Migration Governance in a Multipolar World: How Emerging Powers Challenge Western-Designed Institutional Regimes
Published 2026-01-12
Keywords
- migration governance; BRICS; non-binding frameworks; emerging powers institutional pluralism; responsibility-sharing;

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Abstract
The global governance architecture for international migration has historically reflected Western institutional preferences, enshrined through the 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR's mandate, and recent Global Compacts prioritising developed nation interests whilst preserving sovereign border control. Yet as geopolitical power becomes increasingly multipolar, emerging economies (particularly the BRICS coalition) contest these frameworks, arguing they inadequately represent developing country interests and concentrate refugee and migrant populations in poorer nations whilst wealthier states maintain restrictive admission policies. This article interrogates whether emerging power contestation generates genuine governance alternatives or merely reproduces exclusionary logics under different institutional wrappings. The central argument contends that whilst emerging powers have successfully challenged Western institutional frameworks' legitimacy, they have not developed comprehensive counter-regimes addressing core tensions between state sovereignty, migrant protection, and responsibility-sharing. The analysis reveals that Western institutional design has undergone systematic downgrading from binding to non-binding frameworks, permitting states to appear internationally cooperative whilst maintaining complete discretion over immigration policies. The International Organisation for Migration's consolidation as global lead agency represents victory for labour mobility paradigms over worker protection frameworks. Developing countries hosting disproportionate refugee populations (Turkey, Jordan, Colombia, Uganda) contest this architecture, recognising that non-binding governance enables wealthy states to avoid burden-sharing obligations. Examining BRICS, ASEAN, and Cartagena Declaration alternatives, the article demonstrates that emerging power initiatives similarly operate within structural constraints producing convergence around non-binding governance across all geopolitical blocs. Four fundamental contradictions remain unresolved: sovereignty versus protection obligations, burden distribution versus resource constraints, labour mobility expansion versus worker protection standards, and state rights versus migrant rights. The multipolar moment thus represents institutional pluralism within similar structural constraints rather than governance renewal. Meaningful transformation requires addressing political contradictions that no purely institutional reform can resolve, demanding political movements prioritising migrant protection over sovereign border control rather than merely rearranging institutional frameworks.