This paper deals with the reiteration and re-emphasis of the ineffable nature of ŚrīĀdiŚaṅkaraĀcārya’s Nirguṇa Brahman - the ineffable immutable, partless, distinctionless and non-relational infinite absolute which the inability of mind, logic and language to comprehend it is its self-evidence.It closely follows whatŚrīSureśvaraĀcārya had considered as a self-evident absolute truth revealed in the Upaniṣadic texts, and as such the task of the Advaitins is only confined to refuting criticisms against such an ultimate reality. Wittingly or unwittingly, what is generally observed is that, such a reality that is negatively understood as ‘pure-consciousness’ or the absolute ‘bare ground’ (adhiṣthānamātra) that underlies or implied by or inescapably presupposed by every bit of the depth and range of human experiencecan never be grasped in the relational terms of ‘knower and known relationship’ (jñāta-jñeya or pramāta-prameyasaṁbandha) is still unnoticed. Perhaps, it is this epistemic paradox which Sir Roger Penrose realised when he firmly concluded that, human understanding or consciousness as the underlying basis of every mathematical operation etc., accordingly it can never be reduced to or understood in computational terms. This issue is what this paper seeks to deliberate as a reiteration in the light of some possible methodological approach of comparative analysis involving Edmund Husserl’s conception of consciousness and Heidegger’s logos or discourse. A fact which has so far been lying unexplored is that, though Heidegger’s ontological phenomenology in its path breaking existential orientations avoids the concepts like consciousness, subject, I, ego, mind and object etc, his idea of logos as a part of the fundamental analysis of the existential structure of Dasein as the ‘correct mode of access’ to the non-dualistic Beingseems to have some affinity with Śaṅkara’s examination of the ‘self-showing’ (Heidegger’s) characters of the things of the world conveyed by his asti, bhāti and priyam as the corresponding empirical terms of the self-established (nityasiddha or svataḥsiddha) and self-revealing knowledge (svaprakāsatva) nature of sat, cit and ānanda. These may be compared with Heidegger’s logos as the ‘act of letting the self-showingof the nature of things be seen by the seeing of Dasein’ which without being a knowing subject, it understands the ‘self-manifestation’ of the underlying implicit ontological truth about the non-dichotomic Being. This agrees with the epistemological theory of the self-evident theory of Advaita. No one to one correspondence between the philosophy and Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta and Heidegger’s philosophy of existentially oriented ontological phenomenology or even that of Husserl’s consciousness is assumed by this paper. This task is carried out only to reiterate or re-emphasise the ‘indescribable’ but ‘the ever-present truth’ of Nirguna Brahman as the ‘Cinmātra-pure awareness’ underlying as the ‘unconditioned condition’ of all forms of human experience.