Life Cannot be Good

Abstract

This paper examines a structural tension in contemporary Aristotelian moral philosophy. Geach’s claim that states of affairs cannot be bearers of goodness underpins critiques of outcome-based ethics, yet accounts of human flourishing and procreation appear to rely implicitly on the value of states of affairs. By tracing the roles of Geach, Foot, and Anscombe, the paper shows that this tension is unavoidable: either states of affairs can be good, admitting consequentialist reasoning back into moral theory, or life, flourishing, and procreation cannot be affirmed as morally good. Using procreation as a decisive test case, the argument demonstrates that appeals to virtue or practical reason alone cannot resolve the dilemma. The paper thus contributes a sharpened understanding of the internal structure of Aristotelian ethics and its implications for normative claims about life and human flourishing.