the West. Ethnology and history of law have confirmed these cross-cultural empirical findings, without taking conscious reference to them. Fritz Kern had described the "good, old law" of the Middle Age by nearly the same words Piaget had used without knowing him and without having any idea of the related developmental data. Kern said that the medieval consciousness took laws and customs as unchangeable, eternal, and divine, made by god and not modifiable by human wishes or choices. He added that the Middle Age did not differ physical from human laws and saw both nature and society as ruled by the same holy law and order. Laws exist as physical objects do. In case humans actually changed or installed rules they only had the idea to restore them but not to modify or to create them (Kern, 1952: 17ff, 30-50; Radding, 1985).

Whenever people actually detected new laws, deviations from older traditions, then they declared the new laws either as resurrections or as wrong laws. However, actual legislation and judicial judgments were seen as finding of the law, not as making or creation of law. (Oesterdiekhoff, 2009: 339)

According to Kern, both holy understanding and dismal practice characterize the medieval law. In fact, medieval people deviate more easily from law than today because elites abuse or overpower law, judges and courts had not the skills as they have today, etc. Medieval people bend or falsify laws dependent of situations and interests and very often there is nobody to defend the law against betrayers and armed forces (Kern, 1952: 43; Oesterdiekhoff, 2009: 340). Altogether, the combination of holy understanding and scanty practice characterizes the rule understanding both of children and premodern humans. In comparing the words used it is hard to find any differences between Piaget and Kern although they didn't know from each other.

The medieval "good, old law" resembles the so-called customary laws of tribal societies and ancient civilizations. Every archaic society regards its laws, morals, and customs as made by gods or the first humans as the

above-mentioned Native Americans. It characterizes the ancient Chinese, Japanese, Indian, or African law (Oesterdiekhoff, 2009: 341-345). It stays still today under the name of Shari'a in the centre of the Islamic world. Sharia'a means the law made by Allah and pronounced by Mohammed. Humans and peoples are not allowed to change it but have to follow it as it is written in the holy books. By now peoples across the Islamic world have a popular understanding of law that is close to the second stage respectively to the "good, old law". More than anything else they request that government, parliament, constitution, laws, and morals should obey and follow the Shari'a. In the eyes of the majority of contemporary Islamic people any law that contradicts the Shari'a is not allowed and is not valid. The Shari'a orientation has delivered the basis to the Iranian revolution of 1979, to the dominance of the contemporary Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, to the policy of the fundamentalists not only in Afghanistan but in every Islamic society of North Africa and the Middle East.

Many politicians and theologians of the Islamic world pronounce by today that Shari'a implies that god rules over the society and that the peoples are not allowed to change rules or to install governments. As in Egypt, Gaza or Libanon people tend to use democratic choices only to elect fundamentalist parties, which immediately abolish democracy. Thus, the overweight of dictatorship in relation to democracy in the Islamic world by today reflects a divine understanding of law and government, a preponderance of the second stage of rule understanding and corresponding psychological stages (Tibi, 2000; Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 412-455).

The internal link between religion and policy, god and nation, characterizing all pre-modern societies, is rooted in lower psychological stages. Initially, all children even of the secular societies have this divine understanding of nation and government. The modern adolescents surmount this stage by elaborating the secular mentality that has evolved during the age of Enlightenment and afterwards due to psychogenetic evolution.

> As it turns out, however, not only do many children associate the sanctity and awe of religion with the political community, but to ages 9 or 10 they sometimes have considerable difficulty in disentangling God and country. (Easton and Hess, 1962: 238)

Corresponding to the scanty social praxis children of the second stage of game understanding unfold, premodern societies do not secure the liberty rights and the physical safety of the individual. The individual (or social groups) usually hasn't any possibility to defend himself against attacks of the government. There isn't any constitution that forces rulers to restrain from oppressing individuals. Premodern societies do not care for a division of legislation, jurisdiction, and government, which characterizes modern democracies.

Correspondingly, premodern dictators, monarchs, or feudal elites rule their territories as if they belong to them personally. I have shown this with regard to African dictators after 1960 and to ancient Roman Emperors. They appear us as terrible, wild, cruel, and egocentric persons, even the moderate ones among them behave in a way unconceivable against modern views. The citizens were exposed to their mercy and arbitrariness without any secure protection. The African dictators after 1960 regarded their nations as their private property and exerted governmental, judicial, and legislative powers in one hand simultaneously. The Roman Emperors abused their power to a rate hardly imaginable (Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 455-471).

Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran after 1979 treated his people as if they were preschool children. He ordered how they should drink water, which clothes they should wear, which music they are allowed to listen, which books they should read, and which kind of meals they ought take. People with deviating ideas were murdered. There is hardly any Iranian family without losses stemming from this time of "revolution". Khomeini had an archaic understanding of humans, life, and government identifiable in the Western world only when we trace back to ancient times. Accordingly, Khomeini saw himself as Allah's mirror and representative. Khomeini himself is the law given to the Iranian people because it is up to him to interpret the Islamic law and Allah's wishes.

The Iranian example may be a little bit stranger than the experiences the moderate regimes of North Africa and the Middle East represent but the resemblances to Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and other regimes are striking. Basically, there isn't any Islamic regime that has been securing individual rights, except Turkey probably. I strongly emphasize that the civil sphere of the Islamic nations, the African nations, and other developmental countries has been belonging in the past 50 years more to the second than to the third stage of rule understanding (Tibi, 2000;

Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 391-494). They reveal the same combination of scanty practice and divine understanding of rules that Havighurst and Neugarten, Radding or Kern described as typical to the premodern societies they had researched.

Developmental psychology has found out that children do not understand tolerance for deviating ideas, liberty rights for individuals, rights of individuals against government and authority, and democratic legitimacy of governments and authorities. Adolescents of modern societies after their 13th year of life develop stepwise a democratic consciousness and patterns of tolerance (Adelson and Beall, 1970; Damon, 1977; Durio, 1976; Easton and Hess, 1962; Gallatin and Adelson, 1970; Selman, 1980; Tapp and Kohlberg, 1971; Zellman and Sears, 1971). As we know that premodern adults do not develop the adolescent stage of formal operations it is a priori clear that their lack of democratic consciousness and their preference of authoritarian governments (dictatorship, monarchy, Gottesstaat, Führerstaat, Islamic state, etc.) is solely rooted in their lower psychological stage upon they stay.

Furthermore, it is logically obvious that the irrational, insecure, corrupt, cruel, and intolerant dimensions of the social life and the civil sphere across all premodern societies stem from the patterns Piaget had described as typical for the second stage of rule understanding. All premodern societies are said to be Gottesstaaten (ancient or medieval China, Japan, Europe, Peru, Islamic nations, etc.). According to Piaget, we expect then their scanty social practice in correspondence exactly to this holy understanding of the political life, law, and custom. All reports just verify this expectation because we collect and face only terrible reports about the civil sphere of every premodern society from ancient times up to now, here with reference to the developing countries (Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 391-494).

Only modern constitutional states and democracies have developed a civil sphere and a political life that secure the life of their citizens, the free expression of their opinions, and their free choice of parties and social groups. Only these advanced nations have developed tolerance, freedom, and security, the removal of political oppression, the decline of absurd political tendencies and ideologies, and the admission of the citizens to forms of free and fair cooperation. I strongly emphasize that these achievements, stepwise gained and improved in the past generations, root in the evolution of the third stage of rule understanding

respectively in the adolescent stage of formal operations, having evolved originally in middle class Europeans since the 18th century and evolving in most modern humans during the second decade of life.

Democratic institutions depend on democratic capabilities; these again provide a certain psychological maturity, which manifests on psychological stages beyond childhood. The mixture of authoritarian regime and civil insecurity, however, hints to childlike psychological stages. Self-respect and respect of others, the care for human dignity, the wish to improve social life, the capacity to better life, security, and freedom stands behind the wish of people to install democratic institutions and constitutional states. Psychological maturity is the source of democracy. People on lower stages, however, have not the capacity to allow tolerance and free co-operations, democratic choices and individual rights, as already J. J. Rousseau (1983: 49) recognized. "Locke and Jefferson´s theory of constitutional democracy presumes attitudes of mutual respect among citizens" (Rosenberg, 1988: 152). Premodern peoples tend to riot, turmoil, corruption, oppression, and exploitation. People who do not take themselves and others serious give up their rights in the hands of authorities of whom they hope that the carry out their wishes and not those of other persons. That is exactly what children expect from parents and elderly: Rule but do everything for me because I am not able to do so seems to be their motto (Damon, 1977).

FROM AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES TO DEMOCRACY

The child of the second stage denies democracy and supports the idea of the eternal status of rules and the transcendental status of parents, elderly, and authorities. Thus, there is a direct and internal link between divine status of rules, lack of democracy, and support of unilateral authority people have only to obey. Premodern societies reveal the same patterns. They all combine divine status of rules with a denial of their democratic constitution. The kings, pharaohs, dictators, Imams, and ayatollahs are the direct representatives of the gods or are they themselves. Whatever they wish corresponds to the divine rule. Divine rule, god, and king are several aspects of the same kind. Thus, only the childlike psychological stage is the root of this understanding of political order and law, legitimacy and government.

Accordingly, children even of the most advanced nations identify state and nation with prime minister or president on the one side (nationally) and policeman and judge on the other side (locally). They initially believe that the president (prime minister, chancellor) determines everything alone: laws, economy, foreign policy, wars, and the entire course of the nation, as if he were god. All children initially regard the president as a sort of king or as a big father who rules alone. They always ascribe only good intentions and superior capacities to him as if he were a form of god or superman (Easton and Hess, 1962: 241; Connell, 1971: 26-28).

> When children at a young age are asked in separate items about who makes the laws, runs the country, helps the country most, best represents the government, or, in a political context, who helps you most, the responses consistently favour the President… When children through grade 8 were asked to compare the President to most men with regard to such personal and moral characteristics as honesty, friendliness, overall goodness, and liking for others, and such performance qualities as his knowledge and application to work, the vast preponderance see him as measuring up to most men or surpassing them. And even when father was compared to the President with regard to these characteristics, few rate father higher, and in some role performance qualities they rank him even lower. In subsequent tests of other children, they uniformly see the President possessed of all the virtues: benign, wise, helpful, concerned for the welfare of others, protective, powerful, good, and honest. It is not surprising to find that a high percentage of children hold as strongly positive feelings about their father as they do about the President. (Easton and Hess, 1962: 241f)

Thus, developmental psychology shows that all small children across the world and times initially identify government with one big person, with a paternal person resembling a king who stands above all others and runs the whole country on his own. As children all over the world by their seventh year adore their parents as omniscient and most powerful gods so they adore the president, prime minister or king as powerful and divine person who keeps the world running (Piaget, 1959; Connell, 1971; Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a). Therefore, children initially do not regard rulers as persons to be elected but as persons who have a right to rule and to be obeyed. Even older children who recognize that rulers are installed by an electorate keep on believing that the elected rulers have not to the duty to match or accomplish peoples' opinions and interests. Elected rulers can do what they want and the people are obliged to obey, children all over the world use to say. William Damon is among those

child psychologists who have verified that only (modern) adolescents due to their attainment of the formal stages grasp and support the principles of democracy and constitutional state (Damon, 1977; Connell, 1971; Tapp and Kohlberg, 1971).

Apart from few exceptions such as the ancient Greece for a certain period, premodern peoples all over the world have had the same attitudes to government and state, rulers and kings as children do. They felt themselves obliged to obey and to adorn kings and emperors and didn't feel any necessity to replace authoritarian regimes by democratic ones. As children use to do, premodern peoples have regarded rulers as divine, omniscient, and magical persons, capable not only to rule the people but also nature and physics, sunshine, rains, harvests, and the entire course of country and world. The kings all over the world have been seen as magical kings, as some kind of gods or sorcerers. The whole people used to discuss health and happiness of the kings. In case of the king's sickness and death the whole people felt downhearted and unhappy. Till today some African presidents are seen as magical kings capable to cure their people from AIDS or other epidemics by magical powers, similar to ancient or medieval kings in Europe, as J. Frazer or M. Bloch had documented (Frazer, 1994; Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 421-455).

I strongly emphasize that not institutional arrangements or class constellations account for these forms of paternal rule, monarchy, and tyranny, but only the developmental stage upon premodern peoples stay. They don't want democracy but monarchy and paternal rule due to their psychological constitution. Children tend to rebellions, but only modern adolescents are ready or even keen on revolutions. Only the formal operational stage namely unfolds ideologies or perspectives that describe the transformation of society from actual and present to possible and wishful constitutions (Connell, 1971). Likewise premodern peoples tend to rebellions and turmoil but not to revolutions that lead to constitutional states and democracies. They have even never tried it in world history because it has not been in their repertoire of possibilities. Premodern peoples in world history have replaced one tyranny by another but basically they have never surmounted it by constitutional government and democracy (except the Greek experience to a certain degree, which confirms my theory of the cognitive foundations to the political evolution).

Not only opinion polls in developmental regions document their lack of democratic aspirations but also their mentality and social structures. In case power structures and class constellations might have been the single or main source both of tyranny and democracy we would at least find documents of ancient peoples by which they clearly express their capacity to erect constitutional states and democracies. The first philosophers in the Western world who formulated these principles and programs had been Charles de Montesquieu, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. They formulated both the illegitimacy of tyranny and the institutional, ethical, and philosophical preconditions to democracy and constitutional state. Without these and similar writers Enlightenment, revolutionary transformations, and democratisation would not have taken place. The American and French revolution was expressed and justified in the "bill of rights" of 1791 and the "déclaration des droîts de l´homme et du citoyen" of 1789. These declarations describe the institutional preconditions to democracy and constitutional state. We do not find similar documents in premodern Asia, in pre-Columbian America, in Africa, in the Arabian world, or in ancient Mediterranean. I estimate that a culture that does not formulate texts close to these declarations mentioned does not really want and is not capable as well to erect democracy and constitutional state. They may suffer from tyranny and may thirst for freedom but are nevertheless incapable of erecting the remedial and progressive institutions.

Premodern peoples such as the Romans, the Arabs, the Chinese, the Egyptians, and others have suffered of their emperors a lot. They may have tried to rebel and to renew institutions, but they neither formulated the above-mentioned declarations nor tried to institutionalise democracy and constitutional state. This fact hints to the conclusion that their psychological stage and their corresponding political consciousness were the causes to this deficiency, not power constellations and class blockades (Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 471-493; Rousseau, 1983; Montesquieu, 2011; Rüsen, 2013).

The political philosophy of ancient and medieval Europe and Asia strongly supports authoritarian regimes, monarchies, dictatorships, gerontocracies, etc. Neither Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, nor Confucius or Mencius, or other classical Eurasian authors, formulated theories close to those of Montesquieu, Locke, and Rousseau. Basically, their considerations contradict to these of the three great European inventors of

modern states, fail in recognizing their principles and breakthroughs, and support opposite argumentation. They usually justify both slavery and serfdom in society and authoritarian regimes in politics. Consequently, the simple fact that they justify slavery and serfdom suffices to contend that they do not support freedom and liberalism and back kingship or aristocracy upon intellectual reasons. Usually, the medieval political philosophy corresponds to the second stage of rule understanding, as recent Islamic theories do, too. Erasmus and Machiavelli still represent the second stage; Bodin and Hobbes stay partly on the second, partly on the third stage. Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau were the first to formulate the foundations of the third stage. They formulated for the first time in history the principles of the modern democratic state, which modern adolescents also develop due to the rise of the formal operational stage, as modern developmental psychology has described. These protagonists had taken the role of educators for several generations of revolutionaries and politicians, but beyond that they are rather manifestations than promoters of the cognitive development of the educated classes in Europe (Oesterdiekhoff, 2013a: 471-480).

Without the philosophy of Enlightenment revolution and political transformation would not have taken place. Ideas, capabilities, and aspirations existed before deeds and institutionalisations. The rise of the socio-moral and political stages of consciousness prepared the reforms and revolutions. As the rise of the formal stage unfolds stepwise in very small steps as the rise of political transformations needed generations to accomplish and to improve democracy on stepwise higher levels. According to the above-mentioned facts of psychology, the transformation from lower to higher stages of psyche and cognition needed several centuries in Europe. The correspondence to the length of the democratic transition, covering centuries, is by no means accidental.

The American and French Revolution established democracy and constitutional state for the first time in history (with the Greek democracy for the second time). They had been the fruit of the era of Enlightenment and their related political philosophies. Already Hegel and Kant and many others had analysed that the world history had never seen such occurrences beforehand and that a new stage of consciousness had been originated which would change the whole world in future and forever. From Paris and Washington started an ongoing revolution that has had a tremendous success but has not fully completed by today.

DEMOCRATISATION AS MANIFESTATION OF MODERNIZATION AND PSYCHOGENESIS

The origins of democracy and constitutional state fall in the same period in which modern, industrial society, the new sciences "im eigentlichen Sinne," the era of Enlightenment, and the humanitarian revolution took place. There must exist a common root to the simultaneous origin of these "big five" that appeared in the Western culture after 1700. There must exist a common root of the coincidental origin of modern, industrial society and democracy. Jean Piaget and some other authors broadly evidenced that the historical rise of the adolescent stage of formal operations gave birth to the rise of the new sciences after 1650.

Margaret Jacob belongs to those who described the inevitable precondition of the new chemistry, physics, and mathematics to the invention of Newcomen's and Watt's steam engines. Without the new sciences respectively the freshly evolved formal operations the invention of the new technologies would have been impossible. Additionally, I showed the decisive role of the psychogenetic evolution to the rise of the industrial economy, thus advancing the classical Weberian approach. The crucial role of the adolescent stage to the era of Enlightenment and the humanitarian revolution (abolishment of slavery and serfdom, sadistic punishment law, etc.) is obvious. Thus, the psychogenetic evolution, the stepwise rise of the adolescent stage of formal operations, is the decisive cause to the emergence of the modern, industrial society with its main characteristics industrial economy, sciences, Enlightenment, democracy, and humanism. My theory to the emergence of modern society has been prepared by similar considerations of Jean Piaget and Jürgen Habermas and is in the heritage of classical authors such as Comte, Spencer, Lubbock, Weber, Elias, and others (Elias, 1982; Habermas, 1976; Piaget and Garcia, 1989; Jacob, 1997; Oesterdiekhoff, 2005, 2006, 2011a, 2011b, 2013a: 549-580, 2013b).

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